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Coordinating Council Leaders Discuss Security

LD0911202193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1452 GMT 9 Nov 93

[By diplomatic correspondents Dmitri Voskoboyikov, Igor Porshnev, Vitaliy Trubetskoy, and others; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[Text] The Coordinating Council of the leaders of security departments and secret services from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan held a conference in Dushanbe on Monday and Tuesday. Participants in the conference signed a protocol on cooperation. The document provides for joining efforts in the protection of the "outer" borders of the CIS, including the border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Interfax learned this from Zafar Saydov, Head of the Tajik Foreign Ministry Information Department.

This is the only way to ensure security for the CIS members in Central Asia, he said.

In the meantime, as Interfax learned from sources in Russia's Foreign Ministry, the interdepartmental commission on Tajikistan will hold a session in Moscow on Wednesday. The session will be chaired by Russian Foreign Minister, Andrey Kozyrev.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 10 Nov

LD1011070293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0644 GMT 10 Nov 93

["Press Review"—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, November 10 (TASS)—Today's Moscow-based press highlights a draft new constitution of the Russian Federation which will be brought up for a referendum on December 12.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (RED STAR) runs a headline which says that "The Question of a State Set-Up of Russia Will Be Decided Upon On That Day" (December 12).

Touching upon the full text of the Russian Federation's draft fundamental law, which is published today by the newspaper and other news media, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA points out in particular: "One would like to believe that, upon studying this major document, we all, irrespective of our views and political sympathies, will in the end vote for stability and peace, for our freedoms and rights, for an integrated state in which everyone will feel as a citizen enjoying full rights and as the master of his or her destiny".

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA carries two articles dealing with the draft constitution. The newspaper singles remarks by Robert Tsivilev, assistant to the presidential administration chief in charge of legal matters, to the effect that the draft constitution "rules out a recurrence of the deadlocked October situation when two branches of power had a stand-off".

The newspaper draws a parallel between the fundamental law of Russia and the American Constitution, the world's oldest one, in the sense that the latter "had been created under no less critical conditions" of a severe socio-economic crisis, unemployment, and the lack of funds for the maintenance of the army and navy..."

ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI singles out a report that, upon the adoption of a new constitution, the country will have a powerful instrument to resolve the acutest problems in the state and society.

While pointing out that Russia's Choice Bloc has collected the largest number of signatures during preparations for elections to the Federal Assembly, the newspaper at the same time does not consider it unexpected that the Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin Bloc and the Party of Russian Unity and Accord have placed second and third in the camp of liberal blocs.

It is not ruled out, ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI observes, that votes by constituents who sympathise with the parties of liberal orientation will be distributed approximately in the same way during elections.

A number of newspapers run summaries of President Boris Yeltsin's speech broadcast on the first and second television channels on Tuesday.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA (independent newspaper) leads with Yeltsin's words that Russia is in utter need of a lasting law-governed order.

Drawing readers' attention to "a routine expert document, prepared for the presidential administration, with an analysis of the alignment of political forces on the threshold of the elections", the newspaper quotes the conclusion drawn in the document to the effect that the opposition would consitute a majority in the State Duma (Council).

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA carries an interview with Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak of St. Petersburg, who dwells in particular on the results of his activities in this capacity, and an interview with film director Nikita Mikhalkov.

PRAVDA runs the text of the first two chapters of the draft constitution of the Russian Federation, pointing out that the publication of the draft constitution will be continued in subsequent issues of the newspaper.

PRAVDA carries an interview with Nikolay Travkin, leader of the Democratic Party of Russia, who makes an evaluation of the pre-election situation in the country.

Grachev Discusses Cooperation, Meets Officials in China

Visit Linked to Arms Buildup

PM0911144193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Nov 93 First Edition pp 1, 3

[Vladimir Skosyrev report: "Asia Scared About Expansion of Russo-Chinese Military Cooperation"]

[Text] Beijing—The modernization of the Chinese Army is something that the Russian defense sector is working on too. And many defense workers have come to China, bypassing state channels, at the direct invitation of Chinese military institutions. How many of our specialists are working here? More than 1,000, according to a secret document from the General Department of the CPC Central Committee Military Council, published by the Hong Kong magazine CHENG MING.

Admittedly, the document does not reveal what proportion of the Russians have traveled independently and how many have been sent by Moscow. This information increases the interest in the visit to China by Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev. Until quite recently the two huge armies had been looking at each other down the barrel of a gun, so to speak, but now they have regular exchanges of delegations at different levels, and talks are under way with some success on mutual armed forces cuts along the border.

Talking with Russian journalists, Pavel Grachev said that he intends to sign a cooperation agreement with the Chinese Defense Ministry. But he did not reveal the content of the agreement. Moreover, the trip, as he put it, is aimed at gaining familiarity with the new Chinese Army leadership and the lives of the Armed Forces.

Nonetheless, the local media are giving sparse coverage to General Grachev's trip. Following the 1989 events in Tiananmen Square, the United States and the other NATO countries issued a ban on the sale to China of weapons or "dual-use" technology that could be used for military purposes. Consequently China started looking increasingly frequently to Russia as an alternative source. Thus, deals have been concluded for the supply of 26 Su-27 fighters, S-300 surface-to-air missile systems, and other hardware.

In private conversation, our diplomats have been saying that the volume of official purchases has been small, and they all fall within the framework of international agreements limiting the arms trade. Nonetheless, anonymous Pentagon representatives periodically accuse Russia of helping to turn China into a regional superpower with expansionist inclinations.

Beijing has been reacting to these charges in the best traditions of communist bureaucracy. A veil of secrecy has been drawn over contacts in the military-technical sphere. Moscow too has resigned itself to adopting similar ground rules. A typical example is that this spring there was a Russian arms exhibition near Beijing that only became known to most foreign observers after it was over.

Not only are the foreign contacts of the People's Liberation Army [PLA] still secret, but so is information on its manpower and military spending—not to mention its combat hardware. Admittedly, the recent parliament session published a defense budget. In hard currency terms it came to $7.5 billion. It is also known from Hong Kong press articles that there are approximately 3.2 million men under arms in China.

On the basis of the size of the budget, Beijing claims that China's military spending is the lowest among the major powers and is equivalent to just a few percent of the spending on the U.S. Army.

But observers are skeptical about these assurances. Beijing's military spending increased more than 12 percent this year—for a fourth consecutive year of growth.

Moreover, the budget does not include money to be spent on new military equipment [snaryazheniye], research and development, or payments to officers discharged into the reserve. If all this is taken into account, the spending on the Army is in fact double the announced figure.

In short, the PLA was by no means forgotten when the budget pie was divided up. Which is natural, given its influence on the country's political life. Military representatives have around a quarter of the seats in the party Central Committee and almost 10 percent of the seats in the new parliament.

For what purposes is the Central Committee Military Council primarily earmarking the extra funds allocated by the state? The Council members were greatly impressed by the allied operations during the Gulf War, which used high-tech weapons to rout the Iraqi Army in short order. It is claimed that Deng Xiaoping subsequently said that China should have the capability to wage a future war with the same weapons.

It is not only the PLA's arsenal that is being renewed, but its structure as well. Rapid response forces are being set up, relying on the ability to operate on the high seas beyond the PRC borders. China has reached agreement in principle with two of its neighbors (India and Vietnam) for a "freeze" on border disputes, but it continues to lay claim to sovereignty over the entire South China Sea—a focus for international shipping where there are islands potentially rich in oil and gas. Nor is Beijing ruling out the possible use of force against Taiwan.

Since China will turn into an oil importer in the next two or three years, its interest in establishing control over the South China Sea will increase, in Western analysts' opinion. This could be a cause of conflict with five other Asian countries which are also staking claims to islands in the South China Sea.

Whether this scenario is realistic or not, the secrecy cloaking the PLA's plans gives rise to fears among China's neighbors. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad claims that the modernization of China's military might, which is being carried out with the help of cheap Russian arms shipments, has become alarming.

Cooperation Agreement Expected

MK0911093093 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 9 Nov 93 p 4

[Anastasiya Romashkevich report: "Pavel Grachev's Visit to the People's Republic of China. Moscow and Beijing Will Discuss Military Cooperation Problems," followed by KOMMERSANT-DAILY politics desk commentary—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] An official visit to China by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev ending 12 November began yesterday. One of its expected results will be the signing of a cooperation agreement between the military agencies of the two countries.

China is prepared to continue buying Su-27 aircraft, while Russia is showing an interest in Chinese tactical-level communications systems. The present visit, it appears, will introduce additional clarity in the sides' stance on this question. Also to be discussed is obviously the situation along the Russian-Chinese border—during Boris Yeltsin's visit to the People's Republic of China a year ago, the sides agreed to free this region from the types of armaments that cause the most destabilization.

Boris Yeltsin's statement on Saturday to the effect that the defense minister was going to keep this position is supposed to give Grachev additional weight in the eyes of Beijing officials.

Commentary

Boris Yeltsin's statement—throwing his full support behind the defense minister right after he announced there would be no elections in June—is ostensibly aimed at demonstrating the unity of the president's and the defense minister's positions on key questions of internal policy. As a matter of fact, the alignment of forces inside the Defense Ministry does not strike the question of a reshuffle off the agenda. While Grachev stresses that he backs Yeltsin to the hilt, the president cannot ignore a number of circumstances that appreciably influence the present defense minister's stand.

According to a considerable number of officers, Pavel Grachev is not quite up to what is required of a minister. Besides, he is not upholding the army's interests in the government consistently enough. Grachev's latest statements about the need to revise provisions of the "military package" of laws that give servicemen social guarantees and benefits may provoke serious dissatisfaction in the Armed Forces. Neither does the military hope that the government will pay its debts to them.

Until recently, Pavel Grachev has been coping quite successfully with his role of a buffer between the authorities and Armed Forces leaders. When the president demanded that the minister bring troops into Moscow and take resolute measures to "stabilize the situation," however, the minister was unable to overcome the resistance of commanders of Moscow military district, who to the last minute remained true to the law "On Defense," which forbids using the army to "perform tasks it is not intended for without the Supreme Soviet's sanction"—and it took the intervention by the supreme commander whose order the military could not but follow.

It is thus clear that Pavel Grachev is not quite capable of keeping the situation under control in extreme conditions. To all appearances, Boris Yeltsin does not expect serious complications in the near future, which is why it has been decided to shelve indefinitely the problem of replacing the defense minister—either till final stabilization has been achieved, when it would be possible to think of a scheduled replacement of the minister; or till a fresh spiral of confrontation, when the president would require a more authoritative commander in this position.

Be that as it may, a number of candidates for the ministerial position are being considered. General of the Army Konstantin Kobets and Colonel General Boris Gromov are being named more often than others as the most likely replacements for Grachev. During the recent two years, Kobets has been one of the figures closest to the president; he represented the president's interests in parliament. The other deputy minister, Boris Gromov, enjoys considerable prestige among the troops. It would not be easy for him to become defense minister given the present political leadership. Gromov creates the impression of a strong-willed and independent politician, which is unacceptable from the point of view of the present leaders. One should not perhaps discount Marshal of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov. But the two-year long standoff between the commander-in-chief of the CIS Joint Armed Forces and the Russian military leaders makes the marshal's appointment a virtual impossibility. As for appointing a civilian defense minister (Yuriy Ryzhov has been named as a candidate), the chance is slim—this contradicts the mentality of military men.

Military Cooperation Viewed

MK0911141093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 76, 9 Nov 93 (signed to press 8 Nov) p 1

[Vasiliy Golovnin report under the "Diplomacy" rubric: "Russian Defense Minister Goes to China. Beijing Attempts To Pit the Russians Against the Americans on the Chinese Arms Market"]

[Text] In carrying out its fairly serious plans for the modernization of its military potential, Beijing is clearly trying to bet on forcing the Russians and the Americans, if possible, to vie for the enormous Chinese arms market. This is the context in which the first visit to the People's

Republic of China [PRC] by Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev on 9-13 November is seen in Tokyo. This trip is fairly important in itself. What makes it particularly poignant is the fact that the Russian minister will arrive in Beijing virtually in the footsteps of Charles Freeman, U.S. assistant defense secretary, who said at a news conference in Beijing 2 November that Washington was ready to resume military cooperation with the PRC, which was suspended after the quelling of student protests on Tiannanmen Square in 1989. The lifting of the ban on arms and dual-purpose technology deliveries to China is not yet on the agenda, however, but, as Mr. Freeman pointedly noted, Washington did not see the PRC's Armed Forces as a threat, but rather as "its partner in various areas." The Japanese, who follow the buildup of the Chinese army and navy with some concealed fear, are virtually certain that the current adjustment of the U.S. stance has been made primarily in order to block, if possible, further rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing.

According to available information, General Grachev's trip, which has not yet been officially announced, will be organized according to the rules of a perfect "honeymoon" between the two countries' defense ministries. The minister is expected to sign a serious agreement on cooperation that calls for, among other things, the exchange of personnel and military technologies. As a confidence-building gesture, Minister Grachev was reportedly invited to visit an air force base of Su-27 combat planes, which were bought from Russia.

According to Western estimates, last year Moscow sold at least $1 billion worth of various weapons to Beijing. These include the aforementioned Su-27's and MiG-29 fighters, Ilyushin transportation planes, and air defense systems, which were sold at extremely low prices. Various sources also report that around 1,000 Russian nuclear and missile specialists who have been working in China have helped Beijing to improve seriously the Chinese combat equipment's performance characteristics within an incredibly short time.

Despite all these obvious benefits, however, China is not very pleased with the recent trend toward an overly lopsided headway in military ties with Moscow, to which it has been pushed by Western sanctions imposed after the Tiannanmen events. By some accounts, Chinese emissaries have repeatedly made this clear to representatives of the U.S. Administration, which is still wavering back and forth between the noble cause of "protecting human rights in the PRC" and more cynical "national interests."

Against this backdrop, the coincidence of the visits by a Pentagon bureaucrat and Russian Minister Pavel Grachev can by no means be dismissed as an accidental chance, because Beijing has traditionally attached particular importance to such symbolic gestures in diplomacy. No doubt, the Chinese, grown wise with the experience of many thousand years, would like once again to follow the example of the wise monkey who watched from the mountain a battle between a tiger and a dragon—in this case, for the Chinese arms market and influence on Chinese military plans.

Grachev Visits Beijing Garrison

LD0911133893 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 1200 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] In China, the visiting Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev today visited one of the Beijing garrison military units. Also today he is to meet with premier of the State Council Li Peng and deputy chairman of the Central Military Council Zhang Zhen.

Grachev Continues Visit

LD0911215293 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1930 GMT 9 Nov 93

[From the "Radio Slavyanka" program of the Defense Ministry]

[Text] Russia's Defense Minister Army General Pavel General is continuing his 4-day visit to China, which started on 8 November. This is the first visit by the head of the Russian military department to that country. It is a return visit after the visit to Moscow last year by his Chinese ccounterpart.

The Russian minister expressed principled satisfaction with the state of Russian-Chinese military relations, but also called for their further development. He meant the signing of an agreement of military cooperation, and also a plan for contacts between the Russia's Armed Forces and China's People's Liberation Army for next year.

Grachev Meets Li Peng, Zhang Zhen

LD0911214793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2026 GMT 9 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vyacheslav Tomilin]

[Text] Beijing November 9 TASS—No matter what the internal political situation and ideological aspects will be in Russia and China, China will continue to consolidate friendly relations with Russia, Chinese State Council Premier Li Peng told visiting Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev here today.

In his turn, Grachev said Russia attaches great importance to the development of relations with China and hopes for further consolidation of friendship and cooperation.

On the same day, Pavel Grachev met Deputy Head of the Chinese Central Military Council Zhang Zhen. The sides called for further increase of fruitful bilateral relations.

Commenting on the Chinese official visit, the Russian defence minister expressed satisfaction with the Russian-Chinese military relations and said they are not aimed against third countries but contribute to the consolidation of good-neighbourly relations, correspond to key interests of

the two countries' peoples and help consolidate peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

The 1992 Chinese Visit of Russian President Boris Yeltsin gave a fresh impetus to the development of bilateral relations as it resulted in signing of a record number of bilateral documents, said the minister.

This time the Russian side suggested to elaborate and sign an agreement on prevention of dangerous military actions on land and sea, said Pavel Grachev. The Chinese side accepted the idea with satisfaction. It is expected to be discussed during a Russian visit of Chinese Defence Minister Chi Haotian next year.

A five-year agreement between the Russian and Chinese Defence Ministries will be signed on results of the Chinese visit of Pavel Grachev. In the words of the minister, the agreement provides for the development of cooperation in spheres of mutual interest. "The sides proceed from the interests of their security and consolidation of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. What is most important, the cooperation is not aimed against third countries," said Grachev.

Asked by ITAR-TASS whether the visit dwelt on Russian arms sales to China, the minister said this question was not raised. "Military-technical cooperation is not a competence sphere of the Russian Defence Ministry, it is a prerogative of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations," he added.

Grachev Discusses Military Relations

LD1011092393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0759 GMT 10 Nov 93

[Text] Beijing/Moscow—Russian-Chinese military relations are not directed against third countries. They facilitate the strengthening of good-neighborly ties and are in keeping with the vital interests of the peoples of our two countries, promoting peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific Ocean region, said Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev in Beijing on Tuesday [9 November]. He is in China on an official visit.

On the same day, Grachev met Li Peng, the premier of the State Council and Zhang Zhen, deputy chairman of the Chinese Central Military Commission.

Moscow Radio 'Observer' on Sino-Vietnamese Ties

OW1011091993 Moscow Radio Moscow in Mandarin 1000 GMT 8 Nov 93

[From the "Current Events and Commentary" program]

[Text] Vietnamese President Le Duc Anh will pay an official visit to China in November. Our station's observer Krichevskiy has the following comments on Sino-Vietnamese relations:

First of all, it is heartening to know that mutual visits between high-ranking Vietnamese and Chinese officials have become common. After a long period of confrontation, the two countries moved onto the path of mutual benefit and cooperation in 1990, a path that will not lead to a return to the elder brother and younger brother relationship that existed in the fifties and sixties. Though China and Vietnam still (?show signs of) faith in socialism, even after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, today they are establishing ties on the principles of peaceful coexistence. Both countries have announced their intention to resolve disputes through peaceful means. The most important thing is that they both are gradually but fairly smoothly carrying out in-depth economic reforms, establishing market mechanisms, and discarding the economic development dogmas they followed for many years. Both are trying to attract foreign funds, develop their economies, and improve their peoples' living standards. There are bright prospects for the two countries to exchange experiences and cooperate. Economic and trade relations between China and Vietnam have been resumed gradually. They have signed a series of important agreements concerning trade, mutual protection of investment, and the resumption of rail, air, and sea transportation.

Disputes about land and sea boundaries are the main stumbling blocks to the improvement of Sino-Vietnamese relations. However, the two countries will not now attend summits emptyhanded. An agreement on the basic principles for resolving the border issue between the two sides was signed in October this year in Hanoi. In the agreement, the two countries pledged to gradually follow the norms of international laws; to refrain from adopting unilateral measures that would complicate the situation; not to use force to settle border disputes; to solve problems gradually, starting with the land border issue, followed by the sea boundary issue in the Gulf of Tonkin and in the South China Sea; and, finally, to solve the issues of the Spratly and Paracel archipelagoes. The last is the most acute issue as the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei also have territorial claims on the Spratly Archipelago. It seems that both China and Vietnam believe that no concrete and speedy results can be achieved on this issue, which will be surrounded by mounting difficulties.

Chernomyrdin Ends Visit to Austria; Trade Agreement Signed

LD0911192393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1816 GMT 9 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Ivan Ivanov and Aleksandr Kuzmin]

[Text] Vienna November 9 TASS—The Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin today ended his official visit to the Austrian Republic.

In the morning, Chernomyrdin visited the Austrian parliament where he had a conversation with the First Chairman of the National Council (Parliament) Heinz Fischer. The two statesmen discussed further development of relations between the two countries and the process of democratic changes in Russia.

In the afternoon, Chernomyrdin was taken to the industrial centres of Kindberg and Graz, where he walked around a pipe-making enterprise of the concern "Austrian Industries" and the firm Stair. The Russian premier was accompanied by Federal Chancellor Franz Vranitzky. The revival of cooperative links between Russia and Austria and the search for new forms of collaboration were discussed during the meeti. gs with the management of the enterprises.

The official talks with the federal chancellor and the President Thomas Klestil which took place during Victor Chernomyrdin's visit to Austria, and his meetings with representatives of the Austrian business community aimed to take relations between the two countries to a new, higher level in the political and economic spheres and to look for more effective forms of interaction.

As a result of the talks, an agreement was signed between the Russian Federation and the Austrian Republic on trade and economic cooperation, under which both countries extend most favoured treatment to each other in the field of trade.

Russia and Austria also pledged to work towards maintaining traditional supplies of goods within the frame of existing possibilities, including Russian energy resources to Austria, but also to expand the range of mutual turnover. Cooperation of this kind can proceed in the form of joint ventures established between the two countries, representation offices and subsidiaries of companies, as well as through direct investments and participation in the capital of enterprises, transfer of technologies, exchanges of patents and licenses and the provision of financial and banking services.

Russia and Austria also agreed to set up a mixed Russian-Austrian commission on economic cooperation to deal, among other things, with the working out of proposals for improving and expanding commodity turnover and economic cooperation.

Both sides praised the bilateral talks in Austria as highly effective. Chancellor Franz Vranitzky told a press conference in Vienna that cooperation between Austria and Russia had rich traditions. He spoke in favour of developing equitable partner relations between Russia and European countries and the further improvement of Russian-Austrian interaction.

Interviewed on Foreign Trade, Elections

LD0911232693 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2036 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Interview with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin by unidentified correspondent on board a moving train in Austria; date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] Viktor Stepanovich, we are on a train in Austria and hence the situation demands that we should begin by tackling economic cooperation with foreign countries. The government's policy is that the nature of cooperation with foreign partners must change and we must be seen as an equal and valuable partner. What underpins this new policy, [words indistinct]?

[Chernomyrdin] Well, a great deal of what we had in our lives earlier has now changed, naturally enough. We used to resolve many of our problems by being able to purchase things for hard currency— I mean things to which we paid little attention, although we could have manufactured them ourselves. We bought what we did not produce ourselves. It was simpler, maybe it was easier; it did not entail difficulties.

Now the situation is changing, for the simple reason that if we continue this policy further we will accomplish nothing at all; we will remain at a standstill and will have accomplished absolutely nothing in the economy.

This is in the first place, but in the second place we currently are no longer able to act in this way; we are unable to lay our hands on additional hard currency in our country, in Russia, just in order to make up for our troubles and shortages.

Only one thing remains: to work ourselves, to establish relations and market relations. We have created conditions for our Russian firms, so that they can work as they see fit at home, in Russia, establishing production and other technical and economic ties with the CIS which is of great importance to us currently. These countries for a long time yet will continue to be very much needed by us and very important to us. We will also establish ties with foreign countries. Western Europe, since we are in Europe.

We are now interested in Russian output, which can be offered to the Western markets. So, just look: they negotiate and work with us; we surely will join the EC, but our timeframe is being extended. It turns out that we again remain in a shut-off area, and this alarms us, of course. We shouldn't carry on like this, either, that's what we think. This is why we are saying, in Germany and now in Denmark and in Austria, we are actually finding support and understanding, but what we need today is practical actions. We are able to earn for ourselves at present, earn for ourselves, and this means that thereby we will strengthen our mother ship with our own privatized enterprises—associated ones are also needed today—and move the reform ahead as a whole, because we will not make any progress by words.

Debts also constitute an important question for them today. How do things stand with debts? We will pay and we are paying, and as far as we can we are working so that, with the Paris and London clubs, that part of our debts, what remains from the Soviet Union... [pauses] We have been doing this work, we are doing it, and we will continue doing it. But we need a specific range of work, so that we can work here, too, in a civilized way. We need a business-like approach—when, what timescale—so let's sit down and address these issues. Why is it someone defends his interests and we again have to remain secondary somewhere? This will not happen.

[Correspondent] Viktor Stepanovich, the second question in this regard: Can we really speak about the kind of aid that will help us start our engine and work at full capacity, or does this depend more on the internal situation in the country?

[Chernomyrdin] This question is a serious one, and we shouldn't oversimplify this, we should talk honestly and openly. What do we want, where are we going—and so this question is an important one. Again, you won't do it by appeals alone. Why do we say that the government's position today is unequivocal? In deepening reform, we need to do it calmly, we need calm work today, without being shaken about, without quarrels; we have to get down to work today, and for us it's no less important than for others. For others this is a natural question. This worries them, but even with all the situations today it's clear that much is changing, and they are starting to understand. In this area they are already starting to trust us, that first and foremost we keep our word, whatever happens, we keep it. So in this area we have to convince them psychologically that we won't let them down. There is also another question here which I would divide up into two issues. The first is that of small and medium-sized business. Austria and Denmark like our cooperation, they want it, and they wish to do more in [words indistinct] small and medium business and they can do it. This is in the first place and it is in vain that we failed to take it fully into account. In the second place and of the same importance for Russia today is to put [words indistinct]. I think we should offer things ourselves—it is necessary to set up financial corporations, consortiums, unite capitals of several firms, European, interstate, state, our own, to implement these projects. It is very important for us to carry out this work in Russia, too. However, it is, as a rule, a costly and time-consuming enterprise. Now we have defined our positions in this area, too, I think. There are interesting developments and already this year interesting projects will see the light of day.

[Correspondent] Confidence is needed not just by the Western partners, but in your government, your cabinet. In this context, how do you imagine the upcoming elections [words indistinct]?

[Chernomyrdin] Above all, of course, the elections must now be held. It is a major political campaign for Russia, for our country. There are many complex issues involved here. In the first place, there is little time to prepare ourselves. In the second place, it would be very desirable, of course, for the Duma, the upper chamber, the Federation Council to be staffed by people who feel keenly for Russia, above all. It is very difficult at present to forecast or guess things, but I think that if things go according to plan, according to the draft constitution, according to how the parliament, its lower and upper chambers ought to work, then I do not see any special problems ahead.

That is why one can now speak and must speak of a mechanism whereby these laws and decrees can be implemented and this, as a rule, is [words indistinct]. We either are unable, or we do not know how, or at times we do not want to [?implement] a decree, so that it may start—it will not work.

It is a great and painstaking work, a complex undertaking—the government is no discussion club. The government means people, or a body which makes it its business to put things into practice. If a document is being drawn up, or a government decision, a [word indistinct] mechanism must be prepared, to see how it is going to be implemented. Will it be accepted in the provinces? Are the deadlines realistic? Is the expenditure realistic? And is this document needed altogether? [passage indistinct] This is what is so important today. Is government intervention needed here at all? The government must be a body of qualified people who understand themselves what the consequences are—that if a document is promulgated, it must be known how to implement it in practice, and what effects and results it will yield.

[Correspondent] Evidently you will now be more exacting?

[Chernomyrdin] If documents cannot be passed, they should not be produced in the first place if they cannot be implemented in practice. Who needs such documents?

Chernomyrdin Comments on Trade With Europe

PM0911161093 Copenhagen DET FRI AKTUELT in Danish 5 Nov 93 pp 16-17

[Report on interview with Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin by Per Dalgaard in Copenhagen on 4 November]

[Text] There is freedom of speech in Russia. So said broadly smiling Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin yesterday when DET FRI AKTUELT succeeded—despite the protests of Danish and Russian security men and diplomats—in persuading him to speak freely. We caught him on his way to a meeting with his Danish counterpart, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen.

A number of serious worries are hidden behind the fit 55-year-old prime minister's smile.

Chernomyrdin, Russia's second most powerful man who is currently on an official visit to Copenhagen on the occasion of the 500th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Russia and Denmark, openly admits that Russia finds itself in a deeply serious situation. Even if the power struggle with the old parliament is over after the crushing of resistance in the White House, problems are still mounting up.

"We still have major difficulties, but the worst is over," the powerfully built Russian leader said as we walked into the Hotel Royal's elevator, which indicated that it was overloaded because of the many worried security guards. "It was a tragic and sad decision to have to use

force against the old communists and their undemocratic methods, but we had to make it, if the democratization process was not to come to a complete standstill. Now this is in the past and we can now make progress with our efforts to reform the Russian economy."

Viktor Chernomyrdin, who since his appointment in December 1992 has to everyone's surprise shown himself to be a reliable supporter of President Yeltsin and his radical reforms, said with conviction that his and the government's top priority at present is not the upcoming elections, but the catastrophic Russian economy.

According to the prime minister, the foremost task is to stabilize the ruble, combat inflation, and overcome the payment crisis which is preventing the payment of wages to hundreds of thousands of Russians.

One of the topics which will be discuss[illegible]ng his visit is indeed the Russian economy. Russian [illegible]. Danish support in the negotiations for trade agre[illegible]ments with the European Union. There is every indication that Western Europe—including Denmark—has understood the message that Russian must now be helped. A high-ranking delegation headed by EC Commission President Jacques Delors will travel to Moscow next week to negotiate an agreement. Yesterday evening the Russian prime minister told the TV-Avisen program that in the longer term Russia wants membership of the EC in a "civilized way."

Viktor Chernomyrdin also makes no secret of the fact that Moscow wants to get trade with Western Europe going as soon as possible. However, he stressed yesterday that he can well understand Western Europe's problems with opening its doors to cheap and competitive goods from Russia.

Chernomyrdin, who comes from the central Russian city of Orenburg, has a successful career behind him and was brought to prominence by the Communist Party. The energy sector is his main field. First as an engineer with the economic side as his speciality, then as energy minister under Mikhail Gorbachev.

The well-built prime minister, who in appearance seems very Soviet, is surrounded by respect in his homeland. Like his chief, Boris Yeltsin, he is a man of action. And he has been a decisive card in winning the confidence of the unruly provincial leaders. A role he has put much effort into playing.

Similarly he was an invaluable factor in Yeltsin's relations with the army which he helped to entice into intervening in the power struggle with the parliament.

Chernomyrdin made a huge effort to put the bloody crushing of the parliament, the state of emergency, and the short-lived period of censorship behind him.

Asked whether the upcoming elections can be democratic given the circumstances, Chernomyrdin, who since Aleksandr Rutskoy's fall is also acting vice president, said: "They will be democratic. We have of course immediately gotten rid of censorship again. All parties have access to the media, including television."

Eventually the desperate "officials" succeeded in breaking off our conversation and getting him into a waiting limousine.

"There is both freedom of speech and freedom of the press in Russia!" said Chernomyrdin—the first high-ranking Russian to visit Denmark for 20 years.

Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Libya Sanctions

LD0911150893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1432 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow November 9 TASS—A statement of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Information Department was circulated here today to comment on questions related to an Ostankino interview of Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev.

The interview dwelt on the elaboration of a U.N. Security Council resolution on sanctions against Libya. In the minister's words, Russia is strongly against international terrorism but the sanctions should not hamper payment of the Libyan debt to Russia, which will firmly defend this stand up to the use of veto.

According to today's report from New York, the Security Council has included special provisions in the draft resolution to ensure Russian interests in the part of Libyan debts.

There has been no response to a Russian proposal to upgrade the resolution part dwelling on the need to boost international efforts against terrorism. The Russian stand will depend on reaction to amendments it has suggested, says the statement.

Official Comments on Sanctions

LD0911175393 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1452 GMT 9 Nov 93

[By diplomatic correspondents Dmitry Voskoboinikov, Igor Porshnev, Vitaly Trubetskoy and others; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[Text] Representatives of the U.S., Britain, France and Russia are holding consultations in New York to formulate a resolution on toughening international sanctions against Libya. Moscow hopes that the consultations will be a success and that Russia will not have to use "an extreme measure," its right to veto, when the draft resolution is put to the vote at the UN Security Council. INTERFAX learned this on Tuesday from a senior Foreign Ministry official in Moscow. The official said, however, that to rule out the possibility of a veto completely would be "political short-sightedness."

Libya's debt to Moscow, he noted, makes up about 4 billion dollars. "At the moment Russia is not in a

position to renounce such an amount of money. Our goal is to bring to a minimum the economic losses Russia might sustain as a result of harsher sanctions against Tripoli," the diplomat said.

INTERFAX's interviewee described as "speculation" the allegations that Moscow already consented to the imposition of additional sanctions against Libya on condition of a two-month moratorium on the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolution. "This is another attempt to manipulate public opinion and exert indirect pressure on Russia. We can only deplore the practice of discussing such delicate problems publicly," he said.

According to the diplomat, "that Russia and its Western partners have differing approaches to certain concrete problems, such as sanctions against Libya, is quite admissible." "This is a natural phenomenon. Moscow's desire to defend its financial interests can only enhance its political weight and international prestige," said the Russian Foreign Ministry official.

When asked whether Russian-Libyan relations could suffer as a result of voting at the UN Security Council, he said: "Much will depend not only on the content, but also on the form of the resolution that will be adopted finally."

Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Georgia

LD0911173293 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1607 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow, 9 Nov—The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement today which says:

The region of the river Inguri has been mentioned in military dispatches from Georgia.

The Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation is quite categorically warning that military action in that area, or the crossing by Georgian or Abkhaz armed formations of the river Inguri, the present dividing line between the conflicting sides, is fraught with serious consequences.

The Russian Federation will tighten its economic and other sanctions if the Abkhaz leadership takes this step, or if it allows the transit of militants and weapons to Georgia. Russia will not leave without consequence any actions of the Georgian side either, if its troops transfer military operations beyond the river Inguri.

One year of war in Abkhazia has confirmed that there can be no solution of force in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. The path to settling the conflict lies in going back to the Sochi agreements, and in talks about a full-scale political settlement.

Shokhin Comments on Talks With Baltic States

LD1011044293 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0400 GMT 10 Nov

[Text] Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin told journalists that Russia intends to resort more to economic levers in talks with Baltic countries, INTERFAX reports. He said that with Latvia and Estonia the attitude to the problem of the withdrawal of troops and of the safety of the Russian-speaking population living there will determine Russia's stand at economic talks. The Estonian Government said at a session on Tuesday [9 November] that the Estonian side is satisfied with the date for the withdrawal of Russian troops—by 1 January 1994. Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar said that the exact date for the troops withdrawal could be fixed at a meeting between the two countries' presidents.

Ukrainian Ambassador Speaks on Nuclear Weapons

LD0911213293 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1700 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Report by correspondent M. Tumanova; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] [Tumanova] At a meeting with journalists today, Vladimir Kryzhanovskiy, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Ukraine in Russia, spoke in the main about the increased mutual understanding between the two Slavonic states that had been promoted by the recent meeting between the foreign ministers of Russia and Ukraine in Odessa.

Ukraine's readiness to ratify the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons was again spoken of, but when journalists asked when this would happen they did not receive an answer. On the other hand, it was announced that tactical nuclear weapons had been totally removed from the territory of Ukraine; and our independent neighbor is awaiting material compensation for this. Ukraine is reserving the strategic nuclear weapons for itself. We are capable of guaranteeing its safety, ourselves, the ambassador stated. But he immediately admitted that Ukraine was not capable of guaranteeing itself economic stability with the same success.

Belarusian 'Terrorist' Suspects Arrested

PM0811142193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 5 Nov 93 p 3

[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent Yuriy Kukanov report: "Terrorist Suspects Arrested"]

[Text] St. Petersburg—A citizen of the Republic of Belarus and two subjects of the Russian Federation have been arrested in St. Petersburg on suspicion of committing an act of terrorism in the neighboring state. Belarusian Supreme Soviet Deputy Dmitriy Artsimenya,

chairman of Grodno Oblast Soviet Executive Committee, was murdered in Grodno 30 September this year.

During the operational investigation into the criminal case Belarusian law-enforcement organs established that the suspects were hiding on the banks of the Neva. In this connection the Belarusian General Prosecutor's Office asked Russia for legal aid and assistance in hunting down and arresting the criminals. The operation was entrusted to the anti-terrorism service of the Russian Security Ministry's St. Petersburg Directorate. The Russian Security Ministry Directorate's press service announced that the St. Petersburg Prosecutor's Office has instituted criminal proceedings under Article 66 of the Russian Criminal Code on acts of terrorism. The investigation is being conducted by the St. Petersburg special services in close collaboration with the neighboring state's law-enforcement organs.

Meeting Examines Economic Ties With Kazakhstan

LD0811211793 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1628 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow, 8 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—A conference took place today between Oleg Soskovets, first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers; Aleksandr Shokhin, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers; and the heads of Russian ministries and departments.

Specific measures to maintain and consolidate production ties between enterprises and organizations of Russia and the Republic of Kazakhstan were discussed at the conference.

In connection with the proposed introduction into the Republic of Kazakhstan of its own currency, it has been proposed that ministries and departments of the Russian Federation carry out work with their own partners in the Republic of Kazakhstan on strengthening ties between cooperatives, on conditions of remuneration for output, and on improving the system of mutual financial calculations. Heads of enterprises, ministries, and departments have been given the task of preventing a breakdown of economic ties between the two states and ensuring the mutually advantageous transformation of the common economic space.

Moscow To Insist on Guarantees for Loans to CIS States

PM0811144393 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 5 Nov 93 p 1

[Untitled, unattributed report from the "Focus of Attention" column]

[Text] New Russian credits to CIS countries should be guaranteed by their gold and currency reserves, as Moscow no longer intends to tolerate a situation whereby its trading partners are unable to pay debts which arise as a result of an imbalance in bilateral trade. This was stated by Vladimir Mashchits, chairman of the Russian Federation State Committee on Economic Cooperation with Commonwealth Member States.

Official on Changing Customs Policies

OW0911203293 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel and Orbita Networks in Russian 1945 GMT 26 Oct 93

[Studio interview with Valeriy Gavrilovich Droganov, deputy chairman of the Customs Committee, by Inna Yermilova; from the "Utro" program—live]

[Text] I am sure that many of our viewers will be interested in the discussion which we are about to have with our guest, Valeriy Gavrilovich Droganov, deputy chairman of the Customs Committee of the Russian Federation.

[Droganov] Good morning.

[Yermilova] Good morning again; Valeriy Gavrilovich, I think that our viewers could ask you lots of questions. However, today we will pause on the ones that I think are the most fundamental and the most important. To begin, could you tell us in a few words what the Customs Committee of the Russian Federation is doing at present?

[Droganov] And the Customs Service of Russia as a whole?

[Yermilova] Undoubtedly.

[Droganov] I would like to talk more about the service as whole, inasmuch as the principal effort and burden of our difficult daily existence falls directly on those carrying out customs control at the border. Of course it is a sin to complain about life against the background of those monstrous events which society has suffered during the notorious days, but it would be unfair to say that everything is running smoothly with us. Today we have a huge stream of goods flowing over the border and everything has to be done quickly, competently, and professionally. However, the customs infrastructure does not simply demand renewal only, but improvement as well.

[Yermilova] Rebuild again?

[Droganov] Undoubtedly, and it would not be right not to mention that today, civilized and effective customs control points are being created on the Baltic and the Russo-Ukrainian borders, with all the infrastructure elements characteristic of countries which developed their customs mechanisms long ago. This, of course, does not come easily, and very large capital investment and considerable financing is required. It needs to be said that the government turned out to be far more shrewd than could have been expected by giving us the opportunity to create this infrastructure. All of this benefits businessmen, as well as the state enterprises and the people and, of course, these are the elements which attract foreign investment to our market.

[Yermilova] Vitaliy Gavrilovich, how is customs policy being implemented with respect to CIS countries? I think this issue interests many people, because now people are moving from one country to another and continually run into some kind of problem or other at the border. What is being done about this?

[Droganov] History shows that even the mighty have had something to say about the negative aspects of customs barriers. Napoleon said that the bloodiest wars occur over customs. It seems to me that in spite of the bad times that we have suffered during the one and a half to two years since the creation of the CIS, it is nevertheless very gratifying that we have managed to implement the process of integration, unify customs procedures, and draw together customs legislation. We have seen a general recognition not only by the people of these countries, but also a qualitative revolution occurring in politicians' thinking—state leaders mainly, the presidents and the premiers. At present, we have signed a number of agreements which will lead towards the integration of customs policy. This is extremely important, because we cannot have a flow of goods, capital, and people moving from one place to another in CIS countries with any kind of difficulty. We must never allow the presence of a customs service to become a burden...

[Yermilova, interrupting] For every person.

[Droganov] Undoubtedly, and I would like to calm and reassure viewers that the creation of customs check points on the new borders with Ukraine, the Baltics, Kazakhstan, and other countries—regardless of whether they are CIS members or just countries of the former USSR—is not a tribute to fashion and not altogether a barrier on the path of development.

[Yermilova] A lage amount of imported industrial goods and foodstuffs have appeared now, which can only delight people, because the market is filling up and the people have an opportunity to choose. On the other hand, how can we ensure that this promotes the development of our own industry—Russian industry. Will there be a distinctive approach in terms of customs duties? Will there be any assistance for those who are working to produce for Russia?

[Droganov] I get a distinct impression that you are a customs officer.

[Yermilova] Is that right? [laughs]

[Droganov] Yes, not only do you use professional language, but you also ask very important and precise questions. This is a very serious problem. Customs policy is an aggregate of methods and instruments of control, and customs duties are undoubtedly important as regulators. At first glance, it would appear that the state and the government are only concerned about the fiscal function—that is, to collect more money for the treasury. It is a fact that the budget is experiencing colossal difficulties and that we contribute a fair portion to the income of the budget. However, financial interests alone do not govern the consciousness of our government in general, and the Customs Committee in particular.

Customs tariffs play a protective role, and are one of the main components of control. Since you asked a question about protecting the interests of the producer, today I can tell you that some customs rates are currently being re-examined, particularly those directed at: 1) optimizing exports; and 2) banning irrational imports. What do we mean by irrational imports? Bad quality goods and goods that prejudice our producers from the point of view of competition. Let us say, Red October with its splendid chocolate, of course, cannot compete with the flood of Snickers and other tasty things...

[Yermilova, interrupting] Snickers and large quantities of everything else, although our chocolate is recognized the world over as one of the very best natural chocolates.

[Droganov] Undoubtedly. I think it makes sense to use a differentiating approach in cases like this, and tariffs must and will take this into account. I think that this will happen soon. Today, many departments are working on this under government leadership. We need to create a scale of customs duty rates which would stimulate the development of industries that are obviously competitive on world markets, and as you and I know, there are quite a few of them. I think that this period, the coming period of economic reform, will be precisely...

[Yermilova, interrupting] Aimed at this.

[Droganov] Quite right, aimed at this.

[Yermilova] Let us hope. Valeriy Gavrilovich, unfortunately ours is a news program although the discussion is very interesting and these issues do concern everyone. I think that we must definitely have you come back again soon, but right now if you could answer literally in a couple of words: I think if the hero of the famous film, "The White Sun in the Desert," was sitting in our studio right now, he, of course, would ask you: What can we do so that we will not have to pity our country?

[Droganov] In the first place, one must love the country, and customs officers do love it. In any event, they are involved in the uncompromising struggle with crime—we could say a lot about it today—and we are contributing with all of our might. We are doing this modestly, very assertively, and we are one of the law enforcement bodies in this struggle.

However, coming back to the famous hero who does not want to feel sorry for the country, one needs to believe, and I believe that in a short, while Russia will experience a real boom. There will be an economic boom, a rebirth of creativity, culture, and peoples' happiness. I feel this although I am not 70 years old and I am not claiming to be a soothsayer. However, I am certain that this will happen.

[Yermilova] Thank you, Valeriy Gavrilovich. I am especially glad to hear that from you, seeing that you are the deputy chairman of the Customs Commission of the

Russian Federation. Valeriy Gavrilovich Droganov was the guest of our program. Thank you.

[Droganov] Thank you.

[Yermilova] Until we meet again.

[Droganov] Certainly, without fail.

Russo-Japanese Conference on Nuclear Waste Dumping Held

LD0911161593 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1200 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] Another event connected with the dumping of nuclear waste in the Sea of Japan has been held in Vladivostok. The first Russian-Japanese conference on the use of radioactive waste was held here. Our correspondent Oleg Podenko has the details:

[Podenko] The fact that scientists, diplomats, as well as civil and military experts from both sides took part in the work of this conference demonstrates that finally there is a real joint effort to protect our common habitat.

As a result of an intensive exchange of views, everyone reached the decision that it is necessary to send a joint expedition to the Sea of Japan, to the so-called ninth dumping region, to study the consequences of the impact of liquid radioactive waste on marine life. Such an expedition is scheduled for the end of this year or the beginning of the next. During a briefing for mass media in Vladivostok, (Yukio Amano), head of the science and nuclear research department of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, said in particular that the first meeting between Russian and Japanese experts about the problems of radioactive pollution of the Sea of Japan would be held in Moscow 10-11 November. He also pointed out that, according to Japanese experts who studied its territorial waters, the waste dumped by the Pacific Fleet on 19 October did not create any danger for the radiological safety of the Japanese coast.

Therefore, a question springs to mind: Why then the need for a joint and rather expensive expedition to the ninth region of the Sea of Japan, where the liquid waste was dumped? According to experts, this marine habitat is considered to be one of the most hydro-dynamic of the world oceans. This means that currents here are very fast and strong, and at present no one knows where the 800 tonnes of dead water dumped by the TNT-27 tanker are. It may well be somewhere near the Philippines, or in a completely different area, for example near the Aleut islands, or in the Amur bay. I flew there by helicopter and was terribly surprised to see a massive dark line dividing the bay into two. Unfortunately, I still do not know what it was.

However, Admiral Kasatonov, first deputy commander in chief of the Russian navy, said at the news conference in Vladivostok that the Pacific Fleet will continue to dump liquid waste with low radioactivity until some decision about it is made by the Russian Government. He underscored that this is known to the International Atomic Energy Agency as well as the Japanese.

However, they are all simply being hypocritical because Britain, France, the United States, as well as Japan itself have been doing the same thing on a regular basis, but no one makes a big deal out of it. Therefore, a common problem must be resolved together. Otherwise, as a radiation superviser I know told me recently, the ocean will soon glow in the dark, but unfortunately not only because of plankton.

Deputy Defense Minister Meets With French Ambassador

LD0911150393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1247 GMT 9 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Roman Zadunayskiy]

[Text] Moscow November 9 TASS—Andrey Kokoshin, Russian first deputy minister of defence, discussed bilateral military cooperation with French Ambassador Pierre Morel here on Tuesday.

Kokoshin intends to visit France early next week, a spokesman at Kokoshin's office told ITAR-TASS.

During the visit the Russian deputy defence minister is planning to tour French major defence plants, and hold talks on prospects for Franco-Russian cooperation in military technology and industry.

EC Approves Expansion of Negotiations Mandate

LD0911211593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1820 GMT 9 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Valeriy Shashkov]

[Text] Brussels November 9 TASS—A EC Commission proposal to expand the mandate on negotiations with Russia was approved today by the EC Council. The additional instructions are expected to help complete the year-long negotiations with signing of a EC-Russian agreement on partnership and cooperation, says a communique circulated here today.

Russia shall be viewed as a state with transitional and not purely state economy, which creates prerequisites for giving it non-discriminated access to West European markets. The instructions also provide for consultations to consider prospects for free trade zones to include Russia and EC member-states in 1998.

A Brussels session of the EC Council also decided to send observers to the upcoming Russian Parliament elections as the first step to support Russian democratic process within the framework of the "Twelve" policy after the introduction of the Maastricht treaty on political and currency-economic union.

EC Delegation To Discuss Partnership Accord

LD0911220393 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1931 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] In the course of its upcoming visit to Moscow scheduled for Thursday the delegation of the European Commission intends to discuss issues of political and economic interaction and preparation of a bilateral agreement on partnership with Boris Yeltsin and Viktor Chernomyrdin. At a press conference on Tuesday in Moscow head of European Commission mission to Moscow Michael Emerson reported that the mission intends to consider participation of 26 supervisors from the European commission in the December 12 elections in Russia.

According to Emerson, while developing the agreement on partnership the parties have abolished almost all contradictions between the parties (earlier Russian officials declared that there are contradictions on 8 out of 25 items). He also indicated that development of agreements on economic cooperation and access of Russian goods to European Community's market presented the greatest difficulties (in particular, Moscow accused the European Commission of extreme reduction of deliveries of Russian uranium and aluminium to Europe and Russia's non-admission to the market of commercial space launches).

Emerson also reported that negotiations on free trade regime with Moscow had been scheduled for 1998, however, before that Russia should join the GATT, he believes. According to Emerson, in the near future Russia will present its concept of foreign trade to this organization for consideration.

The delegation to arrive to Moscow on Thursday is made up of the European Commission President Jacques Delors, Hans van den Broek, who is in charge of European commission's foreign policy, Belgium Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene and Foreign Minister Willy Claes.

Nuclear Cooperation With European Center Viewed

PM0811143393 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Yuriy Konorov report: "Let Us Remember Quarks at Long Last]

[Text] An agreement on international scientific cooperation in the sphere of high-energy physics was signed in Protvino near Moscow at the end of last week by Russia and the European Center for Nuclear Research [CERN]. The document was signed by the center's general director, Carlo Rubbia, and Boris Saltykov, Russian minister for science and technical policy.

Today, when fundamental science is going through difficult times, cooperation with CERN is of particular significance. Thus, by a recent decision of Carlo Rubbia, 25 Russian scientists who conducted an important experiment in a Geneva laboratory, were supported by CERN at its own expense. As Boris Saltykov noted in his address to the press, this decision was not merely generated by a desire to help Russia at a difficult time. The point is that if the Russian nuclear scientists had left, a unique experiment would have been disrupted. CERN knows how to count money, but it is not mean when it comes to big-time science. Here, too, Russia risks losing its priorities. Behind the bustle of big-time politics, low-key [nezametnaya] life in Protvino is moved to the background. But after all, it was here that dozens of discoveries worthy of the highest international awards were made. The construction of a accelerator-accumulator complex [uskoritelno-nakopitelnyy kompleks] is practically frozen, although everything is ready for the assembly of equipment which cost the state a lot of money. And big-time science has learned not only to infiltrate into the secrets of the nucleus, but also to create useful things for the economy. For example, super-powerful magnets have generated enormous interest among specialists abroad and could significantly reduce the cost of each quark if production were set up.

In October of this year the Institute of High-Energy Physics celebrated its 30th anniversary. However, "celebrated" is the wrong word, it simply reached maturity, having successfully trained dozens of scientists with world-class skill. Today young people are very unwilling to go into experimental physics.

Gaydar Hits Haste in Licensing Foreign Banks

PM0811153593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Nov 93 First Edition p 1

[Mikhail Berger article, incorporating interview with First Vice Premier Yegor Gaydar; place and date not given: "Foreign Banks in Russia Could Have a Serious Influence on the Configuration of Political Forces"]

[Text] Another five banks—Citibank, Chase Manhattan, ABN AMRO, and two Russian-Turkish banks—recently joined the seven foreign banks that possess a license entitling them to carry out transactions in Russia. And although of the 12 foreign banks that have obtained a Central Bank license Credit Lyonnais is so far the only one really operating, foreign credit institutions' increasing access to the Russian market could cause a serious and long-term rift between our bankers and the authorities.

What do the authorities, then, think about this?

In an interview with IZVESTIYA, First Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaydar said that discussion over the feasibility or infeasibility of foreign banks' activity, which has been going on for more than one year now, is still not over. Banking is too deleicate a sphere and too important to the national economy. This market has in principle to be opened up, according to Gaydar, the question is the extent to which this is to be done and the pace.

The government, Gaydar added, is not a rigid opponent of the presence of foreign banks but nor are we supporters of all restrictions being hastily removed.

[Berger] But what is the point of discussion if the Central Bank issues more and more new general licenses? It seems that Central Bank Chairman Viktor Geraschenko considers this question has been settled.

[Gaydar] I would like to draw attention to the fact that until comparatively recently our economy was distinguished by instability verging on chaos and there was no evidence of a long "foreign" line waiting for banking licences. That line has grown perceptibly, and those waiting in it have become more active since the emergence of the first signs of stabilization. Here the haste being displayed in meeting the needs of that line could have dangerous and far-reaching consequences. I am not convinced that such haste is justified.

Competition in this sphere is absolutely essential, but it is necessary to make sure that it does not lead to a rapid decline of the domestic banking sector. Most countries have opened their doors to foreign banks very slowly. We will probably take measures to regulate further the activity of foreign banks during the transitional period. [interview ends]

For its part, the Central Bank considers that granting licenses to foreign banks does not pose a great problem to this sector of the economy. As Central Bank Deputy Chairman Dmitriy Tulin remarked, the total capital of the banks admitted to Russia does not exceed 5 percent of the capital of Russian commercial banks. Moreover, Tulin stressed, the growth in the capital of foreign banks operating in Russia and the opening of new branches are under the complete control of the Central Bank, from which additional permits have to be obtained for such operations. Clients can only benefit from the emerging competition, according to Tulin.

As we can see, the discussion is indeed continuing. But so long as it goes on and the Central Bank continues to issue new licenses the domestic bankers threaten the "ruling party" with a vote of no confidence as today, in parliament's absence, the Central Bank is accountable to the government. According to some estimates, 500 large, medium-sized, and small banks are particularly alarmed at the easy accessibility of Russia's market to powerful Western competitors and are preparing their own protest actions.

Bearing in mind that after the body of directors it is the banking sector that possesses the biggest organizational and financial means, one might suppose that their actions will cost many, many votes at the upcoming elections.

Conference Notes Huge Shortfall in Foreign Investment

PM0811144993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 Nov 93 First Edition p 3

[ITAR-TASS report: "Not in a Hurry With Investments"]

[Text] Russia ranks 125th-130th among the 160 countries whose economy is attractive to foreign investments.

This was said at an international conference on "Joint Entrepreneurship in Russia," taking place in St. Petersburg. During the five years of practical participation in international industrial cooperation, Russia has received no more than $2 billion in foreign investments. And, according to specialists, it could use $20-30 billions' worth every year.

Political Issues

Yeltsin Addresses Nation on New Constitution

CM1011121393 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1840 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Address to the nation by President Boris Yeltsin in Moscow on 9 November—recorded]

[Text] Esteemed citizens of Russia: Work of great importance for our country was completed yesterday. A draft constitution of the Russian Federation is ready. It will be published tomorrow.

This work lasted for more than three years. It was intense and complicated. At times it was even dramatic.

All this time, one and the same question was voiced by politicians, as well as by common citizens: Do we need a new constitution? Can we not do with the old one, after patching it up? Life itself has replied to this question. It is now clear that if a new constitution had been adopted in time we would have protected democracy without resorting to extreme measures.

A dear price has had to be paid for the lack of a democratic constitution. With its adoption, a powerful tool will appear with which to solve the most acute problems of state and society.

We need order, but not the horrible repressive order of the Stalinist camps. Russia needs a durable legal order. Not an arm of iron but a democratic state power will ensure progress toward a normal and worthy life for citizens, toward prosperity for a single, integral Russia.

The draft constitution will be put to a referendum on December 12. Every citizen of this country will be able to say yes or no to the draft constitution.

I think that today this is the only way to adopt a new constitution. It must be adopted by the people.

Only with the will of the people as the basis, the Russian state can be consolidated, and the vestiges of the communist and Soviet past, the vestiges of dual power, can be done away with.

A firm constitutional basis is needed now as never before for the activity of all branches of power, for constructive interaction of the president, the government, the federal assembly, and the judiciary. We can have it—the basis—ready in one month.

The draft constitution is a fruit of three years of hard work. The Constitutional Commission and then the Constitutional Assembly worked to draw it up. At the latest stage, the Constitutional Assembly's state and public arms worked on it. The country's best lawyers took part in this effort.

The text reflects numerous proposals and wishes expressed by the subjects of the federation, political and public associations, research collectives, specialists, and citizens. The draft constitution was assessed by experts in our country and abroad. Immense work has been done.

Now you, citizens of Russia, must have the final say.

Skeptics say that a majority of people will never read the text of the constitution and will not be able to comprehend this complex matter.

This argument is well known to us from the past. Whenever it was found expedient, the people's opinion was used as a screen. When not, then it was said: The people will not understand this, the people are not ready.

Indeed, a common individual may find it impossible to understand all the juridical subtleties of the text of the constitution, but concerning its main principles and ideas, I think our citizens are not only able to sort them out but have in fact long since done so.

First of all, the new constitution is a constitution of a democratic law-governed state.

In such a state, it is not a separate class, a nation, or another group but the individual is the ultimate value. In accordance with the new constitution, the prime duty of power is to observe and protect the rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen. We shall come to this by all means, even if not at once.

Here are just a few provisions of the new constitution:

All citizens of Russia are equal before the law and the court.

Personal dignity is protected by the state.

No one must be subjected to violence, to treatment, or punishment which is cruel and offends human dignity.

Everyone has the right to privacy, personal and family secrets, to protection of one's honour, and to their good name.

Everyone is guaranteed the right to enjoy the freedom of conscience and faith, freedom of thought and expression, unhampered expression of one's views and convictions. The struggle with alternate thinking, in which our country showed itself so adamant in the past, is banned.

Under the new constitution, every citizen of Russia has the right to use freely his or her abilities and property to engage in entrepreneurial and other economic activity not prohibited by law.

After a 70-year ban, the right to private ownership, including private land ownership, is proclaimed. With the adoption of the constitution a strong barrier is put up against expropriations and nationalizations.

In accordance with the constitution, everyone has the right to work and to protection against unemployment. The right to rest and recreation is proclaimed.

The Russian constitution lays down a system of social insurance of citizens.

The family, maternity, and childhood are placed under the state protection.

Everyone has the right to housing, and citizens within the low-income bracket will get it free of charge or at an affordable price.

Every Russian citizen has the right to health protection, to medical care. Medical care is provided free of charge in state-owned and municipal medical institutions.

Everyone has the right to an education. It is provided also free of charge in state-owned and municipal educational establishments.

Under the constitution everyone has the right to the sound environment, to reliable information about the state of the environment, and to compensation for damage done by any breach of the laws on the environment.

Under the nw constitution, every citizen has the right to state compensation for damage caused by unlawful actions or lack of action on the part of bodies of state authority or officials.

Nobody in Russia is permitted to abuse the rights, freedoms, and lawful interests of other citizens, undermine the basis of the legal status of the individual, the constitutional system, the defense capacity and security of the country.

I have mentioned just a few provisions laid down in the constitution, but on the whole I can say that the level of guaranteed human rights and freedoms and the mechanism of their protection correspond to modern international standards. Russia has not yet had a constitution like this one.

The constitution of Russia is a constitution of a democratic republic. No single individual, no single institution of the state has the right to claim the fullness of power. The principle of separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers is consistently inherent in the draft. Every agency, every official will act independently within the frame of competence.

The constitution sets up a dependable barrier to confrontation between them. Indeed, it orientates the branches of power toward concerted efforts, toward interaction and not toward settling accounts.

In exceptional cases the president gets the right to dissolve the State Duma, and the parliament the right to impeach the president.

The constitution of Russia lays down the principles of ideological freedom and a multiparty system. No ideology, no party will henceforth have the right to claim exclusive domination.

A most important question regulated for the first time on the constitutional level is the question about the federative system of Russia. The new constitution is a constitution of a truly federative state.

The constitution proclaims that all the republics, territories, regions and autonomous areas within the federation have equal rights and equal status.

Along with this, state authorities have no intention whatsoever to infringe on the spiritual and cultural identity of nationalities.

Just on the contrary, they support and will support the understandable and lawful desire of all peoples of Russia to preserve and develop their native languages, culture, and traditions. This applies in full measure also to the Russian people.

Within the final stage of the preparation of the draft constitution we succeeded in improving its text substantially. A number of dangerous provisions imposed by the former Supreme Soviet were deleted.

The procedure of adopting amendments was made much more complicated. Nobody will henceforth be permitted to redraw the constitution to suit anyone's whims.

Esteemed citizens of Russia: There are no miracles. After we adopt the constitution, it will take same time for the life of this state to be put on a normal track. Nonetheless the adoption of the constitution is an event of immense importance.

All developed states have traversed their own difficult path on the way towards their present prosperity. Now Russia is determining its strategic perspective in adopting a constitution.

We need a constitution in order not to dash from one extreme to another, in order to calm down, in order to make fewer mistakes.

Of course, it will not be easy to learn to live by the rules proclaimed in the constitution, but let us begin. Our children will accomplish what our generation does not have time to do.

A referendum on the constitution will be a serious test for the citizens and politicians of Russia.

It is no secret that not all people are interested in it.

The forces which sought to unleash civil war in October do not need this constitution.

Separatists do not need the constitution. The consolidation of the Russian state means an end to their own ambitious plans.

A new constitution is a bane to criminal, mafia-style corrupt groups, because it established a strong state power and, hence, law and order.

The absolute majority of honest citizens need this constitution.

All those who want Russia to have neither dictatorship nor dictators nor arbitrariness nor violence are for this constitution.

All those who want democracy and freedom, stability and peace to take root in Russia, who want all peoples of our country to live in concord and cooperation are for the constitution.

All those whom the word Russia makes feel proud and excited, who want it to be a great and prosperous state are for the new constitution.

I have no doubt that you, my dear compatriots, are for this, for Russia.

Thank you.

Yeltsin To Serve Until 1996

LD0911210693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2053 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow November 9 TASS—The draft of the new Russian Constitution says the president has to work a full term of office which expires in 1996.

"The president of the Russian Federation...since the given Constitution comes into force carries out his powers fixed in it until the term of office for which he was elected expires", according to the interim provisions of the draft which is to be published on Wednesday [10 November].

Initially, both chambers of the new parliament of the first convocation will be elected for two years, according to the interim provisions. Then, according to the draft, the State Duma will be elected for four years while members of the Council of the Federation, the upper house, will be appointed.

The interim provisions also allow government members to combine their ministerial portfolio with parliamentary mandate.

Filatov Assesses Basic Law

LD0911205593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1721 GMT 9 Nov 93

[By Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin, edited by Boris Grishchenko; from the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[Text] It is now known President Boris Yeltsin is planning a televised address to the nation late on Tuesday to air his views on the country's new constitution, the text of which has now been made available to the Russian mass media. Kremlin Chief of Staff Sergey Filatov analyzed in an interview with Interfax the draft of Russia's new basic law.

Filatov spoke of no substantial amendments being made to the draft in the final stage. He said the deletion of "republican sovereignty" was not a case of word juggling. There must be a clear way of power sharing both horizontally and vertically if Russia wants to become a genuine federation, Filatov said.

The draft meets this main condition of power distribution between the executive, legislative and judiciary, he said adding that the constitution singles out what is to be run by the center alone, by the center and regions together and exclusively by the regions.

More importantly, said Filatov, the federal treaty has now become an addendum to the constitution to emphasize that all of the country's constituent parts are equal. The final draft underlines that whenever the treaty and constitution are at odds, it is the constitution which takes the upper hand, he said.

The constitution provides for the Federation Council, the upper house of parliament, to be elected. However, Filatov says this will probably be amended and the upper house will consist of regional leaders in future by the parliament which comes to replace the Federal Assembly due to be elected in December. This will help speed up the legislative process which is too slow now, he said. Filatov thinks that the law making process will precipitated if the Federation Council assumes a new role. If the Council is made up of regional leaders, there will be no need for new-fangled bodies like the Council of Republican Heads of State, he said.

Filatov thinks the new parliament will work for an interim period of two years as envisaged by the new constitution. But when things go back to normal, the next Federal Assembly will be elected for a term of four years, he said.

On relations between the president, government and the State Duma, Filatov said the new constitution provides for the cabinet to work hand in hand with the head of state who is personally responsible for the country's destiny. He said this is caused by the need for new principles of power sharing which can become absurd if brought to the extreme as shown by the events of October 3-4. The uncertainty about the government's status could not have helped towards social stabilization, he said.

Under the new constitution, the President is vested with powers to sack the government or to appoint a Prime Minister on agreement from the State Duma. For its part, the Duma can bring a motion on non-confidence against the government, but a final say rests with the head of state. If he disagrees with the parliament he can dissolve it instead. Filatov says such a mechanism will enable to avert the recent-style confrontation between the executive and legislature which nearly brought the country to the brink of "disaster".

The Prime Minister takes in charge if the head of state is unable to continue to run the country. However, he

cannot call a new election or change the constitution and is bound to step down as soon as a new president has been elected. The constitution provides for an increase in the number of Constitutional Court [CC] Judges from 18 to 21. Filatov says there was a lengthy debate on a CC future. Several options were proposed to avert what happened in a highly politicized court as the previous CC used to be, he said. The new constitution forbids the CC Chairman to stand above the Court as a whole. The Court's only job is to interpret whether statutes or laws in hand tally with the constitution.

The future of the prosecuting office was also the subject of protracted discussions given the bitter public memories of the institution as it used to be in the past, Filatov said. The PGO will remain operative until law and order is brought to the country.

On local government, Filatov said that not only does the new constitution give more say on the ground but it also provides for greater state support to it.

The new constitution can be approved by a majority of votes in a referendum on December 12 provided there is a 50% turnout by those eligible to vote, Filatov said. If not, he does not rule out the possibility of adopting the new basic law by a Constituent Assembly or the State Duma.

Yeltsin Edict Launching Draft Constitution Published

PM0911173193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 10 Nov 93 p 1

[Edict No. 1845 of the Russian Federation president "On the Draft Russian Federation Constitution Being Submitted to a Nationwide Vote," dated Moscow, the Kremlin, 6 November 1993 and signed by Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin, carried under the general headline: "Adoption of the New Russian Federation Constitution Will Create a Sound Legal Base for the Further Development of Democracy and Reforms in the Country"]

[Text] 1. It is laid down that the text of the draft Russian Federation Constitution being submitted to a nationwide vote is submitted 9 November 1993 by the president of the Russian Federation for official publication in the newspapers ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI and ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA and via ITAR-TASS, as well as for publication in a mass print run by the "Yuridicheskaya Literatura" Publishing House.

At the same time the draft Russian Federation Constitution signed by the Russian Federation president is being sent by the Russian Federation president to the Russian Federation Central Electoral Commission.

2. After adoption of the Russian Federation Constitution by nationwide vote the Russian Federation Central Electoral Commission is to file the text of the Russian Federation Constitution for official publication simultaneously with the voting results.

[Signed] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin
[Dated] 6 November 1993

Draft Constitution Published

PM0911195093 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 10 Nov 93 pp 3-6

["Draft Constitution of the Russian Federation. For 12 December 1993 Referendum (Nationwide Vote). Draft Approved by Constitutional Conference. Submitted by Russian Federation President for Nationwide Vote"]

[Text] We, the multinational people of the Russian Federation, united by a common destiny on our land,

asserting human rights and freedoms and civil peace and concord,

preserving historically established state unity,

proceeding from the generally recognized principles of the equality and self-determination of peoples,

revering the memory of our forebears who passed down to us love and respect for the Fatherland and faith in good and justice,

reviving the sovereign statehood of Russia and asserting the immutability of its democratic foundations,

seeking to ensure the well-being and prosperity of Russia,

proceeding from responsibility for our homeland to present and future generations,

recognizing ourselves as part of the world community,

adopt the CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

Section One

Chapter 1. Foundations of the Constitutional System

Article 1

1. The Russian Federation-Russia is a democratic federative rule-of-law state with a republican form of government.

2. The names Russian Federation and Russia are of equal validity.

Article 2

The individual and his rights and freedoms are the supreme value. Recognition, observance, and protection of human and civil rights and freedoms is the obligation of the state.

Article 3

1. The repository of sovereignty and the sole source of authority in the Russian Federation is its multinational people.

2. The people exercise their authority directly and also through organs of state power and organs of local self-government.

3. The supreme direct expression of the authority of the people is the referendum and free elections.

4. Nobody can arrogate power in the Russian Federation. The seizure of power or the arrogation of powers are prosecuted in accordance with federal law.

Article 4

1. The sovereignty of the Russian Federation extends to the whole of its territory.

2. The Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws are paramount throughout the territory of the Russian Federation.

3. The Russian Federation ensures the integrity and inviolability of its territory.

Article 5

1. The Russian Federation consists of republics, krays, oblasts, cities of federal significance, an autonomous oblast, and autonomous okrugs which are equal components of the Russian Federation.

2. A republic (state) has its own constitution and legislation. A kray, oblast, city of federal significance, autonomous oblast, or autonomous okrug has its own charter and legislation.

3. The federal structure of the Russian Federation is based on its state integrity, the unity of the system of state power, the delimitation of areas of responsibility and powers between organs of state power of the Russian Federation and organs of state power of the components of the Russian Federation, and the equality and self-determination of the peoples in the Russian Federation.

4. All components of the Russian Federation are equal with each other in interrelationships with federal organs of state power.

Article 6

1. Citizenship of the Russian Federation is acquired and terminated in accordance with federal law and is uniform and equal irrespective of the basis on which it is acquired.

2. Each citizen of the Russian Federation possess all rights and freedoms on its territory and bears equal obligations stipulated by the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

3. A citizen of the Russian Federation cannot be deprived of his citizenship or of the right to change it.

Article 7

1. The Russian Federation is a social state whose policy is aimed at creating conditions ensuring a worthy life and free development of the individual.

2. In the Russian Federation people's labor and health are protected, a guaranteed minimum wage is established, state support is insured for the family, mothers, fathers, children, invalids, and elderly citizens, the system of the social services is developed, and state pensions, allowances, and other guarantees of social protection are established.

Article 8

1. In the Russian Federation the unity of the economic area, the free movement of goods, services, and financial resources, support for competition, and freedom of economic activity are guaranteed.

2. In the Russian Federation private, state, municipal, and other forms of property enjoy equal recognition and protection.

Article 9

1. The land and other natural resources are utilized and protected in the Russian Federation as the basis of the life and activity of the peoples inhabiting the corresponding territory.

2. The land and other natural resources can be in private, state, municipal, or other forms of ownership.

Article 10

State power in the Russian Federation is exercised on the basis of the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Organs of legislative, executive, and judicial power are independent.

Article 11

1. State power in the Russian Federation is exercised by the president of the Russian Federation, the Federal Assembly (the Federation Council and the State Duma), the Government of the Russian Federation, and the courts of the Russian Federation.

2. State power in the components of the Russian Federation is exercised by the organs of state power formed by them.

3. The delimitation of areas of responsibility and powers between organs of state power of the Russian Federation and organs of state power of components of the Russian Federation is effected by the present Constitution and the Federation Treaty and other treaties concerning the delimitation of areas of responsibility and powers.

Article 12

In the Russian Federation local self-government is recognized and guaranteed. Within the limits of its powers local self-government is independent. Organs of local self-government do not form part of the system of organs of state power.

Article 13

1. In the Russian Federation ideological diversity is recognized.

2. No ideology may be established as the state ideology or as a compulsory ideology.

3. In the Russian Federation political diversity and a multiparty system are recognized.

4. Social associations are equal before the law.

5. The creation and activity of social associations whose objectives and actions are directed toward the forcible alteration of the basic principles of the constitutional system and the violation of the integrity of the Russian Federation, the undermining of the security of the state, the creation of armed formations, or the fueling of social, racial, national, or religious strife are prohibited.

Article 14

1. The Russian Federation is a secular state. No religion may be established as the state religion or a compulsory religion.

2. Religious associations are separated from the state and are equal before the law.

Article 15

1. The Constitution of the Russian Federation has supreme legal force and is direct-acting and applies throughout the territory of the Russian Federation. Laws and other legal enactments adopted in the Russian Federation must not contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

2. Organs of state power, organs of local self-government, officials, citizens, and associations thereof are obliged to observe the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the laws.

3. Laws are subject to official publication. Unpublished laws are not applied. Any normative legal enactments affecting human and civil rights, freedoms, and duties cannot be applied unless they have been officially published for universal information.

4. Generally recognized principles and norms of international law and the international treaties of the Russian Federation are a constituent part of its legal system. If an international treaty of the Russian Federation establishes rules other than those stipulated by the law, the rules of the international treaty apply.

Article 16

1. The provisions of the present chapter of the Constitution form the basic principles of the constitutional system of the Russian Federation and cannot be altered except by the procedure laid down by the present Constitution.

2. No other provisions of the present Constitution can contradict the basic principles of the constitutional system of the Russian Federation.

Chapter 2. Human and Civil Rights and Freedoms

Article 17

1. Human and civil rights and freedoms are guaranteed in the Russian Federation in accordance with generally recognized principles and norms of international law and in conformity with the present Constitution.

2. Basic human rights and freedoms are inalienable and belong to each person from birth onward.

3. The exercise of human and civil rights and freedoms must not violate the rights and freedoms of others.

Article 18

Human and civil rights and freedoms are direct-acting. They determine the meaning, content, and application of laws and the activity of the legislative and executive branches and of local self-government and are safeguarded by justice.

Article 19

1. All are equal before the law and the courts.

2. The state guarantees equality of human and civil rights and freedoms regardless of sex, race, nationality, language, origin, property and position, place of residence, attitude toward religion, convictions, membership of public associations, and also other circumstances. Any forms of restriction of citizens' rights on grounds of social, racial, national, linguistic, or religious affiliation are prohibited.

3. Men and women have equal rights and freedoms and equal opportunities to exercise them.

Article 20

1. Each person has the right to life.

2. Until its abolition the death penalty can be prescribed by federal law as the supreme penalty for particularly grave crimes against life, the accused being granted the right to trial by jury.

Article 21

1. The dignity of the individual is protected by the state. Nothing may be grounds for disparaging it.

2. No one must be subjected to torture, violence, or other brutal or humiliating treatment or punishment. No one

may be subjected to medical, scientific, or other experiments without their voluntary consent.

Article 22

1. Each person has the right to freedom and inviolability of the person.

2. Arrest, taking into custody, and keeping in custody are permitted only by judicial decision. An individual cannot be detained for a period of more than 48 hours without a judicial decision.

Article 23

1. Each person has the right to inviolability of his private life, individual and family privacy, and defense of his honor and good name.

2. Each person has the right to privacy of correspondence, telephone conversations, and postal, telegraph, and other communications. Limitation of this right is permitted only on the basis of a judicial decision.

Article 24

1. The collection, storage, utilization, and dissemination of information about a person's private life without his consent are not permitted.

2. Organs of state power and organs of local self-government and their officials are obliged to ensure that each person has the opportunity to see documents and materials directly affecting his rights and freedoms unless otherwise provided by law.

Article 25

Dwellings are inviolable. No one is entitled to enter a dwelling against the wishes of the persons residing there except in cases prescribed by federal law or on the basis of a judicial decision.

Article 26

1. Each person is entitled to determine and indicate his own nationality. No one may be compelled to determine and indicate his own nationality.

2. Each person has the right to use his native language and to the free choice of language of communication, education, instruction, and creativity.

Article 27

1. Each person who is legally present on the territory of the Russian Federation has the right freely to travel and choose his place of stay and residence.

2. Each person may freely travel outside the Russian Federation. The citizen of the Russian Federation has the right to return without impediment to the Russian Federation.

Article 28

Each person is guaranteed freedom of conscience and freedom of religion, including the right to profess any religion individually or together with others, or not to profess any, and freely to choose, hold, and disseminate religious and other convictions and to act in accordance with them.

Article 29

1. Each person is guaranteed freedom of thought and speech.

2. Propaganda or agitation exciting social, racial, national, or religious hatred and enmity is not permitted. Propaganda of social, racial, national, religious, or linguistic supremacy is prohibited.

3. No one may be compelled to express his opinions and convictions or to renounce them.

4. Each person has the right freely to seek, receive, pass on, produce, and disseminate information by any legal method. The list of information constituting a state secret is determined by federal law.

5. The freedom of mass information is guaranteed. Censorship is prohibited.

Article 30

1. Each person has the right of association, including the right to create trade unions to protect his interests. The freedom of the activity of public associations is guaranteed.

2. No one may be compelled to join or to remain in any association.

Article 31

Citizens of the Russian Federation have the right to assemble peacefully without weapons and to hold meetings, rallies and demonstrations, processions, and pickets.

Article 32

1. Citizens of the Russian Federation have the right to take part in the administration of the state's affairs both directly and via their representatives.

2. Citizens of the Russian Federation have the right to elect and to be elected to organs of state power and organs of local self-government, and also to take part in referendums.

3. Citizens deemed incompetent by a court and also those detained in places of imprisonment by sentence of a court do not have the right to elect and to be elected.

4. Citizens of the Russian Federation have equal access to state service.

5. Citizens of the Russian Federation have the right to take part in the administration of justice.

Article 33

Citizens of the Russian Federation have the right to appeal personally and also to send individual and collective appeals to state organs and organs of local self-government.

Article 34

1. Each person has the right to make free use of his abilities and property for purposes of entrepreneurial activity and other economic activity not prohibited by law.

2. Economic activity directed toward monopolization and unscrupulous competition is not permitted.

Article 35

1. The right of private ownership is protected by law.

2. Each person is entitled to own property and to possess, utilize, and dispose of it both individually and together with others.

3. No one may be deprived of his property except by court decision. The compulsory expropriation of property for state requirements may be carried out only if full compensation is paid in advance.

4. The right of inheritance is guaranteed.

Article 36

1. Citizens and their associations are entitled to hold land in private ownership.

2. Owners freely possess, utilize, and dispose of land and other natural resources provided that this does not damage the environment and does not violate the rights and legitimate interests of others.

3. The conditions and procedure for the use of land are defined on the basis of federal law.

Article 37

1. Labor is free. Each person has the right freely to dispose of his abilities for labor and to choose a type of activity and occupation.

2. Forced labor is prohibited.

3. Each person has the right to work in conditions meeting the requirements of safety and hygiene and to receive remuneration for labor without any discrimination and of not less than the minimum pay prescribed by federal law, and also the right to protection from unemployment.

4. The right to individual and collective labor disputes utilizing the methods of solving them prescribed by federal law, including the right to strike, is recognized.

5. Each person has the right to leisure. Persons working on the basis of a labor contract are guaranteed the working hours, days off, and holidays prescribed by federal law and paid annual leave.

Article 38

1. Maternity and childhood and the family are under the state's protection.

2. Concern for children and their upbringing are the equal right and duty of the parents.

3. Able-bodied children who have reached the age of 18 years must look after [zabotitsya o] disabled parents.

Article 39

1. Each person is guaranteed social security in old age, in the event of sickness, disability, or loss of breadwinner, for the raising of children, and in other cases prescribed by law.

2. State pensions and social benefits are prescribed by law.

3. Voluntary social insurance, the creation of additional forms of social security, and charity are encouraged.

Article 40

1. Each person has the right to housing. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of housing.

2. Organs of state power and organs of local self-government encourage housing construction and create the conditions for exercise of the right to housing.

3. Housing is provided free or at affordable cost to low-income and other citizens indicated in the law who require housing from state, municipal, and other housing stocks in accordance with the norms prescribed by law.

Article 41

1. Each person has the right to health care and medical assistance. Medical assistance in state and municipal health care establishments is provided to citizens for free by means of funds from the relevant budget, insurance contributions, and other revenue.

2. In the Russian Federation federal programs to protect and strengthen the population's health are financed, measures to develop state, municipal, and private health care systems are taken, and activities conducive to the strengthening of people's health, the development of physical culture and sport, and ecological and sanitary and epidemiological well-being are encouraged.

3. The concealment by officials of facts and circumstances creating a threat to people's lives and health entails responsibility in accordance with federal law.

Article 42

Each person has the right to a decent [blagopriyatnyy] environment, reliable information about the state of the

environment, and compensation for damage caused to his health or property by ecological offenses.

Article 43

1. Each person has the right to education.

2. General access to free preschool, basic general, and secondary vocational education in state or municipal educational establishments and in enterprises is guaranteed.

3. Each person is entitled on a competitive basis to receive free higher education in a state or municipal educational establishment or in an enterprise.

4. Basic general education is compulsory. Parents or persons in loco parentis ensure that children receive basic general education.

5. The Russian Federation establishes federal state educational standards and supports various forms of education and self-education.

Article 44

1. Each person is guaranteed freedom of literary, artistic, scientific, technical, and other types of creation and teaching. Intellectual property is protected by law.

2. Each person has the right to participate in cultural life and use cultural institutions and to have access to cultural treasures.

3. Each person must display concern for preserving the historical and cultural heritage and look after historical and cultural monuments.

Article 45

1. State protection of human and civil rights and freedoms in the Russian Federation is guaranteed.

2. Each person is entitled to protect his rights and freedoms by any methods not prohibited by law.

Article 46

1. Each person is guaranteed judicial protection of his rights and freedoms.

2. The decisions and actions (or inaction) of organs of state power, organs of local self-government, public associations, and officials can be appealed in court.

3. Each person is entitled, in accordance with the Russian Federation's international treaties, to appeal to interstate organs for the protection of human rights and freedoms if all available means of legal protection inside the state have been exhausted.

Article 47

1. No one can be deprived of the right to have the case against him heard by the court and the judges to whose jurisdiction it is assigned by the law.

2. Anyone accused of having committed a crime has the right to have the case against him heard by a court and jury as provided by federal law.

Article 48

1. Each person is guaranteed the right to receive qualified legal assistance. Legal aid is rendered free of charge as provided by law.

2. Each detainee held in custody and accused of having committed a crime has the right to benefit from the assistance of a lawyer (defense attorney) from the moment of his detention, placing in custody, or indictment respectively.

Article 49

1. Each person accused of having committed a crime is presumed innocent until his guilt is proved as provided by federal law and established by means of a legitimate court sentence.

2. The accused is not obliged to prove his innocence.

3. Any undispelled doubts regarding the individual's guilt are interpreted in the accused's favor.

Article 50

1. No one can be tried a second time for the same crime.

2. The use of any proof acquired in breach of the federal law is not permitted in the administration of justice.

3. Each person sentenced for a crime has the right to have his sentence reviewed by a superior court as provided by federal law, as well as the right to appeal for pardon or a reduction of sentence.

Article 51

1. No one is obliged to testify against himself or against his spouse or close relatives, the range of the latter being defined by federal law.

2. Other instances when the obligation to give evidence is lifted can be laid down by federal law.

Article 52

The rights of the victims of crimes or of abuses of power are protected by law. The state guarantees the victims' access to justice and to compensation for damage caused.

Article 53

Each person has the right to compensation from the state for damage caused by the unlawful action (or inaction) of organs of state power or their officials.

Article 54

1. No law establishing or mitigating liability can be retroactive.

2. No one can be held liable for any act which, at the time it was committed, was not considered to be in breach of the law. If liability for a breach of the law is abolished or mitigated after an act has been committed, the new law is applied.

Article 55

1. The listing of basic rights and freedoms in the Constitution of the Russian Federation must not be interpreted as negating or diminishing other universally recognized human and civil rights and freedoms.

2. Laws abolishing or diminishing human and civil rights and freedoms must not be promulgated in the Russian Federation.

3. Human and civil rights and freedoms can be curtailed by federal law only to the extent to which it may be necessary for the purpose of protecting the foundations of the constitutional system, morality, and the health, rights, and legitimate interests of other individuals, or of ensuring the country's defense and the state's security.

Article 56

1. Individual restrictions of rights and freedoms can be introduced, with an indication of their extent and duration, in a state of emergency in order to ensure the safety of citizens and the protection of the constitutional system in accordance with federal constitutional law.

2. A state of emergency may be introduced throughout the territory of the Russian Federation or in individual localities thereof in the circumstances and according to the procedure provided by federal constitutional law.

3. The rights and freedoms contained in Articles 20, 21, 23 (Part 1), 24, 28, 34 (Part 1), 40 (Part 1), and 46-54 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation may not be restricted.

Article 57

Each person is obliged to pay legitimately levied taxes and duties. Laws introducing new taxes or detrimental to the taxpayers' situation cannot be retroactive.

Article 58

Each person is obliged to protect nature and the environment and to show solicitude for natural wealth.

Article 59

1. The protection of the fatherland is the duty and obligation of citizens of the Russian Federation.

2. Citizens of the Russian Federation perform military service as provided by federal law.

3. In the event that the convictions or religious beliefs of a citizen of the Russian Federation are at odds with the performance of military service, as well as in other instances as provided by federal law, the citizen has the right to perform alternative civil service as a substitute.

Article 60

A citizen of the Russian Federation can autonomously exercise his rights and obligations in full from the age of 18 years.

Article 61

1. A citizen of the Russian Federation cannot be expelled from the Russian Federation or extradited to another state.

2. The Russian Federation guarantees the protection and patronage of its citizens outside its borders.

Article 62

1. A citizen of the Russian Federation can hold citizenship of a foreign state (dual citizenship) as provided by federal law or an international treaty of the Russian Federation.

2. The fact that a citizen of the Russian Federation holds citizenship of a foreign state does not diminish his rights and freedoms or exempt him from obligations stemming from Russian citizenship, unless otherwise provided by federal law or an international treaty of the Russian Federation.

3. Foreign citizens and stateless persons in the Russian Federation enjoy equal rights and bear equal obligations with citizens of the Russian Federation, except when otherwise provided by federal law or an international treaty of the Russian Federation.

Article 63

1. The Russian Federation offers political asylum to foreign citizens and stateless persons in accordance with universally recognized norms of international law.

2. The Russian Federation does not permit the extradition to other states of persons persecuted for their political beliefs or for actions (or inactions) which are not considered a crime in the Russian Federation. The extradition of persons accused of having committed a crime, or the extradition of sentenced persons to serve their sentence in other states, is performed on the basis of federal law or an international treaty of the Russian Federation.

Article 64

The provisions of this chapter comprise the foundations of the individual's legal status in the Russian Federation and cannot be amended except by the procedure established by the present Constitution.

Chapter 3. Federative Structure

Article 65

1. The composition of the Russian Federation comprises the following components of the Russian Federation:

The Republic of Adygea (Adygea), the Republic of Altay, the Republic of Bashkortostan, the Republic of Buryatia, the Republic of Dagestan, the Ingush Republic, the Kabardino-Balkar Republic, the Republic of Kalmykia—Khalmg Tangch, the Karachay-Cherkess Republic, the Republic of Karelia, the Republic of Komi, the Republic of Mari El, the Republic of Mordovia, the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), the Republic of North Ossetia, the Republic of Tatarstan (Tatarstan), the Republic of Tuva, the Udmurt Republic, the Republic of Khakassia, the Chechen Republic, the Chuvash Republic—Chavash Respubliki;

Altay Kray, Krasnodar Kray, Krasnoyarsk Kray, Maritime Kray, Stavropol Kray, Khabarovsk Kray.

Amur Oblast, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Astrakhan Oblast, Belgorod Oblast, Bryansk Oblast, Vladimir Oblast, Volgograd Oblast, Vologda Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Irkutsk Oblast, Kaliningrad Oblast, Kaluga Oblast, Kamchatka Oblast, Kemerovo Oblast, Kirov Oblast, Kostroma Oblast, Kurgan Oblast, Kursk Oblast, Leningrad Oblast, Lipetsk Oblast, Magadan Oblast, Moscow Oblast, Murmansk Oblast, Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast, Novgorod Oblast, Novosibirsk Oblast, Omsk Oblast, Orenburg Oblast, Orel Oblast, Penza Oblast, Perm Oblast, Pskov Oblast, Rostov Oblast, Ryazan Oblast, Samara Oblast, Saratov Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Smolensk Oblast, Tambov Oblast, Tver Oblast, Tomsk Oblast, Tula Oblast, Tyumen Oblast, Ulyanovsk Oblast, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Chita Oblast, Yaroslavl Oblast;

Moscow, St. Petersburg—cities of federal significance;

The Jewish Autonomous Oblast;

The Aga Buryat Autonomous Okrug, the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Okrug, the Koryak Autonomous Okrug, the Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug, the Taymyr (Dolgano-Nenets) Autonomous Okrug, the Ust-Orda Buryat Autonomous Okrug, the Khanti-Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug, the Chukotsk Autonomous Okrug, the Evenk Autonomous Okrug, the Yamalo-Nenetsk Autonomous Okrug.

2. The admission to the Russian Federation and the formation as part of the Russian Federation of a new component are carried out according to the procedure laid down by federal constitutional law.

Article 66

1. The status of a republic is determined by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and by the constitution of the republic.

2. The status of a kray, oblast, city of federal significance, autonomous oblast, and autonomous okrug is determined by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the charter of the kray, oblast, city of federal significance, autonomous oblast, and autonomous okrug adopted by the legislative (representative) organ of the relevant component of the Russian Federation.

3. A federal law on the autonomous oblast or an autonomous okrug can be adopted upon submission by the legislative and executive organs of the autonomous oblast or autonomous okrug.

4. The relations of autonomous okrugs forming part of a kray or oblast can be regulated by a federal law and treaty between the organs of state power of an autonomous okrug and, accordingly, by the organs of state power of a kray or oblast.

5. The status of a component of the Russian Federation can be changed by the mutual consent of the Russian Federation and the component of the Russian Federation in accordance with federal constitutional law.

Article 67

1. The territory of the Russian Federation includes the territories of its components, internal bodies of water, and territorial sea, and the airspace over these.

2. The Russian Federation possesses sovereign rights and exercises jurisdiction over the continental shelf and within the exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation in accordance with the procedure defined by federal law and the norms of international law.

3. The borders between components of the Russian Federation can be amended by their mutual consent.

Article 68

1. The Russian language is the state language of the Russian Federation throughout its territory.

2. Republics are entitled to establish their own state languages. They are used alongside the state language of the Russian Federation in the organs of state power, organs of local self-government, and state institutions of the republics.

3. The Russian Federation guarantees all its peoples the right to retain their mother tongue, and to create conditions for its study and development.

Article 69

The Russian Federation guarantees the rights of numerically small indigenous peoples in accordance with the generally recognized principles and norms of international law and the international treaties of the Russian Federation.

Article 70

1. The state flag, emblem, and anthem of the Russian Federation, the description of these, and the procedure for their official use are established by federal constitutional law.

2. The capital of the Russian Federation is the city of Moscow. The status of the capital is established by federal law.

Article 71

The following fall within the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation:

a) the adoption and amendment of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws, and the monitoring of compliance with them;

b) the federative system and territory of the Russian Federation;

c) the regulation and protection of human and civil rights and freedoms; citizenship of the Russian Federation; the regulation and protection of the rights of national minorities;

d) the establishment of a system of federal organs of legislative, executive, and judicial power, the procedure for their organization and activity; the formation of federal organs of state power;

e) federal state property and the mangement thereof;

f) the establishment of the fundamentals of federal policy and federal programs in the sphere of state, economic, ecological, social, cultural, and national development of the Russian Federation;

g) the establishment of the legal foundations of the single market; financial, currency, credit, and customs regulation, monetary emission, and the foundations of pricing policy; federal economic services, including federal banks;

h) the federal budget; federal taxes and duties; federal regional development funds;

i) federal power systems, nuclear power generation, fissile materials; federal transport, railroads, information, and communications; activity in space;

j) the Russian Federation's foreign policy and international relations and the Russian Federation's international treaties; issues of war and peace;

k) the Russian Federation's foreign economic relations;

l) defense and security; defense production; the determination of the procedure for the sale and purchase of weapons, ammunition, military hardware, and other military property; the production of toxic substances, narcotic substances, and the procedure for their use;

m) the determination of the status and protection of the state border, territorial seas, airspace, the exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf of the Russian Federation;

n) the judicial system; the prosecutor's office; legislation in the field of criminal, criminal-procedure, and criminal-executive law; amnesty and the granting of pardons; legislation in the field of civil law, the law of civil procedure and the law of arbitral procedure; the legal regulation of intellectual property;

o) federal law relating to the conflict of laws;

p) the meteorological service, standards and standard weights and measurements, the metric system and measurement of time; geodesy and cartography; geographic names; official statistical records and accounting;

q) state awards and honorary titles of the Russian Federation;

r) the federal civil service.

Article 72

1. The following fall within the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the components of the Russian Federation:

a) the guaranteeing that the constitutions and laws of republics, and the charters, laws, and other normative legal acts of krays, oblasts, cities of federal significance, the autonomous oblast, and autonomous okrugs accord with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws;

b) the protection of human and civil rights and freedoms; the protection of the rights of national minorities; the guaranteeing of legality, law and order, and public safety; the arrangements relating to border zones;

c) issues relating to the ownership, use, and disposal of land, mineral resources, water, and other natural resources;

d) the delimitation of state property;

e) the use of the natural environment; environmental protection and the guaranteeing of ecological safety; natural sites under special protection; the protection of historical and cultural monuments;

f) general issues of nurture, education, science, culture, physical fitness, and sport;

g) the coordination of questions of public health; the protection of the family, mothers, fathers, and children; social protection, including social security;

h) the implementation of measures for combating catastrophes, natural disasters, and epidemics, and the elimination of their consequences;

i) the establishment of general principles of taxation and levying of duties in the Russian Federation;

j) administrative, administrative-procedural, labor, family, housing, land, water, and forestry legislation, and legislation on mineral resources and on environmental protection;

k) cadres of judicial and law-enforcement organs; attorneys and notaries;

l) the protection of the primordial habitat and traditional way of life of numerically small ethnic communities;

m) the establishment of the general principles for the organization of a system of organs of state power and local self-government;

n) the coordination of the international and foreign economic relations of components of the Russian Federation, and the fulfillment of the Russian Federation's international treaties.

2. The provisions of this article extend in equal measure to the republics, krays, oblasts, cities of federal significance, the autonomous oblast, and autonomous okrugs.

Article 73

Outside the compass of the Russian Federation's jurisdiction and the powers of the Russian Federation as regards the terms of reference of the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the components of the Russian Federation, the components of the Russian Federation possess state power in its entirety.

Article 74

1. The establishment of customs borders, duties, levies, and any other hindrances to the free movement of goods, services, and financial assets is not permitted on the territory of the Russian Federation.

2. Restrictions on the movement of goods and services can be introduced in accodance with federal law if this is essential for ensuring safety, the protection of the life and health of people, and the protection of nature and cultural assets.

Article 75

1. The monetary unit in the Russian Federation is the ruble. Monetary emission is carried out exclusively by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation. The introduction and emission of other currencies [dengi] is not permitted in the Russian Federation.

2. The protection and the guaranteeing of the stability of the ruble is the basic function of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation which it carries out independently of the other organs of state power.

3. The system of taxes levied for the federal budget and the general principles of taxation and levies in the Russian Federation are established by federal law.

4. State loans are issued according to a procedure determined by federal law and are floated on a voluntary basis.

Article 76

1. Federal constitutional laws and federal laws which operate directly throughout the territory of the Russian Federation are adopted with regard to the Russian Federation's areas of responsibility.

2. Federal laws, and the laws and other normative legal enactments of the components of the Russian Federation adopted in accordance with the aforesaid federal laws, are promulgated with regard to the areas of joint responsibility of the Russian Federation and components of the Russian Federation.

3. Federal laws cannot conflict with federal constitutional laws.

4. Outside the compass of the Russian Federation's jurisdiction and the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the components of the Russian Federation, the republics, krays, oblasts, cities of federal significance, the autonomous oblast, and the autonomous okrugs exercise their own legal regulation, including the adoption of laws and other normative legal enactments.

5. The laws and other normative legal enactments of the components of the Russian Federation cannot conflict with federal laws adopted in accordance with the first and second parts of this article. In the event of conflicts between the federal law and another enactment promulgated in the Russian Federation, the federal law is to obtain.

6. In the event of conflict between the federal law and a normative legal enactment of a component of the Russian Federation promulgated in accorance with the fourth part of this article, the normative legal enactment of the component of the Russian Federation obtains.

Article 77

1. The system of organs of state power of the republics, krays, oblasts, cities of federal significance, the autonomous oblast, and autonomous okrugs is established by the components of the Russian Federation independently in accordance with the fundamentals of the constitutional system of the Russian Federation and the general principles of the organization of representative and executive organs of state power established by federal law.

2. Within the areas of responsibility of the Russian Federation and the powers of the Russian Federation as regards the terms of reference of the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the components of the Russian Federation, the federal organs of executive power and the organs of executive power of the components of the Russian Federation form a unified system of executive power in the Russian Federation.

Article 78

1. In order to exercise their powers, the federal organs of executive power can create their own territorial organs and appoint the relevant officials.

2. The federal organs of executive power, by agreement with the organs of executive power of the components of the Russian Federation can hand over to them the implementation of part of their powers provided that this does not conflict with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws.

3. By agreement with the federal organs of executive power the organs of executive power of the components of the Russian Federation can hand over to them the implementation of part of their powers.

4. The president of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation ensure, in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the exercise of the powers of federal state authority throughout the territory of the Russian Federation.

Article 79

The Russian Federation can participate in interstate associations and hand over to them part of its powers in accordance with international treaties unless this entails the restriction of human and civil rights and freedoms and unless it conflicts with the fundamentals of the constitutional system of the Russian Federation.

Chapter 4. President of the Russian Federation

Article 80

1. The president of the Russian Federation is the head of state.

2. The president of the Russian Federation is the guarantor of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and of human and civil rights and freedoms. Within the procedure established by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, he adopts measures to safeguard the sovereignty of the Russian Federation and its independence and state integrity, and ensures the coordinated functioning and collaboration of organs of state power.

3. The president of the Russian Federation, in compliance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the federal laws, determines the basic guidelines of the state's domestic and foreign policy.

4. The president of the Russian Federation, in his capacity as head of state, represents the Russian Federation within the country and in international relations.

Article 81

1. The president of the Russian Federation is elected for four years by citizens of the Russian Federation on the basis of universal, equal, and direct suffrage in a secret ballot.

2. A citizen of the Russian Federation who is at least 35 years of age and has been permanently resident in the Russian Federation for at least 10 years can be elected president of the Russian Federation.

3. One and the same person cannot hold the office of president of the Russian Federation for more than two consecutive terms.

4. The procedure of elections for president of the Russian federation is established by federal law.

Article 82

1. At his inauguration the president of the Russian Federation swears the following oath to the people:

"In exercising the powers of president of the Russian Federation I swear to respect and protect human and civil rights and freedoms, to observe and defend the Constitution of the Russian Federation, to defend the state's sovereignty and independence and its security and integrity, and faithfully to serve the people."

2. The oath is administered in a ceremonial atmosphere in the presence of members of the Federation Council, deputies of the State Duma, and justices of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation.

Article 83

The president of the Russian Federation:

a) appoints with the consent of the State Duma the chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation;

b) has the right to chair sittings of the Government of the Russian Federation;

c) adopts the decision on the dismissal [otstavka] of the Government of the Russian Federation;

d) submits to the State Duma the candidate for appointment to the office of chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation; raises before the State Duma the question of removing from office the chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation;

e) at the proposal of the chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation appoints and removes from office the deputy chairmen of the Government of the Russian Federation and federal ministers;

f) submits to the Federation Council candidates for appointment to the office of justices of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, and Superior Court of Arbitration of the Russian Federation, and also the candidate for general prosecutor of the Russian Federation; submits to the Federation Council the proposal on removing from office the general prosecutor of the Russian Federation; appoints justices in other federal courts;

g) forms and heads the Security Council of the Russian Federation, whose status is defined by federal law;

h) approves the military doctrine of the Russian Federation;

i) forms the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation;

j) appoints and removes plenipotentiary representatives of the president of the Russian Federation;

k) appoints and removes the high command of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;

l) appoints and recalls after consultations with the relevant committees or commissions of the chambers of the Federal Assembly diplomatic representatives of the Russian Federation in foreign states and international organizations.

Article 84

The president of the Russian Federation:

a) schedules elections to the State Duma in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal law;

b) dissolves the State Duma in instances and according to the procedure laid down by the Constitution of the Russian Federation;

c) schedules referendums according to the procedure prescribed by federal constitutional law;

d) submits draft laws to the State Duma;

e) signs and promulgates federal laws;

f) delivers to the Federal Assembly annual messages on the state of the nation and on the basic guidelines of the state's domestic and foreign policy.

Article 85

1. The president of the Russian Federation may use conciliation procedures to resolve disagreements between organs of state power of the Russian Federation and organs of state power of components of the Russian Federation, and also between organs of state power of components of the Russian Federation. In the event of failure to reach an agreed solution he may refer the resolution of the dispute for examination by the appropriate court.

2. Pending a resolution of the matter by the appropriate court, the president of the Russian Federation is entitled to suspend the operation of enactments by organs of executive power of components of the Russian Federation if these enactments contravene the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws or the Russian Federation's international commitments or violate human and civil rights and freedoms.

Article 86

The president of the Russian Federation:

a) exercises leadership of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation;

b) conducts talks and signs international treaties of the Russian Federation;

c) signs instruments of ratification;

d) accepts the credentials and letters of recall of diplomatic representatives accredited to him.

Article 87

1. The president of the Russian Federation is the supreme commander in chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

2. In the event of aggression against the Russian Federation or a direct threat of aggression the president of the Russian Federation introduces martial law [voyennoye polozheniye] on the territory of the Russian Federation or in individual localities of that territory and immediately notifies the Federation Council and State Duma of this.

3. The regime of martial law is defined by federal constitutional law.

Article 88

In the circumstances and according to the procedure laid down by federal constitutional law, the president of the Russian Federation introduces on the territory of the Russian Federation or in individual localities of that territory a state of emergency and immediately notifies the Federation Council and State Duma of this.

Article 89

The president of the Russian Federation:

a) decides questions of citizenship of the Russian Federation and of granting political asylum;

b) confers state awards of the Russian Federation and awards honorary titles of the Russian Federation and higher military and higher special ranks;

c) grants pardons.

Article 90

1. The president of the Russian Federation issues edicts and directives.

2. Implementation of the edicts and directives of the president of the Russian Federation is mandatory throughout the territory of the Russian Federation.

3. The edicts and directives of the president of the Russian Federation must not contravene the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws.

Article 91

The president of the Russian Federation enjoys immunity.

Article 92

1. The president of the Russian Federation begins exercising his powers from the moment he swears the oath and ceases exercising them upon the expiry of his term of office from the moment that the newly elected president of the Russian Federation swears the oath.

2. The president of the Russian Federation ceases the exercise of his powers early in the event of his resignation, persistent inability to exercise his powers for health

reasons, or removal from office. Furthermore, the election of the [new] president of the Russian Federation must take place no later than three months after the early cessation of the exercise of powers.

3. In all instances where the president of the Russian Federation is unable to perform his duties, they are temporarily carried out by the chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation. The acting president of the Russian Federation does not have the right to dissolve the State Duma, schedule a referendum, or submit proposals on amendments to and the revision of provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

Article 93

1. The president of the Russian Federation can be removed from office by the Federation Council only on the basis of a charge of treason or commission of some other grave crime, filed by the State Duma and confirmed by a ruling of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation that the actions of the president of the Russian Federation contain the elements of crime and a ruling by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation that the established procedure for filing the charge has been observed.

2. The decision by the State Duma on filing the charge and the decision by the Federation Council on removing the president from office must be adopted by a vote of two-thirds of the total number [of members] of each chamber on the initiative of at least one-third of deputies of the State Duma and provided there is a ruling by a special commission formed by the State Duma.

3. The decision by the Federation Council on removing the president of the Russian Federation from office must be adopted not later than three months following the filing of the charge against the president by the State Duma. If the decision by the Federation Council is not adopted within this period of time, the charge against the persident is deemed rejected.

Chapter 5. Federal Assembly

Article 94

The Federal Assembly-Parliament of the Russian Federation is the representative and legislative organ of the Russian Federation.

Article 95

1. The Federal Assembly consists of two chambers—the Federation Council and the State Duma.

2. The Federation Council consists of two representatives from each component of the Russian Federation; one each from the representative and executive organs of state power.

3. The State Duma consists of 450 deputies.

Article 96

1. The State Duma is elected for a term of four years.

2. The procedure for composing the Federation Council and the procedure for electing deputies of the State Duma are established by federal laws.

Article 97

1. A citizen of the Russian Federation who has attained the age of 21 years and has the right to participate in elections can be elected a deputy of the State Duma.

2. One and the same person cannot simultaneously be a member of the Federation Council and a deputy of the State Duma. A deputy of the State Duma cannot be a deputy of any other representative organs of state power or organs of local self-government.

3. Deputies of the State Duma work on a full-time professional basis. Deputies of the State Duma cannot be in state service or engage in any other paid activity, apart from teaching, scientific, or other creative activity.

Article 98

1. Members of the Federation Council and deputies of the State Duma enjoy immunity for the duration of their term of office. They cannot be detained, arrested, or searched unless detained at the scene of a crime, nor can they be subjected to a body search except as provided by federal law in order to guarantee other people's safety.

2. Any question concerning the lifting of immunity is decided by the appropriate chamber of the Federal Assembly upon submission by the general prosecutor of the Russian Federation.

Article 99

1. The Federal Assembly is a permanently functioning body.

2. The State Duma meets for its first sitting on the 30th day after its election. The president of the Russian Federation can convene a sitting of the State Duma prior to this date.

3. The first sitting of the State Duma is opened by the oldest deputy.

4. From the moment that the work of a newly elected State Duma begins, the powers of the previous State Duma are terminated.

Article 100

1. The Federation Council and the State Duma sit separately.

2. Sittings of the Federation Council and the State Duma are open. In instances stipulated by the standing orders of a chamber it is entitled to conduct closed sittings.

3. Chambers may convene jointly to hear messages from the president of the Russian Federation, messages from the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, and speeches by the leaders of foreign states.

Article 101

1. The Federation Council elects from its membership the chairman of the Federation Council and his deputies. The State Duma elects from its members the chairman of the State Duma and his deputies.

2. The chairman of the Federation Council and his deputies, and the chairman of the State Duma and his deputies, chair sittings and control the internal procedures of the chamber.

3. The Federation Council and the State Duma form committees and commissions and conduct parliamentary hearings into matters under their jurisdiction.

4. Each of the chambers adopts its own standing orders and decides matters relating to the internal procedure governing its activity.

5. In order to monitor the implementation of the federal budget the Federation Council and the State Duma form a Comptrollers Office [Schetnaya palata], whose composition and work procedure are determined by federal law.

Article 102

1. The jurisdiction of the Federation Council includes:

a) confirming alterations to borders between components of the Russian Federation;

b) confirming an edict of the president of the Russian Federation on the introduction of martial law;

c) confirming an edict of the president of the Russian Federation on the introduction of a state of emergency;

d) deciding the question of the possibility of the utilization of Russian Federation Armed Forces outside the borders of the territory of the Russian Federation;

e) scheduling elections for the president of the Russian Federation;

f) removing the president of the Russian Federation from office;

g) appointing justices of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, and the Superior Court of Arbitration of the Russian Federation;

h) appointing and removing from office the general prosecutor of the Russian Federation;

i) appointing and removing from office the deputy chairman of the Comptrollers Office and half of its staff of auditors.

2. The Federation Council adopts decrees on matters designated as its area of responsibility by the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

3. Decrees of the Federation Council are adopted by a majority of the votes of the total number of Federation Council members unless some other procedure for adopting a decision is stipulated by the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

Article 103

1. The jurisdiction of the State Duma includes:

a) giving consent to the president of the Russian Federation for the appointment of the chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation;

b) deciding a motion of confidence in the Government of the Russian Federation;

c) appointing and removing from office the chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation;

d) appointing and removing from office the chairman of the Comptrollers Office and half of its staff of auditors;

e) appointing and removing from office the commissioner [upolnomochennyy] for human rights, who operates in accordance with federal constitutional law;

f) declaring an amnesty;

g) filing a charge against the president of the Russian Federation to remove him from office.

2. The State Duma adopts decrees on matters designated as its area of responsibility by the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

3. Decrees of the State Duma are adopted by a majority of the votes of the total number of deputies of the State Duma unless some other procedure for adopting a decision is stipulated by the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

Article 104

1. The right of legislative initiative is vested in the president of the Russian Federation, the Federation Council, members of the Federation Council, deputies of the State Duma, the Government of the Russian Federation, and legislative (representative) organs of components of the Russian Federation. The right of legislative initiative is also vested in the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, and the Superior Court of Arbitration of the Russian Federation in matters under their jurisdiction.

2. Draft laws are submitted to the State Duma.

3. Draft laws on the introduction or abolition of taxes, exemption from the payment of taxes, the floating of state loans, the alteration of the financial obligations of the state, and other draft laws envisaging expenditure

funded out of the state budget can be submitted only when the government's findings are known.

Article 105

1. Federal laws are adopted by the State Duma.

2. Federal laws are adopted by a majority of the votes of the total number of deputies of the State Duma unless otherwise stipulated by the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

3. Federal laws adopted by the State Duma are passed to the Federation Council within five days for examination.

4. A federal law is deemed to have been approved by the Federation Council if more than half of the total number of members of this chamber have voted for it or if it has not been examined by the Federation Council within 14 days. In the event of the rejection of a federal law by the Federation Council the chambers may form a conciliation commission to overcome differences which have arisen, after which the federal law is subject to repeat examination by the State Duma.

5. In the event of disagreement by the State Duma with a decision of the Federation Council, a federal law is deemed to have been adopted if at least two-thirds of the total number of deputies of the State Duma vote for it in a repeat vote.

Article 106

Federal laws adopted by the State Duma are subject to compulsory examination in the Federation Council when they concern questions of:

a) the federal budget

b) federal taxes and levies;

c) financial, foreign currency, credit, and customs regulation and money emission;

d) the ratification and denunciation of international treaties of the Russian Federation;

e) the status and protection of the state border of the Russian Federation;

f) war and peace.

Article 107

1. A federal law that has been adopted is submitted within five days to the president of the Russian Federation for signing and promulgation.

2. The president of the Russian Federation signs and promulgates the federal law within 14 days.

3. If the president of the Russian Federation, within 14 days of receiving the federal law, rejects it, the State Duma and the Federation Council reexamine the said law in accordance with the procedure laid down by the Constitution of the Russian Federation. If, after repeat examination, the federal law is approved by a majority of the votes of at least two-thirds of the total number of members of the Federation Council and deputies of the State Duma in the wording previously adopted, it is to be signed by the president of the Russian Federation within seven days and promulgated.

Article 108

1. Federal constitutional laws are adopted on matters stipulated by the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

2. A federal constitutional law is deemed to be adopted if it is approved by a majority of the votes of at least three-fourths of the total number of members of the Federation Council and at least two-thirds of the total number of deputies of the State Duma. A federal constitutional law that has been adopted is to be signed by the president of the Russian Federation and promulgated within 14 days.

Article 109

1. The State Duma may be dissolved by the president of the Russian Federation in the circumstances stipulated in Articles 111 and 117 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

2. In the event of the dissolution of the State Duma, the president of the Russian Federation sets the date of elections so as to ensure that the newly elected State Duma is convened not later than four months from the date of dissolution.

3. The State Duma may not be dissolved on the grounds stipulated in Article 117 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation for one year following its election.

4. The State Duma may not be dissolved from the moment it files a charge against the president of the Russian Federation, until the adoption of a corresponding decision by the Federation Council.

5. The State Duma may not be dissolved during the period of operation of a state of martial law or state of emergency on the whole territory of the Russian Federation, or within the six months preceding the expiry of the term of office of the president of the Russian Federation.

Chapter 6. Government of the Russian Federation

Article 110

1. Executive power in the Russian Federation is exercised by the Government of the Russian Federation.

2. The Government of the Russian Federation consists of the chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, the deputy chairmen of the Government of the Russian Federation, and the federal ministers.

Article 111

1. The chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation is appointed by the president of the Russian Federation with the consent of the State Duma.

2. A proposal on the candidacy for the chairmanship of the Government of the Russian Federation is submitted not later than two weeks following the entry into office of a newly elected president of the Russian Federation or the resignation of the Government of the Russian Federation or within a week following the rejection of a candidacy by the State Duma.

3. The State Duma examines the candidacy for the chairmanship of the Government of the Russian Federation submitted by the president of the Russian Federation within a week of the day the candidacy proposal is submitted.

4. Following three rejections by the State Duma of candidacies submitted for the chairmanship of the Government of the Russian Federation, the president of the Russian Federation appoints a chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, dissolves the State Duma, and schedules new elections.

Article 112

1. The chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, not later than one week following his appointment, submits to the president of the Russian Federation proposals on the structure of the federal organs of executive power.

2. The chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation proposes to the president of the Russian Federation candidacies for the posts of deputy chairmen of the Government of the Russian Federation and federal ministers.

Article 113

The chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws, and edicts of the president of the Russian Federation, defines the basic guidelines for the activity of the Government of the Russian Federation and organizes its work.

Article 114

1. The Government of the Russian Federation:

a) drafts the federal budget, submits it to the State Duma, and ensures its implementation; submits to the State Duma a report on the implementation of the federal budget;

b) ensures the implementation of a single fiscal, credit, and monetary policy in the Russian Federation;

c) ensures the implementation of a single state policy in the Russian Federation in the sphere of culture, science, education, health, social security, and ecology;

d) administers federal property;

e) implements measures to ensure the defense of the country, state security, and the realization of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation;

f) implements measures to ensure the rule of law, civil rights and freedoms, the protection of property and public order, and the struggle against crime;

g) exercises other powers vested in it by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws, and edicts of the president of the Russian Federation.

2. The procedure for the activity of the Government of the Russian Federation is defined by federal constitutional law.

Article 115

1. On the basis of and in implementation of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws, and normative edicts of the president of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Russian Federation issues decrees and directives and ensures their implementation.

2. Decrees and directives of the Government of the Russian Federation are mandatory in the Russian Federation.

3. Decrees and directives of the Government of the Russian Federation, in the event that they are at variance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws, or edicts of the president of the Russian Federation, may be rescinded by the president of the Russian Federation.

Article 116

The Government of the Russian Federation surrenders its powers to a newly elected president of the Russian Federation.

Article 117

1. The Government of the Russian Federation may offer its resignation, which is accepted or rejected by the president of the Russian Federation.

2. The president of the Russian Federation may adopt a decision on the dismissal [otstavka] of the Government of the Russian Federation.

3. The State Duma may express no confidence in the Government of the Russian Federation. A decree of no confidence in the Government of the Russian Federation is adopted by a majority of votes of the total number of deputies of the State Duma. Following an expression of no confidence by the State Duma in the Government of the Russian Federation, the president of the Russian Federation is entitled to announce the dismissal of the Government of the Russian Federation or to disagree with the decision of the State Duma. In the event that the State Duma expresses no confidence in the Government of the Russian Federation for a second time within three

months, the president of the Russian Federation announces the dismissal of the Government or dissolves the State Duma.

4. The chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation may submit to the State Duma a motion of confidence in the Government of the Russian Federation. If the State Duma refuses its confidence, the president adopts a decision within seven days on the dismissal of the Government of the Russian Federation or on the dissolution of the State Duma and the holding of new elections.

5. In the event of its resignation or the surrender of its powers, the Government of the Russian Federation, on the instructions of the president of the Russian Federation, continues to act until the formation of the new Government of the Russian Federation.

Chapter 7. Judicial Branch

Article 118

1. Justice in the Russian Federation is exercised only by the court.

2. Judicial power is exercised by means of constitutional, civil, administrative, and criminal court proceedings.

3. The judicial system of the Russian Federation is established by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and by federal constitutional law. The creation of emergency courts is not permitted.

Article 119

Citizens of the Russian Federation who have attained the age of 25 and have higher legal education and at least five years' experience in the legal profession may be justices. Additional requirements for justices in the courts of the Russian Federation may be imposed by federal law.

Article 120

1. Justices are independent and are subordinate only to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and to federal law.

2. The court, having determined in the course of examining a case that an enactment of a state organ or other organ is not in accordance with the law, adopts a ruling in accordance with the law.

Article 121

1. Justices may not be removed.

2. A justice's powers may not be terminated or suspended except in accordance with the procedure and on the grounds laid down by federal law.

Article 122

1. Justices enjoy immunity.

2. A justice may not be subjected to criminal proceedings except in accordance with the procedure defined by federal law.

Article 123

1. The examination of cases in all courts is open. Hearing a case in closed session is permitted in circumstances stipulated in federal law.

2. The in absentia examination of criminal cases in the courts is not permitted, except in circumstances stipulated in federal law.

3. Court proceedings are carried out on the basis of the adversarial system and the equal rights of the parties.

4. In circumstances stipulated in federal law, court proceedings take place with the participation of jurors.

Article 124

The financing of courts is effected solely from the federal budget, and must ensure the possibility of the complete and independent exercise of justice in accordance with federal law.

Article 125

1. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation consists of 19 justices.

2. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, on the application of the president of the Russian Federation, the Federation Council, the State Duma, one-fifth of the members of the Federation Council or deputies of the State Duma, the Government of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation or the Superior Court of Arbitration of the Russian Federation, or organs of legislative and executive power of the components of the Russian Federation, resolves cases relating to the compliance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation of:

a) federal laws and normative enactments of the president of the Russian Federation, the Federation Council, the State Duma, or the Government of the Russian Federation;

b) the constitutions of republics and the charters of components of the Russian Federation and laws and other normative acts issued by them on matters falling within the jurisdiction of organs of state power of the Russian Federation or the joint jurisdiction of organs of state power of the Russian Federation and organs of state power of components of the Russian Federation;

c) treaties between organs of state power of the Russian Federation and organs of state power of components of the Russian Federation and treaties between organs of state power of components of the Russian Federation;

d) international treaties of the Russian Federation that have not entered into force.

3. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation resolves disputes over areas of jurisdiction:

a) between federal organs of state power;

b) between organs of state power of the Russian Federation and organs of state power of components of the Russian Federation;

c) between the highest state organs of components of the Russian Federation.

4. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, on the basis of complaints regarding the violation of citizens' constitutional rights and freedoms and at the request of justices, examines the constitutionality of the law that has been applied or is applicable in the specific case, in accordance with the procedure laid down by federal law.

5. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, on the application of the president of the Russian Federation, the Federation Council, the State Duma, the Government of the Russian Federation, or the organs of legislative power of components of the Russian Federation, provides an interpretation of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

6. Enactments or individual clauses that are deemed unconstitutional lose their force; international treaties of the Russian Federation that are not compatible with the Constitution of the Russian Federation are not valid for entry into force or application.

7. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, on the application of the Federation Council, issues a ruling on whether the presentation of a charge against the president of the Russian Federation of treason or the commission of some other grave crime complies with established procedure.

Article 126

The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation is the highest judicial organ for civil, criminal, administrative, or other cases under the jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction, exercises judicial oversight over their activity within the procedural forms laid down by federal law, and provides clarification on questions of judicial practice.

Article 127

The Superior Court of Arbitration of the Russian Federation is the highest judicial organ for the resolution of economic disputes and other cases examined by the courts of arbitration, exercises judicial oversight over their activity within the procedural forms laid down by federal law, and provides clarification on questions of judicial practice.

Article 128

1. Justices of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, and the Superior Court of Arbitration of the Russian Federation are appointed by the Federation Council on the submission of the president of the Russian Federation.

2. Justices of other federal courts are appointed by the president of the Russian Federation in accordance with the procedure laid down by federal law.

3. The powers and the procedure for the formation and activity of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, the Superior Court of Arbitration of the Russian Federation, and other federal courts are laid down by federal constitutional law.

Article 129

1. The Russian Federation Prosecutor's Office is a single centralized system in which lower-level prosecutors are subordinate to higher-level prosecutors and to the general prosecutor of the Russian Federation.

2. The general prosecutor of the Russian Federation is appointed and released from office by the Federation Council on the submission of the president of the Russian Federation.

3. The prosecutors of components of the Russian Federation are appointed by the general prosecutor of the Russian Federation by agreement with the Federation components.

4. Other prosecutors are appointed by the general prosecutor of the Russian Federation.

5. The powers and the organization and procedure of activity of the Russian Federation Prosecutor's Office are defined by federal law.

Chapter 8. Local Self-Government

Article 130

1. Local self-government in the Russian Federation ensures that the population autonomously resolves questions of local importance and the ownership, utilization, and disposal of municipal property.

2. Local self-government is exercised by citizens by means of referendums, elections, and other forms of direct expression of will and through elected and other organs of local self-government.

Article 131

1. Local self-government in urban and rural settlements and other territories is exercised with due consideration for historical and other local traditions. The structure of local self-government organs is autonomously determined by the population.

2. Changes to the borders of territories where local self-government is exercised are permitted with due consideration for the opinion of the population of the relevant territories.

Article 132

1. Organs of local self-government autonomously manage municipal property, formulate, approve, and implement the local budget, levy local taxes and duties, implement the protection of public order, and also resolve other questions of local importance.

2. Individual state powers can be vested in organs of local self-government by law, with the transfer of the material and financial resources necessary to exercise them. The exercise of delegated powers is monitorable by the state.

Article 133

Local self-government in the Russian Federation is guaranteed by the right to judicial protection, compensation for additional expenditure arising as a result of decisions adopted by organs of state power, and the prohibition of the restriction of the rights of local self-government established by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws.

Chapter 9. Constitutional Amendments and Revision of the Constitution

Article 134

Proposals to amend or revise provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation can be submitted by the president of the Russian Federation, the Federation Council, the State Duma, the Government of the Russian Federation, legislative (representative) organs of components of the Russian Federation, and also by a group comprising at least one-fifth of members of the Federation Council or deputies of the State Duma.

Article 135

1. The provisions of Chapters 1, 2, and 9 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation cannot be revised by the Federal Assembly.

2. If a proposal to revise the provisions of Chapters 1, 2, and 9 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation is supported by a vote of three-fifths of the total number of members of the Federation Council and deputies of the State Duma then, in accordance with federal constitutional law, a Constitutional Assembly is convened.

3. The Constitutional Assembly either confirms the immutability of the Constitution of the Russian Federation or elaborates a draft of a new Constitution of the Russian Federation which is adopted by the Constitutional Assembly by a vote of two-thirds of the total number of its members or is submitted to a nationwide vote. If a nationwide vote is held, the Constitution of the Russian Federation is considered adopted if votes for it are cast by more than one-half of voters casting their votes, provided that more than one-half of voters have cast their votes.

Article 136

Amendments to Chapters 3-8 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation are adopted by the procedure envisaged for the adoption of federal constitutional law and come into force after they have been approved by the organs of legislative power of at least two-thirds of the components of the Russian Federation.

Article 137

1. Amendments to Article 65 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which determines the composition of the Russian Federation, are submitted on the basis of federal constitutional law relating to admission to the Russian Federation, to the formation of a new component of the Russian Federation within it, and to the alteration of the constitutional-legal status of a component of the Russian Federation.

2. In the event of changes to the name of a republic, kray, oblast, city of federal significance, autonomous oblast, or autonomous okrug, the new name of the component of the Russian Federation is to be incorporated in Article 65 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

Section Two

Concluding and Transitional Provisions

1. The Constitution of the Russian Federation comes into force on the day of its official publication following the results of the nationwide vote.

The day of the nationwide vote—12 December 1993—is deemed the day of the adoption of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

The Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Russian Federation-Russia, adopted 12 April 1978 with its subsequent amendments and additions, simultaneously ceases to be in force.

In the event of noncompliance with provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation of provisions of the Federation Treaty—the Treaty on the Delimitation of Areas of Responsibility and Powers Between Federal Organs of State Power of the Russian Federation and Organs of State Power of Sovereign Republics Within the Russian Federation, the Treaty on the Delimitation of Areas of Responsibility and Powers Between Federal Organs of State Power of the Russian Federation and Organs of State Power of Krays, Oblasts, and the Cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg in the Russian Federation, the Treaty on the Delimitation of Areas of Responsibility and Powers Between Federal Organs of State Power of the Russian Federation and Organs of State Power of the Autonomous Oblast and Autonomous Okrugs of the Russian Federation, as well as other treaties between federal organs of state power of the

Russian Federation and organs of state power of components of the Russian Federation, and treaties between organs of state power of components of the Russian Federation—the provisions of the Constitution of the Russian Federation will prevail.

2. Laws and other legal enactments which were in force on the territory of the Russian Federation prior to the entry into force of the present Constitution are applied to the extent to which they do not contravene the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

3. From the day the present Constitution comes into force, the president of the Russian Federation, elected in accordance with the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Russian Federation-Russia, exercises the powers laid down by the present Constitution until the expiry of the term for which he was elected.

4. From the day the present Constitution comes into force, the Council of Ministers-Government of the Russian Federation acquires the rights, obligations, and responsibilites of the Government of the Russian Federation established by the Constitution of the Russian Federation and is thereafter known as the Government of the Russian Federation.

5. Courts in the Russian Federation administer justice in compliance with the powers laid down by the present Constitution.

After the Constitution has come into force, the justices of all courts in the Russian Federation retain their powers until the expiry of the term for which they were elected. Vacancies are filled according to the procedure established by the present Constitution.

6. Pending the entry into force of the federal law laying down the procedure for the hearing of cases by a court with the participation of jurors, the existing procedure for judicial examination of such cases is retained.

The existing procedures for the arrest, holding in custody, and detention of persons suspected of having committed a crime are retained until such time as the criminal procedure legislation of the Russian Federation is brought into line with the provisions of the present Constitution.

7. The first Federation Council and the first State Duma are elected for a two-year term.

8. The Federation Council will convene for its first sitting on the 30th day following its election. The first sitting of the Federation Council will be opened by the president of the Russian Federation.

9. A deputy of the first State Duma can simultaneously be a member of the Government of the Russian Federation. The provisions of the present Constitution on deputies' immunity as regards liability for actions (or inaction) associated with the performance of official duties do not extend to deputies of the State Duma who are members of the Government of the Russian Federation.

Deputies of the first Federation Council perform their duties on a part-time basis.

Editor on Yeltsin, 'Predictable Politics'

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[Article by Vitaliy Tretyakov, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA chief editor: "Elections, Constitution, and Life. Two Parallel Lines Intersect Only in Infinity, i.e., Beyond 1996"]

[Text] President Yeltsin has announced that he will stay on in his post until 1996. Thereby he has disavowed his own promise to hold presidential elections next summer—on 12 June. Viktor Chernomyrdin described this as a decision by "a man of high integrity." I do not know what integrity, especially high, has to do with this, but it is clear that this is politics, moreover easily predictable politics.

In fact, everything can now be predicted with the maximum degree of probability because what is currently at work are the mechanisms of political life—not some ideas or considerations of morality.

So, on 12 December a constitution will be adopted at the referendum which includes a gentleman's set of rights, freedoms, and democratic bodies, but this will be a constitution for the president in general—for President Yeltsin in particular.

On 12 December a new parliament will also be elected—decently democratic, but pretty soon it will become indecently oppositional to the government course. The reason is obvious—the government's course is incoherent, and moreover it vacillates to suit the situation. Therefore it will breed opposition in all proportions.

Then a new government will be formed. In all likelihood, it will be headed by Viktor Chernomyrdin although there is also an approximately 30 percent probability that it will be led by Yegor Gaydar. Chernomyrdin has to his credit the fact that his resignation would mean a too real strengthening of the anti-Gaydar opposition in and around the Federal Assembly. At the same time, within the present composition of the government (apparently after the elections will be decoratively and marginally renewed) a certain modus vivendi will be found—they quarrel but they do not divorce.

The pro-Gaydar opposition in the event of Chernomyrdin's retaining his post as head of government is, first, more civilized (in its nonradical part) and second, (in the same part), it is more professional—that is to say, it has many other things to do apart from indulging in political intrigues.

Therefore we again end up with what the president and his team tried to move away from with his decisions of 21 September and 4 October. There will be no greater stability in the accurate sense of this word, but there is a

greater confidence on the part of many top-level officials about their own political future in the next few years. Actually, this is what they have been aspiring for. I can just imagine how Boris Yeltsin's close entourage was persuading him (if he really thought about it) to renounce the 12 June elections. To go through such a frightening stretch, and all for the sake of six months of quiet life?! Clearly, the present generation of Russian politicians cannot rise above this communist tradition—once you have reached the pinnacles of power, it is for the rest of your life.

Hence the continued tradition for further bloating of the state apparatus because only it, especially with its present intimate links with commercial structures, allows everyone willing to be ensured the utmost political and material well-being. In Lenin's terminology, we are certainly entering the stage of state capitalism, extremely monopolized and extremely politicized. This trend is clear-cut and unequivocal.

The situation with Russia's military and foreign policy is more complex. The contradictions between the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry are becoming increasingly obvious. Whereas the official foreign policy course since fall 1991 has turned 90 degrees, the military course has made a full U-turn.

I remember the end of last summer, when "A Strategy for Russia" was published in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, essentially raising the question about the unfeasibility of a crystal-pure democratic foreign policy for the central republic of a former empire, which aroused discontent in official quarters. Now the Foreign Ministry has long been working according to this scheme, but the Defense Ministry is even more radical. The defense minister is not only substantially revising the military doctrine, returning it to the nuclear channel, but himself sets conditions for the pullout of Russian troops from the former USSR republics. All this is dictated by, among other things, objective reasons, but the disparity between the activity of the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry is becoming increasingly wider while President Yeltsin is sitting on both ends of these scissors. These are the grounds for future political crises.

To be sure, the army's choice on the night of 3 and 4 October was correct since, first, a different choice could rather have led to a full-scale civil war; second, Rutskoy and Khasbulatov (had they been successful) would have begun to divide power among themselves, but the final price for that choice is such that any constitutions, parliaments, elections, and referendums have now turned into nothing more than political rituals since the maximum effect is produced not by a sound policy but by a sound influence on the president. In any event we have returned to the Andropov era (but in a democratic decor). Yuriy Vladimirovich wanted everyone to arrive at work on time. In Moscow that resulted in colossal congestion in the Metro, which showed that new rules of the game are impossible to enforce without violence either with respect to the people or to transport as part of the social system. In fact, the present-day reformers are trying to do the same, only within the scope of the entire society. No wonder that failures occur here, there, and everywhere. Yet the order has been issued to move toward a market economy, but the Metro is a little too narrow. Therefore everything has to be spurred on by orders (i.e., edicts) all the time which are being only half-fulfilled. Purely authoritarian methods are no longer working, but purely democratic methods on the other hand may return society into the "Brezhnev stagnation period." Hence the constant changes in the rules of the game and administration through edicts (i.e., provisional laws). Hence also the relative unimportance of the concrete content of the constitution. The apparatus will be implementing it through inertia, i.e., in a way that is dictated by the expediency of a concrete situation and the interests of the apparatus in this situation. Society will be trying to grab what is "its own;" the civil servants, "their own;" and the large property owners, "their own." Therefore until 1996 what matters is not the text of the constitution but an assortment of figures at the head of Russia. Therefore the struggle is being waged not for the lineup of these figures around the Kremlin throne, which naturally must be preserved intact because getting to it allows everything to be achieved at once. The end justifies the means only when it is single, and single it must remain because, if anything, our politicians mastered the Leninist strategy of seizing the commanding heights back when they were still young Pioneers.

Sverdlovsk Council To Hold Referendum on Ural Republic

LD0911135893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1015 GMT 9 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nadezhda Potapova]

[Text] Yekaterinburg November 9 TASS—The Sverdlovsk regional council which held an emergency session on Tuesday [9 November] has resolved to hold its own referendum on the constitution of the self-proclaimed Ural republic and early elections of the governor on December 12.

These resolutions were adopted in the wake of criticism voiced by Moscow of the self-proclaimed Urals republic.

The referendum on the constitution "of local importance" which was adopted by Sverdlovsk law-makers at the last session, is expected to give more legitimacy to the document in the absence of the highest representative bodies of power in Russia.

It was pointed out that elections of the governor scheduled to take place after bodies of the highest legislative power are elected, will be held to protect him from any sanctions by the federal authorities.

Yeltsin Dissolves Ural Republic

AU0911154793 Paris AFP in English 1530 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow, Nov 9 (AFP)—Russian President Boris Yeltsin dissolved on Tuesday the self-proclaimed Urals Republic and declared that all decisions by the local government were without legal force.

The Presidential Press Office said Yeltsin issued a decree ordering "a halt to activities of the Sverdlovsk regional soviet and local deputies."

Earlier Tuesday regional deputies in Yekaterinburg, formerly Sverdlovsk, reaffirmed a decision taken in late October to declare their region a republic.

Yeltsin Dissolves Sverdlovsk Parliament

LD0911155793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1540 GMT 9 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow November 9 TASS—President Boris Yeltsin decreed on Tuesday [9 November] to dissolve the parliament of his native Sverdlovsk region which had raised the status of the region and proclaimed the Ural Republic.

The press service of the president said the decree was signed "in connection with multiple violations by the soviet of the Russian Constitution and laws".

The president also ruled to hold elections of a new regional legislature in January-February 1994. The exact date of the elections is to be announced by the regional administration.

Ural Republic Constitution Affirmed

LD0911173193 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1500 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Telephoned report from Yekaterinburg by correspondent Vladimir Perfilyev—from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] A session of the Full Council [Bolshoy Sovet] of the Sverdlovsk oblast was held in Yekaterinburg today. It once again confirmed the legitimacy of the constitution of the Ural Republic, which was recently adopted. It was decided to hold elections for governor of the Urals Republic on 12 December, along with the elections to the Federal Assembly and the State Duma. The elections for governor are to be held in accordance with a law adopted today. At this stage it is too early to talk about what kind of republic the Urals Republic will be and and what kind of governor it will have. Moscow will probably have to decide on this.

Sverdlovsk Executive Head Dissolves Legislature

LD1011145293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1338 GMT 10 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nadezhda Potapova]

[Text] Yekaterinburg November 10 TASS—Eduard Rossel, head of the administration of the Sverdlovsk region of Russia, signed a resolution on Wednesday dissolving the regional legislature which had proclaimed the Ural republic and adopted its constitution.

The decision came after President Boris Yeltsin decreed on Tuesday to dissolve the parliament of his native Sverdlovsk region "in connection with multiple violations by the Soviet of the Russian Constitution and laws".

"The decision of the Soviet to proclaim the Ural republic and the adoption of the Constitution of the Ural republic were recognised as legally invalid from the moment of adoption", the presidential press service commented.

The president also ruled to hold elections of a new regional legislature in January-February 1994. The exact date of the elections is to be announced by the regional administration.

Rossel's resolution orders to transfer the property of the legislature to the regional administration and to provide social guarantees to the leaders of the dissolved soviet.

It also establishes a commission which is to prepare elections to the regional parliament.

Security Council's Rubanov Interviewed

LD0911224593 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1900 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Studio interview with Vladimir Rubanov, deputy secretary of Security Council, by various journalists, hosted by Sergey Torchinskiy and Tatyana Krasnova; from the "Without Retouching" program—live]

[Excerpts] [Krasnova] Vladimir Arsentyevich Rubanov, born 1944 in Voronezh oblast. Prior to the army he studied at an institute and at the same time he was a worker in factories in Voronezh. He spent his military service in the Soviet Army, in radio counter-intelligence, and completed it as an officer in the reserve of the USSR KGB. In 1970 Vladimir Rubanov graduated from the Voronezh polytechnic institute, speciality engineer-mechanic in aircraft building, and spent a year working as a design engineer at an aviation plant in Voronezh. In 1971 he joined the KGB, and in 1981 he came to Moscow and served in the central apparatus. He underwent legal post-graduate training at the USSR KGB higher school. In 1989 and 1990 Vladimir Rubanov was an aide to the USSR minister of internal affairs, then deputy chairman of the RSFSR State Committee for Defence and Security, and from 1991 he was head of the analytical directorate of the USSR KGB. In 1992 Vladimir Rubanov was discharged from active military service into the reserve on completing his term of service, with the rank of colonel. And since August 1993 Vladimir Rubanov has been deputy secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council. Vladimir Rubanov is married, he has two children, he is interested

in painting and writing on current affairs. He is a member of the editorial council of the journal SVOBODNAYA MYSL [FREE THOUGHT], which is represented in our program today, and this journal published the first current affairs articles by Vladimir Arsentyevich. [passage omitted]

[Rubanov] Well, first of all I would like to introduce the structure in which I now work, because it is not traditional for our political practice, for our state, and in this regard I would like to use the time to talk a bit to the journalists here and to the viewers about what the Security Council is, what it does, where the idea originated, because I was quite directly connected with the idea of the Security Council, when I was still working in the KGB. Even then it was clear that the special services don't always take a standpoint which represents common state interests, that the KGB quite often represented its own departmental approach. When I started studying the experience of other countries, how the system of state security is managed and organized, I noticed that all more or less democratic states have such a structure as a national security council. This is a body which is designed for the top political leadership of a country to be able to manage its own structures, and so that departmental approaches of such powerful organizations as the special services, the Defense Ministry, so that they might be able to coordinate their activities with the civilian departments. If you like, it's a form of civil and presidential supervision of the activities of the special services and power departments.

Under conditions of transition to a democratic form of administration, the role of the Security Council is very important. I think that it is a body that is capable of elaborating an ideology of reform and ensuring supervision of its implementation. This is a body that enables the president to directly supervise the activities of the special services. It is a body that enables departments to work out a coordinated approach and submit it for the president's decision. It is a body that makes it possible to develop an integral policy in the sphere of national security, not from the standpoint of departmental approaches, but from a standpoint of common state interests.

At present this is already becoming our political practice to a certain extent, at present the results of the Security Council's activity have appeared. Just recently there has been quite a lot of interest in such a product of the Security Council as the military doctrine. This is not the only document being prepared in the sphere of national security, and I would also like to say that in the long term we anticipate that the Security Council's role will grow, and it should grow.

Probably viewers' and journalists' interest is in the operation of this mechanism, and in this regard I would like to move on to the dialogue with the journalists. My first thoughts about how the sphere of national security should be managed, how the activity of the special services differs from ensuring security as a common state function, what is important for the country, and how an information culture differs from a cult of secrecy, these thoughts were published for the first time in the journal SVOBODNAYA MYSL five years ago. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified SVOBODNAYA MYSL correspondent] Yes, a lot of water has flowed under the bridge since that time, that is since 1988. Your publications really did evoke a whole barrage of responses throughout the world and various kinds of analytical considerations. I can see, I can see. KOMMUNIST magazine was transformed into SVOBODNAYA MYSL. Tell us please, in these years has society moved a long way in information culture, in your view?

[Rubanov] Well, there is certain progress, albeit in the sense that the subject itself has gone beyond prohibition. The term "intellectual property" had to a certain extent become an everyday one. A number of draft laws have been adopted, but nevertheless, for all that, with respect to many issues we still do not understand the fact that information and intellectual property is what is renewable for us, it is our invaluable national resource, on which one stakes incidentally in an (?ideologically) developed society. Literally, I had a meeting today within the framework of the American-Russian commission on issues of conversion, where the problem of bringing closer the national legislation in the sphere of security, where the American representatives themselves said that Russia's wealth is precisely not its raw materials, but its wealth lies in the information, in those talents, those resources that have accumulated in our country, first and foremost in the defense industry. Therefore, in this sense there is progress, but a great deal of work still lies ahead before are working on the level of world standards. [passage omitted]

[Grigoryan] Sergey Grigoryan,, GLASNOST agency. Vladimir Arsentyevich, you were the first person from the group of, let us say, people who were striving for reform in the Ministry of Security, from Bakatin's group, who returned to the state apparatus. In the two months since your return, really even less, big changes have taken place in the country and in the Ministry of Security. Do you think that other colleagues of yours, let's say like General Sham or Petr Grozay or Petr Nikulin may also return to the KGB now and promote changes in the Ministry of Security?

[Rubanov] Well, I would like to say, Sergey Aleksandrovich, that in general I have not returned to the Ministry of Security. Generally speaking I have gone over to a structure of a slightly different type. I would probably put it like this. Naturally, the people that you have mentioned are people who have left their own good mark on the activity. These were people who distinguished themselves during the period of reform. It is those people who did in fact make the breakthrough which society may not have seen and hastened those changes which occurred in society. I do not think that this will actually happen at the present time. I maintain contacts with the

people that you mentioned. I do not think that one can go down the same road twice, all the more so since their ages do not allow them to be engaged in operational work, and as far as their potential is concerned, I believe that it will be called for and used by society, and I think that it will be required by the state structure as well. If one takes, for example, the activity in which Petr Ivan Glazay is engaged, he is occupied in setting up a security service for independent enterprises, including such state enterprises as the Gazprom. He is thereby making a contribution to the security system.

That is, we are moving away from the totalitarian method of protecting our normal vital interests to a separate method where the state is occupied with those functions relating to the authorities and the politicians, and all the other security issues in the sphere of industry should be in the new structures. These structures themselves are developed. The experience that these members of staff have is probably different from that of others, and their capabilities will be called for today. Therefore I do not think that the problem of where they are is a real one.

[Vaynonen] Nikita Vaynonen, from ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI newspaper. Vladimir Arsentyevich, judging by the press, many people have been perplexed, if not bewildered, in my view, by the absence from our military doctrine of Russia's pledge not to be the first to use nuclear arms. Was this issue debated when the program was being drawn up? What is your attitude to this fact, what would you say about it?

[Rubanov] Yes, there were debates, moreover, the military doctrine was developed without involving the general public and in a fairly secret way precisely because the military doctrine contains a number of provisions which are understood properly only by professionals. A somewhat incorrect interpretation of them could have provoked undesirable political debates, influenced the authors and, perhaps, not the best solutions could have been taken under pressure from non-professionals. I would like to say, after the event, that today I had very long conversations with the U.S. military, including a deputy secretary for defense. They are professionals and they understand why such a provision has not been made. The thing is that, all right, we will not be the first to use nuclear arms, but what if another kind of mass destruction weapon is used against us? What then? So a multitude of problems are arising here. Therefore, by a whole range of its other provisions the doctrine itself guarantees that, like a number of other nuclear countries, Russia will not be the first to use it, in essence. But a moment of uncertainty should remain for a potential aggressor who flouts the laws of the world community and makes it possible to solve the task proceeding from the situation. I can say that a provision on not to be the first to use nuclear arms is included only in the People's Republic of China's doctrine, while all the states, following long and complex deliberation, have based their nuclear doctrines on the concept of deterrence, and this is a common provision.

[Vaynonen] In other words, the absence of this provision has a preventive nature, as it were, not that of threat?

[Rubanov] Yes, absolutely correct.

[Vaynonen] Thank you.

[Filgengauer] Pavel Filgengauer, from SEGODNYA newspaper. Vladimir Arsentyevich, a year ago President Yeltsin promised that a military doctrine would be adopted after public discussion, but his promise was not kept, and even after being adopted the military doctrine remains formally not for publication. As was promised, the military doctrine should become an integral part of Russia's general security doctrine. Can we expect that at least this part of the general security doctrine will be made public?

[Rubanov] Yes, I believe that this promise remains valid and the doctrine will be made public. Moreover, a version of the doctrine meant for publication is ready and is currently being agreed with members of the Security Council. Practically the whole doctrine will be published. But I would like to draw your attention to the following circumstance. The thing is that, in accordance with the usual way of adopting a doctrine, it is written as a method for implementing laws in the sphere of national security. In the sphere of [national]] security our legal basis is inadequate for the time being, and a number of questions which have been streamlined in the doctrine do not follow immediately from the laws we currently have, although the doctrine had to address them anyway. The issue of publishing the doctrine in full is therefore also linked with the circumstance that we live now, let us say, through an extraordinary period.

We should not forget either that, generally speaking, representative authority, the Federal Assembly, should have their say, too. I believe that the executive authority has expressed its stand on those issues, but nevertheless there is a need to consult the legislators. After the legislators have been consulted on the issues which may have been interpreted not in a straightforward way in the doctrine, after the doctrine has been discussed at the Federal Assembly, it will be published in full, but the main part of the doctrine will be published in the near future, it is a technical question.

[Filgengauer] And what sections precisely will not be published?

[Rubanov] I think that all sections will be published. I have in mind the military, political, and military-technical fundamentals of the military doctrine. I am only saying that there are several bits which, however, require professional and politically frank dialogue, but I repeat that there is nothing mind-shattering there. However, a state should observe certain rules. We should not make use of the extraordinary situation which exists at present and take decisions which put the executive authority in a special position.

[Zhavoronkov] Gennadiy Zhavoronkov, from OBSHCHAYA GAZETA. Vladimir Arsentyevich, even your ill-wishers describe you as a highly professional analyst. Could you please disclose the terrible secret of what a state secret is? You know when I tried, for instance, to learn about Sakharov's documents in the former KGB and now the Security Ministry, I was called an agent of influence of Western special services trying to steal state secrets. I would not like to be a spy and damage my own state. Could you explain to us, simple mortal taxpayers, what is a state secret?

[Rubanov] On the whole, a state secret is a certain limitation of the right to information. In other words, within the normal established legal space covering information, citizens should have access to any activity of any state structures, but limitations on access to certain kinds of information are established in the interests of national security. There are several principles here. First, these data are not a norm but an exception in an ordinary law-based society. Second, they should relate to the spheres of defense, security and interstate relations. Third, these exceptions should be made known to citizens. Fourth, all these exceptions should be made in accordance with a procedure laid down in law.

If these four characteristics are present, then everything is legal. But if it is a question of departments hiding their actions or abuses of law, world practice bans that. Moreover, the legislation on state secrets, incidentally, our legislation, too, forbids using the institution of restricted access to information on defense and national security for the purpose of restricting access to the information needed by society if there are signs showing, I repeat, that the concept of state secret is being used to hide departmental mistakes and so on. In this sense, naturally, we should give up this practice, and the new law on state secrets—and I, incidentally, took a certain part in developing it—includes this norm, fortunately. In other words, the law directly forbids the use of restricted access for covering up the work of departments.

[Veniditov] Aleksey Venidiktov, Ekho Moskvy radio station. Vladimir Arsentyevich, was the issue of dividing the present-day Security Ministry into several individual departments discussed at the Security Council? If yes, what can you say about this? If no, what is your personal view?

[Rubanov] I would like to say straight away that although many versions on this account have been published in the press, this issue was not discussed at the Security Council. The issue of whether this operation is required or not, I think, should become the subject of a specially commissioned study and a Security Council commission's work, and only after this can the issue be raised.

For me and for many other people it is not an obvious issue. For instance, let us take the sphere of economic security. First of all, our economic departments have not established what is good and what is bad and the role of our intelligence and counter-intelligence in protecting our vital economic interests. In other words, I believe than we should now abandon the old practice of reorganizing something without setting a clear-cut goal for ourselves or providing a mechanism for implementing the decisions adopted by the supreme state authorities. I think that, first, we should define our policy in the spheres of economic security, ecological security and so on, and the role and place of state structures, including the special services, and only after this can we talk about different forms of organizational structure. So I would not raise the issue now but, instead, I would simply answer the question on the purpose of the special services and the sphere of their activities. Only then, after the purpose has been determined, should the functions and the structure follow, in accordance with the theory of state management. I believe that this theory should be applied to determine the future of our special services.

[Bekhtina] Natalya Bekhtina, from Radio Rossii. Vladimir Arsentyevich, many listeners, viewers, and readers are aware of the sad history of the intellectual potential of the military-industrial complex. Has the Security Council any specific measures for putting to use this rich intellectual potential for purposes other than the production of frying pans and mixers, that is, for truly serious purposes?

[Rubanov] Well, you know, the Security Council, or to be more precise its working apparatus, is taking relevant measures in the structural and operational aspects. First of all, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that two inter-departmental commissions—if somebody has read the president's latest decree on measures to develop the Security Council, the presidential decree provides for a commission, led by Mikhail Dmitriyevich Maley, for scientific and technical issues of the defense industry—incidentally, this inter-departmental commission is precisely the structure which should define the problem and present it to the president in a correctly worded form—and a commission for information security, also provided for in the decree. I am now taking part in developing its concept and preparing normative documents. These two inter-departmental commissions should develop, let us say, standards which will make it possible for us to determine priorities, to solve the issue of carrying out an inventory of our achievements and taking them under protection, but the main thing is, you see, that these achievements are without owners.

There was a meeting with an American delegation today, including on issues of control of export, but the problem is not that of providing control over our dangerous technologies which can get in the hands of dangerous regimes. The problem is that control becomes effective only when this intellectual property, these achievements, including those suitable for military purposes, find owners, for if there is no owner, nobody can be encouraged or punished. Yes, this is a topical issue, and in my opening remarks I said that it is scientific and technical potential precisely, our national resource that makes us a country deserving a high position among developed

countries, and we must, first of all, tackle these issues the way it is done in other countries.

[Makarov] Dmitriy Makarov of ARGUMENTY I FAKTY. Does Russia still have any secrets from other states, given our military sales and world travel by KGB generals.

[Rubanov] Undoubtedly some secrets remain, and I would like to draw your attention to the fact that when you cited examples of secrets, they were mainly related to the problems of intellectual property, namely scientific and technical secrets. Because our state used to be a monopolist, matters that are usually dealt with through copyright, patent rights and industrial confidentiality, were simply dealt with by using state secrets. So our understanding of a state secret is rather broader than in other countries, but as for secrets relating to issues of defense and the arms trade, this is common practice, you know, and it depends what our technical cooperation relations are like. After all, a secret can be preserved through bilateral relations. So you have to take specific examples. Say we are selling arms. This will be to an ally and we will maintain secrecy through the means of international law and the other state also has no interest in letting this secret leaking out because this would make things worse for them, and the effectiveness of military equipment is reduced as a result of the disclosure of information.

Generally speaking, the sphere of secrecy should not be a large one. It should primarily concern the military sphere. [passage omitted]

[Grachev] Ivan Grachev, POSTFACTUM. I have two very brief questions. Tell us please, the majority of viewers have no idea what the Security Council is. Viewers do not know this, I am sure. We don't know how many members you have in the Security Council, who they are? There have been reshuffles recently and people have changed in it. How do you explain this and what was the cause? That is my first question. My second is this. You worked in state structures, then you went into private business and then you returned. Where do prefer to be?

[Rubanov] Right, on the first question. In actual fact, the Security Council is described in such detail in the law on security that anyone who is interested can find out everything about the Security Council in it. In addition, it follows from this law that those working in, or rather not working in but who make up, the Security Council, are mainly ex officio, as they say. In other words, they are on the Security Council by virtue of the office they hold. So, according to the law, the Security Council is made up of: the president who is chairman of the council; the vice president; the prime minister; the secretary of the Security Council; and the first deputy head of representative power. At present, there are three permanent members of the Security Council, namely the president, vice president, and the secretary of the Security Council. You know why this is. It is because of the present essentially emergency nature of the activity of executive power and the absence of these structures.

As for the other officials who make up the Security Council, they are directly defined by the law. They are: the minister of defense, minister of foreign affairs, minister of security, and minister of internal affairs, in other words, the power structures. Then there are the head of the Foreign Intelligence Service and leading departments: the ministers of economy, finances, and for healthcare and ecological issues.

Essentially, the publication of the latest decree was not a result of the president changing something. Simply the people in these posts had changed and the decree was announcing the new members of the Security Council. In other words, this was not, in fact, a case of an initiative that deviated from the law. That's the first question.

As for the second question, for me the question of whether it is better or worse is connected to a certain extent with where one can realize one's potential best of all. I can say that our state is currently still very strong, and very many things depend on the state, including also the sphere of private business. Therefore, I believe that my potential was developed better, at least in my case, is better realized within the sphere of state activity. This is what I was trained for, it is my profession. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified correspondent] What legal guarantees does a person with a different way of thinking have today? How is the individual protected from the Security Minister, from the organization for which we have don't exactly have fond memories?

[Rubanov] They are not fond memories, but I would like to draw attention to the fact that, first, there are legal gaurantees, that is, in general the Committee for State Security is dependent on an article which is de facto linked either with violent overthrow of power or with a call for a violent overthrow of power. Thus this is the line which distinguishes pluralism, let's say, and any political opposition, from what is criminal. This is the first thing. The activity of political parties, including opposition parties, is the second feature to which I would like to draw attention. According to the law, their activity is monitored by the procuracy and the Ministry of Justice. Today's practice itself shows that for political reasons—there are representatives from the Glasnost agency... [pauses] I do not think there are any instances which would point to the Security Ministry doing this.

[Unidentified correspondent] The idiocy of secrecy—that's precisely what I call the extent of secrecy which there was—caused a great deal of damage to our country, in economic terms in particular.

[Rubanov] Yes, I agree. A great deal of harm. The fact is that information and scientific and technological achievements are the sort of things which quickly become outdated and rusty without use. Thus many national resources were developed in exemplary fashion

but it is a bit like the harvst which was good but which was left to rot in the fields. So a purely strong-arm approach to the issue of security, a narrow departmental approach to security issues has to be overcome. Today the issue of the safety of information—and the Security Council is forming a commission on these issues—the main department will be Kominform, the committee for information affairs. Thus it will formulate a policy and the issues of protection and the fight against foreign intelligence service will follow on from what the use of information is all about.

[Krasnova] They say that a CheKa officer must have a cool head, a hot heart, and clean hands. This may be a somewhat personal question. You spent a while serving in the KGB. Did you possess all these qualities?

[Rubanov] I would not like to talk about myself; I am not my own judge. I would only say one thing: I believe that now we are assessing the KGB, the behavior of the people who served in it, and its role in society in a very primitive way. The fact is that the KGB was a rather elitist organization, and I want to say that only people who had graduated with distinction were considered for jobs in state security. We had all lived during that period, hadn't we. However, in terms of sincerity and ethics, the staff of special services and security rated rather high. I can say that it was corporation ethics: You come to a new town, you do not know anybody, you go to your colleague for help, and you get it without any hassle. Some officers' traditions—in the good sense of this word—existed in the KGB, including those principles that you have mentioned. For many people these words had meaning, and we educated the staff in this spirit of clean hands. You remember Andrey Sakharov's words that that organization was better than other institutions.

[Krasnova] Another short question in the remaining seconds. Vladimir Arsentyevich, did you foresee, as a professional, the outcome of those tragic events on 3 and 4 October?

[Rubanov] Yes I did, because you know, I believe it's always down to force or law. Any decision which breaks the law is always fraught with a violent resolution of conflict. I am not going to pass judgement, I am only going to say that there were many digressions beyond the space defined by the law during that political crisis. I abide by the principle of the supremacy of law even when the world topples, if you wish. Because if the law starts to topple, the world would surely follow.

[Krasnova] Thank you.

[GLASNOST agency correspondent] Vladimir Arsentyevich, it is hard to fully agree with your assessment of the KGB and the Ministry of Security; you understand of course that your experience differs quite substantially from ours. But I would like to ask you about another matter. You are an author of the law on the state secret which has been adopted in a different version. To what extent are you planning to continue reforming legislation, so that the functions of special services would finally be changed?

[Rubanov] I would like to say about the law on the state secret that changing a law is not an end in itself. A law should have some social effect in the final account. Therefore, I think that the main way of improving this newly adopted law is to bring it into correlation with the new legislation on intellectual property. It should help us to fulfill our potential and not be an obstacle to this. It is in this respect that it should be brought into agreement with other legal norms. [passage omitted]

[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent] Mr. Kalugin has recently said again that Oleg Gordiyevskiy has betrayed his motherland. So what has he betrayed—the regime or his motherland? But then the majority of Russians have betrayed the regime. What is your attitude to this situation, and especially to the fact that his sentence still remains in force?

[Rubanov] Well, as for the first part of your question, betrayal of the motherland is of course an ideologically charged formula. I have written before that motherland is a moral, not a legal notion, and for this reason it would be more appropriate to speak in terms of high treason if we are talking about the correctness of the wording. As for the question of whether he broke his oath of allegiance to his state—bad though that state may have been—I think he probably did. It is difficult to say that he has not committed this act of high treason in the legal sense; in fact, he has committed it. [passage omitted]

[SEGODNYA correspondent] What is Russia's overall security doctrine like, what is its structure, and which of the deputy heads of the Security Council supervises the drawing up of this doctrine?

[Rubanov] You know, at the moment I would answer: Well, of course the secretary of the Security Council, because this is a general kind of work, not just covering one particular aspect. But you have probably noticed a recent decree setting up a Scientific Consultative Council under the Security Council; that is, researchers are being specially recruited who will assist the Security Council, with the help of various branches of the Academy of Sciences and other institutes and departments, to fulfill this difficult task. [passage omitted]

[SVOBODNAYA MYSL correspondent] Vladimir Arsentyevich, in your articles you have written—very conclusively, in my opinion—about our country's national interest. Which election bloc, do you think, represents Russia's national interests in the most adequate way?

[Rubanov] You know, the question of correlation between party interests and the interest of the whole nation is the most complicated of all, but if you ask me, I can say this: Of course, the party which really wants to come to power should reflect the entire gamut of political forces and political interests. But frankly speaking, I

cannot see a bloc which would live up to demands of a state-wide scope in the full sense of the word. After all, every bloc has a certain social basis, a limited range of interest and its slogans and standpoints are adjusted to the political environment. In that sense, I think we have not yet reached the level of forming parties on a state level, mature parties. We are still in our infancy.

[Venediktov] Aleksey Venediktov, Ekho Moskvy. Vladimir Arsentyevich, could you tell us about the strange actions taken by the Security Council during the events of 3-4 October, and why was there a need to set up an operational headquarters headed by General Kopets and Dmitriy Volkogonov? Were there no other structures?

[Rubanov] This conversation is, surely, not for the Blitz section [of this program]. The thing is that the Security Council does not deal with operational matters. It is in its power to suggest to the president to impose a state of emergency.

[Venidiktov] And did you suggest it?

[Rubanov] The president arrived at this decision himself and discussed it with us at the Security Council sitting when he arrived in Moscow. In other words, I would like to say that the Security Council is not an operational headquarters. It works out policy and coordinates the work of the departments. As for other questions, Oleg Lobov and the power ministers [silovyye ministry], so to speak, took a joint decision and the very work carried out during that critical period at night was in essence what the Security Council was working on, on the adoption of difficult decisions which are known to you. That is why I do not agree with you fully.

[Torchinskiy] Thank you. OBSHCHAYA GAZETA. Stand by, ARGUMENTY I FAKTY.

[Zhavoronkov] One felt ashamed and embittered to read the semi-criminal conversations between Barannikov and Yakubovskiy, which we are still continuing to read. Maybe we need some sort of public commission to carry out supervision so that the lessons we have learned do not repeat themselves and so that we are not utterly defenseless against our own Security Ministry?

[Rubanov] Well, you see, I would like to say here that law cannot be more important than morality. Since methods of this sort are being used in political struggle, they reflect, first and foremost, the moral state of society and the moral condition of state structures. The only thing I can do is to say that I share your anxiety in the sense that these methods ought to be eliminated from political struggle, even acute political struggle. The question of the involvement of the Security Ministry in these problems is not obvious to me, there are no real facts here, and I would not really agree with the second part of your question. I simply do not possess the facts to make such accusations. I do not want to become like the people who base their accusations and interpretations on rumors. It only whips up passions in society. [passage omitted]

[Torchinskiy] Radio Rossii. Stand by, ZA RULEM.

[Bekhtina] Vladimir Arsenyevich, after all these painful and tragic events, can you say that the Security Council possesses some information guaranteeing that this situation cannot and should not be repeated? Are you more in control of the situation?

[Rubanov] You know, I would not guarantee that at the moment because the question you raise is a question of giving the president a tactical and strategic warning of threats, first of all, internal threats. The Security Council is the one to work out such a mechanism. I am not going to talk now about the way it works in other countries, for instance, FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency], an American system aimed at the timely settlement of critical situations. One cannot achieve it overnight. But we are working on an early warning system for the president. [passage omitted]

[POSTFACTUM correspondent] In 1991, when you were head of the KGB analytical adminstration, according to certain information, your brother in law was working in an American firm and lived in the same apartment as you. Is that normal? In previous times, the period of stagnation, could this be tolerated? And how does this tie up?

[Rubanov] Well, my brother in law graduated from the Patrice Lumumba institute, and in general terms, he was working in an American firm as an employee through the diplomatic corps. He was invited to this firm, he went through a competition, and in this sense ...

[Correspondent, interrupting] And could this have happened in years gone by?

[Rubanov] I believe that this happened as much as you like even in years gone by.

[Correspondent] So it's normal?

[Rubanov] Yes, it's normal. [passage omitted]

Yeltsin Approves List of Security Council Commissions

PM0911152793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Nov 93 First Edition p 5

[Edict No. 1686 of the Russian Federation president "On Improving the Activity of the Interdepartmental Commissions of the Russian Federation Security Council," dated Moscow, the Kremlin, 20 October 1993 and signed by Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin, followed by "List of Standing Interdepartmental Commissions of the Russian Federation Security Council"]

[Text] For the purposes of improving the activity of the interdepartmental commissions of the Russian Federation Security Council I decree:

1. That the following are approved:

the list of standing interdepartmental commissions of the Russian Federation Security Council (appended);

the Standard Statute on the Interdepartmental Commission of the Russian Federation Security Council (appended).

The working apparatuses, appellations, and statutes of the interdepartmental commissions provided for in the appendix to this edict are to be brought into line with the structure of the apparatus of the Russian Federation Security Council, the list of standing interdepartmental commissions of the Russian Federation Security Council, and the Standard Statute on the Interdepartmental Commission of the Russian Federation Security Council within one month. The new statutes on these commissions are to be submitted for approval in accordance with the established procedure.

2. This edict comes into force the moment it is signed.

[Signed] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin
[Dated] 20 October 1993

List of Standing Interdepartmental Commissions of the Russian Federation Security Council

I.

The Interdepartmental Foreign Policy Commission of the Russian Federation Security Council (Footnote 1)(Created by the Russian Federation President's Edict No. 1571 of 16 December 1992).

The Interdepartmental Commission of the Russian Federation Security Council on Ecological Security (Footnote 2)(Created by the Russian Federation President's Edict No. 1035 of 13 July 1993).

The Interdepartmental Commission of the Russian Federation Security Council on Defense Security.

The Interdepartmental Commission of the Russian Federation Security Council on Information Security.

The Interdepartmental Commission of the Russian Federation Security Council on Economic Security.

The Interdepartmental Commission of the Russian Federation Security Council on Social Security.

The Interdepartmental Commission of the Russian Federation Security Council on Safeguarding the Population's Health.

II.

The Special Interregional Commission under the Russian Federation Security Council (Footnote 3)(Created by the Russian Federation President's Directive No. 472-rp of 28 August 1992).

The Interdepartmental Commission of the Russian Federation Security Council on Fighting Crime and Corruption (Footnote 4)(Created by the Russian Federation President's Edict No. 103 of 20 January 1993; additional measures are defined in the Russian Federation President's Edict No. 935 of 21 June 1993).

The Interdepartmental Commission of the Russian Federation Security Council on Scientific and Technical Questions of the Defense Industry (Footnote 5)(Created by the Russian Federation President's Edict No. 1192 of 2 August 1993).

Note. Section I of the list enumerates the interdepartmental commissions of the Russian Federation Security Council corresponding to the classification of security components defined by the Russian Federation Law "On Security" and by the Statute on the Russian Federation Security Council.

The Standard Statute on the Interdepartmental Commission of the Russian Federation Security Council is not cited.

Expert Body Set Up To Support Security Council

PM0911170793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Nov 93 First Edition p 5

[Edict No. 1807 of the Russian Federation president "On Forming the Russian Federation Security Council Scientific Council," dated Moscow, the Kremlin, 1 November 1993 and signed by Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin]

[Text] For the purposes of improving scientific support for the activity of the Russian Federation Security Council and on the basis of Article 15 of the Russian Federation Law "On Security" I decree that:

1. A Scientific Council (with the rights of an interdepartmental commission of the Russian Federation Security Council) is to be created under the Russian Federation Security Council.

2. Academician Vladimir Semenovich Pirumov, vice president of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, is to be appointed chairman of the Russian Federation Security Council Scientific Council (combined with his main post).

3. The chairman of the the Russian Federation Security Council Scientific Council is to be entrusted with preparing and submitting for approval within one month a Statute on the Scientific Council and proposals for staffing it.

4. For organizational-technical support of the activity of the Russian Federation Security Council Scientific Council a sector consisting of six people, including five senior officials, is to be formed in the Russian Federation Security Council apparatus, correspondingly increasing the Russian Federation Security Council apparatus personnel total and wages fund.

5. The leader of the Russian Federation President's Administration and the Russian Federation Council of

Ministers-Government are to make provision, in accordance with the prescribed procedure, for funding the activity of the Russian Federation Security Council Scientific Council out of the republic budget.

6. This edict comes into force from the moment it is signed.

[Signed] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin

[Dated] 1 November 1993

Yeltsin Relieves Makarov From Corruption Commission

LD1011141593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1250 GMT 10 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow November 10 ITAR-TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin today signed an order relieving famous lawyer Andrey Makarov of his duties as a member of the commission in charge of exposing corruption in Russia's top echelons of power. The relief was requested by Makarov himself, according to the presidential press office.

Makarov made a name for himself in a number of cases in the past, including in the case of former Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev's son- in-law, the case of the former Communist Party of the Soviet Union heard by the Constitutional Court, and, recently, in publicizing shady deals involving ex-Vice-President Aleksandr Rutskoy.

Yeltsin Institutes New State Prizes in Arts, Literature

LD1011143493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1229 GMT 10 Nov 93

[Text] Moscow November 10 ITAR-TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin today signed a decree instituting state prizes of the Russian Federation to be awarded in the field of literature and the arts.

The presidential press office said fifteen state prizes of the Russian Federation, ten million roubles each, will be awarded to the authors of "the most talented works of literature and the arts, outstanding in their remarkable novelty and originality and making considerable contribution to Russia's artistic achievements.

The decree endorses the provision for the state prizes of the Russian Federation in the field of literature and the arts and the provision for the commission under the president of the Russian Federation, which will select nominees for the state prizes of the Russian Federation in the field of literature and the arts.

Nevzorov Expects '600 Seconds' To Be Back on Air

PM0811162793 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 6 Nov 93 p 2

[Telephone interview with Aleksandr Nevzorov, presenter of "600 Seconds," by Aleksandr Golovenko; place and date not given; under the general heading: "What They Are Saying. We Will See 'Chapayev.' But What About '600 Seconds'?"]

[Text] Nevzorov's famous "600 Seconds" has not aired for over a month now. The program has been shut down without trial or investigation, so to speak. Will the TV program beloved of millions appear at all?

[Nevzorov] I have had firm promises of airtime. I will most likely have a half-hour program of my own [avtorskaya programma] once a week. Bella Kurkova, head of the channel with whom we are conducting talks, is acting properly in this case and even sympathizes with me, hinting that she is by no means responsible for everything.

[Golovenko] There don't somehow seem to be demonstrations outside the television center on Chapygin Street in your defense right now...

[Nevzorov] I do not want a repetition of the events outside Ostankino, so I am opposed to all demonstrations. Although many people often send us words of support, suggestions, and help.

[Golovenko] Is it true that you agreed to run for the State Duma?

[Nevzorov] I was nominated with Igor Shafarevich and Mikhail Astafyev, whom I very much respect, therefore I could not refuse. I harbor no illusions about the Federal Assembly, but a deputy's mandate would be a great help to me in my professional activity.

[Golovenko] See you on the air soon!

[Nevzorov] I wish PRAVDA personnel success!

New Editor Pledges Return to Paper's Founding Principles

PM0811170193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Ivanova: "The Newspaper Was and Still Is a State Newspaper"]

[Text] It is three years since the first issue of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA appeared. In an interview with an ITAR-TASS correspondent Natalya Polezhayeva, its chief editor, recalled that this publication, whose future is being heatedly discussed at various levels today, had a bright and very promising start.

Its first issue opened with a letter to the readers signed by Boris Yeltsin. Then still chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, he wished for the paper to be independent of the tastes and passions of the country's leadership, receptive to new things, democratic in the maximum degree, and tolerant of different viewpoints.

What happened to ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA later, when Valentin Logunov replaced Boris Mironov in the post of ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA's first chief editor on the personal orders of Ruslan Khasbulatov, was a mirror image of those wishes expressed earlier, Natalya Polezhayeva believes.

She began working at ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA on the morning of 4 October. Many reproaches and accusations have been addressed to her in the space of a month. "I have nothing for which I must justify myself; moreover I have devoted 24 hours a day to the newspaper," the chief editor said. But it can already be said today that the rumors of a mass resignation by editorial office employees were exaggerated. Just 17 people have tendered their resignation, whereas according to the staff list there are supposed to be 415 people at ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, including 150 journalists.

Natalya Polezhayeva is surprised that many mass media have portrayed the situation at the newspaper as a suppression of dissidence. For some reason everyone forgets that during the difficult days of the standoff ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA was the only publication in the country to publish the edicts of Aleksandr Rutskoy as president and the additions adopted by deputies to the Criminal Code on the introduction of the death penalty for opposing the Supreme Soviet. Nor does anyone recall that, following the suspension of its activity, ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA's former chief editor and the editorial board organized the distribution to the regions of materials capable of causing the situation to explode, she said. There are other facts too. According to staff at the newspaper, one week before the bloody Moscow events Valentin Logunov, after visiting Ruslan Khasbulatov in the White House, told his retinue: "In one week's time everything will be ours." Constant communication was maintained with the White House.

The new chief editor say that she has become convinced in the space of one month that there were not many people in the editorial office who were impetuously devoted to Ruslan Khasbulatov, and not many supported "the steep turn taken by Valentin Logunov in this publication's position" either. So the "cool reception," to put it mildly, given to the new editor most likely resulted from uncertainty about the future and from high emotion.

True, there is also another aspect—the economic aspect, Natalya Polezhayeva remarked. "I respect other people's political convictions and people who fight for an idea," she declared. But, let us state frankly, during the Khasbulatov days the newspaper was far from "poor." It had two accounts: a budget account and a current account. All the costs of producing the newspaper and employees' wages and bonuses were paid out of the first, while all income came into the second. A financial check now being conducted has proved unable to "find" tens of millions of rubles for the paper's publicity. ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA is no example from which to draw conclusions about the current statization of the mass media, she believes. The newspaper was and still is a state newspaper. The fact that it had been registered not only as a mass medium but also as a state enterprise was a legitimate reason for reregistering ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA. The Supreme Soviet, according to the laws which it itself adopted, did not have the right to found a state enterprise. The appeals lodged with the court of arbitration by those staff members who left the editorial office of their own will were rejected on these grounds.

In Natalya Polezhayeva's opinion, the charge that the government is "topping up" the newspaper today by paying for a preferential subscription out of taxpayers' pockets is not tenable either. She explained that, following the example of her former publications SOTSIALNAYA ZASHCHITA and VASHE PRAVO, she has made the subscription more expensive for departments and thereby granted privileges to private individuals.

The newspaper today, according to its chief editor, is still far from ideal, but much has already been done. ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA was the first to publish materials which were subsequently reprinted in many publications. Our goal on entering the fourth year of "newspaper life," Natalya Polezhayeva believes, is to return to the principles proclaimed in its first issue.

Election Issues

Kovalev Rejects Yeltsin's Election Decision

LD0911215593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1931 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] Chairman of the presidential commission on human rights and one of the leader of the Russia's Choice bloc Sergey Kovalev disagrees with Boris Yeltsin's decision not to hold early presidential elections next summer.

"On the one hand, such elections would not be useful for the country, and the president is quite right," Kovalev said in his interview with Interfax and the Postfactum news agency. "The president has appropriate moral grounds to remain in his post until his term expires because he had been elected by nationwide voting and then received support of electors at the April referendum," he said. In addition, Kovalev believes that "the president has taken quite definite obligations and we must give him an opportunity to fulfill them."

He underlined that from his point of view, the president "made a courageous decision on September 21 caused by extreme necessity." "However, is it worth creating one

more precedent on June 12 (the date of supposed early presidential elections - Interfax) to deviate from the procedure?," Kovalev asked. On the contrary,, he believes, "one should create other precedents - the president and parliament working out their term."

However, the president's rejection of early elections has another aspect, Kovalev continued. He believes that Boris Yeltsin should not have cancelled his previous decision, which "was also a reasonable and courageous one under those extraordinary circumstances." Kovalev considers the cancelation of early presidential elections on the initiative of a new parliament but not the president as the most appropriate way out the situation. He did not rule out the possibility that Boris Yeltsin had taken a "misguided decision" as a result of somebody's unscrupulous advice of a provocative nature aimed against the presidential team, in particular, against Russia's Choice.

Yeltsin Aide Denies Election 'Canceled'

BR1011132993 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 10 Nov 93 p 6

["E.F." interview with Viktor Ilyushin, "head of Boris Yeltsin's aides and assistants," by unidentified correspondent in the Kremlin on 9 November: "Presidential Election? Nothing Decided Yet"]

[Text] Moscow—"You journalists have misunderstood completely." Speaking politely, but firmly, Viktor Ilyushin—head of Boris Yeltsin's aides and assistants—took issue with the media. It is not true, he said, that the Kremlin leader has "canceled" the early presidential election slated for June 1994. "Boris Nikolayevich merely expressed his opinion in this regard, saying that he no longer considers the election advisable; but the final decision lies with the new parliament," Ilyushin explained, attributing Yeltsin's reevaluation to the fact that in recent weeks "the situation has changed."

Indeed, everything has changed—even the offices of the president and his aides, who have moved to another building in the Kremlin, the seat of the former Parliament of the USSR, because the old "presidential palace" needs refurbishment, which will take at least three years. It is here that Ilyushin granted LA REPUBBLICA an interview yesterday. A 45-year-old with a passion for tennis, like his boss (on the walls, where Lenin's picture used to hang, there are now posters of Gabriella Sabatini and Andre Agassi), and long a very loyal Yeltsin aide, Ilyushin occupies a post equivalent to that of the American White House chief of staff. He is said to be the most influential Kremlin aide. He denied having any real "power," but on his desk lay the text of the Constitution that Yeltsin was to present to the country a few hours later, after personally making the final corrections.

[LA REPUBBLICA] So, Viktor Vasilyevich, were we wrong about the early presidential election?

[Ilyushin] Yes, the media was mistaken. Last week, when he met with the editors of Russian newspapers, Yeltsin did not say that there will not be a presidential election on 12 June 1994. In September he originally called an election to find a solution to the crisis with Parliament, but the deputies rejected that offer, and now that Parliament no longer exists. So, the president said that he no longer sees the need for an early election and considers it more advisable to complete his term of office normally, in 1996. Yeltsin received the people's support in the 1991 presidential election and in the referendum last April: Tell me another country in the world where the president has to confirm his mandate three times in three years. In any case, the final decision will be made by the new Parliament. What could be more democratic than that?

[LA REPUBBLICA] The president also said that he will not stand again as a candidate in 1996. Is that a final decision?

[Ilyushin] In Russia we say, whoever lives shall see.

[LA REPUBBLICA] In Italy, too, but will you continue to work for him?

[Ilyushin] There is another proverb, a Tartar one: The khan's wife dies with the khan. I will work with Yeltsin as long as he wants me to do so, and I will leave with him.

[LA REPUBBLICA] Some people accuse Yeltsin of drafting a constitution in his own image and likeness...

[Ilyushin] Thousands of people worked on this document for three years, including the Constitutional Committee of the former Parliament. But one of the reasons for our delay in completing it is that too many people wanted to go down in history as its author, but there can be only one author, one father of the new Constitution—the president, because it was he who decided to submit it to the people's judgment.

[LA REPUBBLICA] Another charge is that a narrow group of advisers influences Yeltsin's decisions and prevents anyone else from communicating different opinions to him.

[Ilyushin] Nothing could be farther from the truth. Look. (He stood up and took a sheet of paper from his desk). This is a list of the people who want to see the president in November. I drew this up. There are dozens and dozens of names. Those with a black cross against them are the people he has already seen. Those with a red cross against them are people he has not seen but would like to meet. He will not be able to meet them all, that is inevitable. But I show him all of them, and he decides. His every minute through the end of the month is occupied with visits and meetings. Look at this chart (he pointed to a calendar completely full of appointments) for the past few weeks—at least half a dozen official meetings a day. The rumors that Yeltsin receives only screened information is without any real foundation.

[LA REPUBBLICA] Is the president always in a good mood or does he get mad from time to time?

[Ilyushin] He is a normal man. He has feelings and emotions and becomes irritated, like anyone else. I can only say that I have never seem him shout at anyone. And that he addresses everyone, including me, formally, as a sign of respect.

[LA REPUBBLICA] Who wrote the speech that Yeltsin will deliver on television this evening?

[Ilyushin] There is a team of speech writers, as is logical for any chief of state. But Boris Nikolayevich explains to them what he wants to say, and how. And if you could see how many things he corrects, removes, and adds to the text submitted to him... Only the naive believe that the president confines himself to reading speeches written by others. [Ilyushin ends]

A telephone on the desk rang with an unusual sound. Ilyushin rushed to answer it. "Yes, Boris Nikolayevich," he said, "I'll come right away." He put down the receiver and informed me that the interview was over: "There, you see? The president wants to put the final touches to this evening's speech. I cannot keep him waiting, can I?"

Plans for 1994 Presidential Election Questioned

PM0911165393 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Nov 93 First Edition p 1

[Article by Vasiliy Kononenko: "B. Yeltsin Renounces Reelection, Fearing a Wholesale Change of Power"]

[Text] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin's brief Saturday meeting with leaders of the mass media most likely would have remained an unremarkable event in the country's political life if it had not been for the head of state's sensational statement that he does not intend to hold an early presidential election in June 1994.

The polemic which instantly flared up on this topic covers the range from a reassessment of the situation which has taken shape since the October revolt to a deception of the people, as certain parties of a communist orientation declared. But even if we abstract ourselves from extreme positions, many questions remain. Above all, why has the president risked displeasing a section of the population by renouncing his own repeated promises to hold the presidential election after the parliamentary poll; why is he doing this now, during the fight for seats in the future Federal Assembly?

In conversation with an IZVESTIYA correspondent V. Kostikov, press secretary to the Russian Federation president, declared that the president had reached his own political decision to use the mandate of the people's trust—which, moreover, was confirmed during the April referendum—until it expires. In other words, he will remain in this post through 1996. As regards the discrepancy between this decision and the promise to hold an election in June, the press secretary suggested recalling other statements by Yeltsin in this regard.

In Barnaul back in the spring of 1992 Yeltsin assured the people of Altay Kray: "Despite opposition pressure, I will remain in my post until the end of the prescribed term, and I will not run for reelection...." Subsequently his press secretary and S. Filatov, chief of the president's administration, also spoke out in his name against early elections. But why did the president need to announce early reelection and confirm this in Edict 1400 and at the government's recent enlarged session?—this was my next question to Kostikov.

"This step was dictated by the need to pacify political passions under conditions of pressure on the president from the parliamentary opposition," he replied. The rest of his reply boiled down to the fact that, since the opposition had not accepted this bold offer from the president, the point of it had now been lost.

Now, in the course of the battles which are getting under way for parliamentary seats, certain political parties and individual candidates are essentially changing the aim of the political struggle as they go along: They are already aiming for the presidency. Hence the emergence of "carpetbagger" sentiments in the government and the nervousness in the regions, since, if a presidential election is held after the parliamentary elections, we will have to forget about a cautious transitional period of forming new power structures which absolutely have not been approved under our conditions. The victors will do this wholesale.

But what if we rise above the present problems and look into the future? A presidential election is more necessary to political parties than it is in reality, since there is practically no alternative to the course of transformations being implemented by Yeltsin.

It cannot be ruled out that, if the situation remains unstable and if there are no guarantees of the irreversibility of the democratic transformations, Yeltsin could nominate himself for reelection in 1996. At any rate, no one in the president's team rejects this possibility. True, Kostikov pointed out, much will depend on the degree of maturity and professionalism of the future Federal Assembly. His words can also be understood like this: It is possible that the future parliament will have to finally decide the presidential election question.

Analyst Says Yeltsin Election Decision Correct

MK0911140093 Moscow KURANTY in Russian 9 Nov 93 p 4

[Report by Viktor Bondarev from the "Talking Points" column: "Should the President Be a Gentleman?"]

[Text] The president has stated that there will be no early elections. This must be his most unpopular decision ever. It is easy to predict that not only his political opponents but also many of his supporters will react

negatively: The president has broken his word that he has given on so many occasions.

I shall not dwell on the subject that the decision on early elections was caused by the brazen blackmail on the part of the Supreme Soviet, which openly ignored the will of the people expressed in a referendum. This is obvious. Nonetheless, in spite of these circumstances wthat partially absolves the president of responsibility, certain doubts remain. Yes, the opposition and, primarily, the Supreme Soviet, its leaders, and the former vice president are a bunch of irresponsible politicos without honor or conscience, even without brains. But does the president have the right to stoop to the level of this gang by breaking his pledge?

To answer this question, let us pose another: Who needs these early elections?

The new elections are needed by our weak parties and those who have made politicking their profession. To make a little more noise on TV screens and present their absolutely groundless ambitions. This is first. Second, elections are needed for the president himself in order to appear to the public as a man who keeps his word. Who else? No one. Even the intransigent opposition is hardly interested in Yeltsin's contesting the presidency again because his chances for victory are fairly substantial.

Right now, during the parliamentary election campaign, we can see many of its shortcomings. I am not talking about hundreds of billions of rubles—these, in the final analysis, are trifles. What is much worse is that instead of reforming the economy and the business sphere and many other useful things, people are engaged in political struggle. After all, it is impossible to do without a parliament, and elections must be held. But why should the president face new elections? Why agitate the country for another six months when there is a legally elected president whose powers have been confirmed just recently? Yes, one can take up an uncompromising stance: The president must be a gentleman and keep his word under all conditions, and for that to happen the whole country may again turn into a political circus. Isn't this too high a price for such "gentlemanship?" There is a serious crisis in the country and virtually for purely "sportsmanlike considerations," should we destabilize the situation just so that the president will appear more noble in the public eye? The country's interests should be above private interests, even above the president's reputation.

Now about even more important things: If the president remains at his post for another two years, the country will finally get the most essential condition for economic reforms—political stability. At least in the political respect there will be confidence about the future and therefore real possibilities to overcome the crisis and improve the living standards for millions of Russians. If we weigh all the pros and cons, we shall understand the following: The president has made the right choice! Of course, a person must keep his word, but if we have to choose between faithfulness to one's word and the country's well-being, the latter is paramount. And what about the reputation? This will depend on how the president uses his remaining tenure.

Shumeyko Wants Chernomyrdin To Remain Prime Minister

LD1011142593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1124 GMT 10 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anna Melnikova]

[Text] Moscow November 10 TASS—"I would like Viktor Chernomyrdin to remain as prime minister after the elections to the federal assembly," First Vice-Chairman of the Russian Government Vladimir Shumeyko told journalists here today.

He believes that the "present government has accumulated definite experience and its replacement today will contradict the interests of the Russian economy". Shumeyko did not back the idea of setting up a coalition government, because, in his opinion, its work would resemble that of the former parliament.

He believes this is unacceptable to Russia today: the country needs an efficient council of ministers.

The first vice-premier backed Yeltsin's decision not to hold presidential elections in June 1994. "This was a compromise with the former Supreme Soviet, but the situation has changed, and the president remains the principal guarantor of the ongoing reforms," Shumeyko stressed.

Dwelling on the possible course of the election campaign, Shumeyko went on record for coordinated actions "with the leaders of other democratically-oriented blocs, which must support each other". He thinks the "Russia's Choice' bloc could cooperate with the Russian Party of Unity and Concord, with the Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc, and with the Russian Movement for Democratic Reforms.

Asked about the future of the Federal Information Centre, Shumeyko said that there were two ready drafts of a presidential decree on this score. The first draft, drawn up by chief of the Federal Information Centre Mikhail Poltoranin, leaves the centre under the direct subordination of the president. The second draft, drawn up by the government, envisages the centre's inclusion in the Ministry for the Press and Information.

Shumeyko backs the government's version.

Gaydar Pays Pre-Election Visit to Krasnoyarsk

LD1011144393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1123 GMT 10 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Gennadiy Yezhov and Yuriy Khots]

[Text] Krasnoyarsk November 10 TASS—Russian First Vice-Premier Yegor Gaydar, currently paying a pre-election visit to Krasnoyarsk, believes it is necessary to set up a broad political coalition, responsible for everything that happens in the country. Gaydar, who heads the "Russia's Choice" election bloc, began his canvassing visit by meeting professors and students of Krasnoyarsk State University.

The first vice-premier believes the reforms are being jeopardised primarily by the split which had occurred within the reformist forces after the October events. Unfortunately, the democrats are beginning to split up, and this may give the conservative forces, which are on the whole hostile to our society, to take their revenge. "The historical experience of Russia, which has twice suffered from the break up the Russian democratic movement, teaches us not to repeat this mistake," Gaydar noted.

The first vice premier visited the Krasnoyarsk harvester combines plant. Addressing its personnel, he said that the "Russia's Choice" bloc called for measures to stabilise the rouble, for relatively low interest rates and taxes, for guarantees to private property. "The observance of these conditions," Gaydar said, "will give us a chance to make effective progress not only in the foreseeable future, but in the distant perspective, too."

Later in the day Gaydar met representatives of Krasnoyarsk public circles. Instead of a traditional report, outlining the programme of the "Russia's Choice" bloc, he preferred to answer numerous questions put to him by the audience. Dwelling on the steps that would be taken in the foreseeable future, the first vice-premier said that a presidential decree was being drawn up on state-run enterprises. It envisages tougher controls over the activities of the directors of plants and factories, still remaining as federal property, in order to do away with corruption.

Asked about the savings of citizens, which were devaluated during the reforms, Gaydar said that, of course, it would have been easy to increase them 1,000 times over, but in fact, all those bank deposits were nullified many years ago, while the December 1991 liberalisation of prices only showed that there was nothing to back them up.

Gaydar noted the alarming fact that about 50 per cent of all the country's children were now living in more than one-third of Russia's poor families. He said the government planned measures to rectify the situation primarily in this area. Immediately after that Gaydar met activists of the local branch of the "Russia's Choice" bloc to discuss the tactics of the ongoing election campaign.

Burbulis Says Bloc Motivated by Responsibility

LD0911143393 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1023 GMT 9 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anna Melniko]

[Text] Moscow November 9 TASS—"Russia has already made its choice, and we have established our bloc to enable Russians to re-confirm their choice through the polls," said Gennadiy Burbulis, former secretary of state, who is now president of the "Strategy", a humanitarian and political science centre, as well as a member of the Executive Committee and the leader of the electoral campaign of the bloc "Russia's Choice".

As the president of Strategy, Burbulis said "political, moral and ideological principles from which Russia's Choice takes its guidance are fully in accord with the programme which forms the basis of activity of the centre (Strategy)."

These include "the working out of a strategy of comprehensive reforms in Russia in line with the policy pursued by the president and the reformer wing of the government in the past two years".

"It is not power in itself, not the desire to wield power that motivates the bloc today. It is, above all, the sense of responsibility for the actions already taken by the country and the policy it needs", Burbulis stressed.

The bloc's mainstay is its awareness of the country's need for concerted and steady efforts of a competent government and President Yeltsin's need for a streamlined structure of legislative and executive bodies of power".

As concerns the possibility of creating electoral coalitions, Burbulis said Russia's Choice will support cooperation and coordinate its activities with other blocs which stick consistently to reformer and democratic positions.

The bloc is interested in basing the selection of candidates in majority and two-seat constituencies on principles of professionalism in order to enable the new parliament to operate from the basis of stable theoretical and professional positions".

Burbulis also said that the main reason for his refusal to be nominated in a one-seat constituency was that he thought it would be better "to concentrate efforts on the electoral campaign as a whole, to prove that a proportional system of elections is productive and can serve as a major precondition for forming normal political parties in the future".

Burbulis expressed the hope that "in the course of political struggle three or four fully-fledged parties can emerge in Russia capable of carrying on dialogue in a civilized and lawful form and maintain their representatives in parliament".

As concerns the draft new constitution, Burbulis said it would be good for a fresh parliament to finalize the draft and bring it in line with the results of the nation-wide discussion and referendum.

Tsarev Cited on 'Apathy' Toward Elections

PM0911140593 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Nov 93 p 2

[Interview with Aleksey Tsarev, former head of the parliamentary subcommittee for the armed forces, by Anatoliy Stasovskiy; place and date of interview not given: "Aleksey Tsarev: New Parliament Will Not Be Able To Avoid Military Problems"]

[Text] From KRASNAYA ZVEZDA file: Aleksey Yuryevich Tsarev—born 21 December 1953 in Samara. Graduated from Rostov higher military command school and military-political academy. Before being elected a Russian Federation people's deputy he served as deputy regimental commander for political affairs in Orenburg Oblast. As head of the Russian parliamentary subcommittee for the armed forces Aleksey Tsarev took part in drafting the laws "on defense" and "on military service obligation and military service" and many other legal acts. He is a colonel.

[Stasovskiy] Aleksey Yuryevich, it will obviously be a long time yet before we all manage to leave behind the tragic days of early October. The wave of emotional outbursts has passed and now we are trying to think, to draw lessons from what happened. Where were you in the vortex and what did you experience?

[Tsarev] As a people's deputy I was, naturally, in the White House, but if one obeyed sane logic or reason there was no point in staying there, particularly when it became clear that strong-arm confrontation was, alas, inevitable and that armed resistance could push the country toward civil war. After all until the last moment there remained a hope of a peaceful settlement of the conflict situation.

The members of our parliamentary committee on questions of defense and security did everything possible to avoid drawing the army into the confrontation which was heating up. We appealed to the personnel of all power structures to keep their established subordination.

In addition we did what we could to persuade our colleagues that the army would not independently get involved in the conflict of the branches of power and that it could not be pushed or provoked into doing so.

[Stasovskiy] Nonetheless the majority of people's deputies did not heed your opinion and the gulf not only between the branches of power but also probably between some groups of parliamentarians nonetheless widened?

[Tsarev] That is all true. In response to our appeal to the army another draft was brought to the committee—compiled, unless, of course, I am wrong, under the leadership of Boris Vasilyevich Tarasov. This appeal was the complete opposite of ours and we rejected it by an absolute majority, but the Supreme Soviet did not support us.

After that it became clear that it was no longer possible to influence the processes which had begun to develop in the White House. They became simply uncontrollable. It was virtually impossible to come out with any compromise idea or opinion differing from the one which had formed in the majority of those in the auditorium. Anyone was silenced, rudely interrupted, or ignored. I nonetheless told the congress of my doubts that Rutskoy could assume the powers of president. I proceeded from the Constitution, but no arguments or persuasion had any effect.

When a thick circle of Internal Affairs Ministry servicemen formed around the White House it seemed to me that circumstances themselves excluded the people's deputies from the events which even at the time many people realized could become tragic. But this last warning, so to speak, had no effect.

After the defense minister's order to send the military servicemen-deputies back to the commanders in chief of the branches of the Armed Forces, I left for the headquarters of the Strategic Missile Forces. The chief of the cadres directorate talked with me and we examined the possibility of my further service in the army.

[Stasovskiy] How do you assess the situation which is taking place in society prior to the elections scheduled for 12 December?

[Tsarev] I have visited my electoral district. To be honest among the majority of people there is the most complete apathy and indifference toward the forthcoming elections. The Tselinnyy electoral district for which I was a deputy consists of six rural rayons in Orenburg Oblast. The peasants' financial situation today is very complex. They no longer believe any promises at whatever level they are made.

We all remember how that land was developed. People responded to propaganda appeals and came from Ukraine, Belarus, and all Russia. They "raised" the virgin land, achieved quite good results, and settled in. But today it turns out that their wheat which, incidentally, is of valuable strains, is unprofitable. Not so long ago I made suggestions to the government for preparation for the 40th anniversary of the development of the virgin lands and the elaboration of a federal program for the development of Russia's virgin land regions. The government supported the proposal and as far as I know is already preparing a special program of aid for the region.

I have also visited several military units stationed on the territory of the Tselinnyy electoral district. I formed the impression that the men in shoulder boards are so far somehow indifferent and even cautious toward the actual topic of elections. Understandably, agitation in military units is forbidden by law. And that is right. I think that as a whole it is also correct to raise the question of servicemen themselves and those who want to continue service not having to combine it with a

deputy's duties. It is well known that these recommendations came to the troops from the center.

But for all that in my view we should also think about the following point: Will there be people in the new parliament with an adequate knowledge of the problems of the armed forces, people who are prepared and able to represent the interests of servicemen and their families and all those linked in one way or another with the army? Can we in the army be indifferent to this? Will the result not be a situation in which parliament will be dominated by those with a dilettantish or even worse a nihilistic approach to defense problems who do not conceal their dislike of the military...

I believe, considering all this, that the possibility of nominating candidates from the ranks of servicemen should not be ruled out completely. That complete clarity is needed is another matter: The serviceman who has decided to join the election struggle must, I think, ascertain his position precisely and promptly and write a report to his commander asking to be released from the army if he is elected to the Federal Assembly.

I for one have written such a report to the commander in chief. Because I would like to fight for a deputy's seat in order to use my experience of lawmaking work and benefit the armed forces.

[Stasovskiy] Well, that could indeed be useful, but today I am not talking to you as a possible candidate deputy (especially as there has not yet been any official registration) so unless you object we shall not touch on the question of election programs... Let us return to the problem mentioned above: How to achieve the point where the servicemen, in fulfilling their civil duty at the elections, do it consciously, realizing exactly what they are voting for...

[Tsarev] The ban on agitation in the military units should in my view be understood as a ban on specific agitation speeches by candidate deputies and their agents in military collectives and the impermissibility of some publicity and propaganda actions. But we must not go to extremes and try, for instance, to isolate the military totally from election subject matter. Indeed, that is impossible. It is impossible to keep the men in shoulder boards away from radio, television, and the newspapers and journals to which they subscribe or to ban them from exchanging opinions on candidate deputies and their programs when they are off duty. The question must be put like this: Agitation should be ruled out but information for servicemen on the candidates and their programs should be organized quite well, and then let them decide for themselves for whom to vote.

[Stasovskiy] Aleksey Yuryevich, forecasts are a thankless business but on whom can the men in shoulder boards count today?

[Tsarev] I think that the most realistic chances of being elected to the Federal Assembly belong to those who have already been people's deputies and won prestige by engaging primarily not in politics but in real affairs.

As for the former deputies who gambled on populism, I think their time has passed. In my opinion voters have already learned from bitter experience and realize that there is little sense to be got from those who fight only for populist laws and who consequently do not work. That is why it is important to be concerned to ensure that the new parliament is joined by those who can work constructively without becoming trapped in futile confrontation with the executive power but cooperating with it and doing the same job.

Need we mention, for instance, how much it will mean for the armed forces to have normal collaboration between the future committee which will engage in questions of defense and the Defense Ministry. In any case the Ministry will have to cooperate actively with parliamentarians. Even if there are only civilians in parliament. It will be very important to find a common language.

I do not rule out the possibility that the Defense Ministry will want to use former people's deputies for liaison with the new parliamentarians. These people can be posted to the relevant parliamentary structures and work there as advisers, experts, and consultants. I know that the Defense Ministry has already created a department for cooperation with parliament. Incidentally, this problem is far more serious than it might seem. It must be admitted that the Security Ministry, or, for instance, the foreign intelligence service have been far more active on this plane.

In brief, for all the features of the problem of the army and the elections, for all its specific nature, we must clearly understand that a very great deal in the fate of the armed forces as a whole and in the fate of each serviceman will depend on how these elections take place. That is why there should be no indifferent or alienated approach here.

Rules for Federation Council Election Cited

LD0911192593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1741 GMT 9 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Zamyatina]

[Text] Moscow November 9 TASS—"The Federation Council (the upper parliament chamber) shall include two representatives of each Federation subject: one from the representative power body and one from the executive power body", in accordance with Article 95 of the draft Russian Constitution.

However, at December 12 elections Federation Council deputies will be elected in two-mandate districts—two representatives from each Federation subjects.

Assistant Head of the Russian president staff lawyer robert Tsivilev told ITAR-TASS this time the Federation

Council will be elected in accordance with transitional provisions of the draft Russian Constitution (Section 2, Item 7).

Ministers Should Submit to Election

PM0911151393 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 9 Nov 93 p 1

[Article by Sergey Yushenkov: "Ministers Will Be Able To Confirm Their Bids for High Office in the Election"]

[Text] The draft new constitution allows for the possibility during the transitional period of combining a post in the government with a deputy's mandate. It has been stressed that ministers should be politicians and not administrators or economic managers, i.e. not just administrators and economic managers. In this connection it seems to me that every minister should get actively involved in political activity and the political struggle, testing his bid for high office within the structures of the executive branch through the elections. I see nothing reprehensible about this. Moreover, the number of ministers in the entire Federal Assembly will be too insignificantly small to have a decisive impact on the adoption of a particular decision.

The separation of powers does not mean confrontation between the powers. The executive and the legislature are branches of one and the same tree, of which the state is the trunk. And in this sense they should have a common basis. From the viewpoint of state development and state building, the participation of members of parliament in the government's work and, conversely, government involvement in parliament's work will facilitate the search for common solutions. This is extremely important for our country, which has long been tired of conflict and confrontation.

Free Airtime for Party Advertising Reiterated

LD0911222393 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 9 Nov 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] I would like to remind you that, from 20 November to 10 December this year, between 0700 and 0900 in the morning on working days, and also in the evening between 1900 and 2300, airtime is offered to parties and blocs free of charge.

As for extra time, from the moment of their registration and until 19 December inclusive, it is granted for the conduct of electioneering on TV and radio for payment.

You can inquire about the granting of airtime through the Ostankino TV and Radio Broadcasting Company on the following telephone numbers: 217-91-18 and 181-43-50.

Chechnya Warned Against Election Interference

LD0911193193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1420 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] No one has the right to deprive Russian citizens, including Chechens, no matter where they live, of their inalienable human and civil rights and freedoms, such as the right to free and democratic elections. "No one can make decisions for a whole nation, no one can use his personal power to exclude the multinational Republic of Chechnya from the Russian Federation." This is announced in a joint statement released on Tuesday [9 November] by the Committee on the Affairs of the Federation and Nationalities and by the Central Electoral Commission.

The document urges the Chechen leadership to display "prudence and wisdom and take organizational measures in connection with preparations for parliamentary elections and for a nationwide referendum on Russia's draft constitution."

For their part, the authors of the statement pledged to give the necessary assistance in conducting elections in the territory of Chechnya.

Irregularities Found in Voters Signature Lists

LD0911132093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1140 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] According to Interfax sources, at least 5 out of the 14 election associations, which have been checked by the Central Election Commission, may be denied the right to have their candidates appear on the ballot due to violations uncovered concerning their mandatory lists of signatures.

The 5 election associations are the Russian National Union led by Sergey Baburin, the Consolidation Party, led by Aleksandr Tikhonov, the New Russia block (Telman Gdlian), the National-Republican party, led by Nikolay Lysenko and the Constitutional-Democratic Party, headed by Mikhail Astafyev.

Blocs May Be Disqualified

PM0911171593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Nov 93 First Edition p 1

[Report by Aleksandra Lugovskaya: "Five Blocs Risk Having Their Registration Turned Down. They Are Suspected of Falsifying Lists"]

[Text] On 9 November the Central Electoral Commission continued its work of counting up and collating lists of signatures submitted by political blocs and parties. All the apparatus staffers are working at this task. The processing is extremely rigorous. The work may be finished by evening. But even now INTERFAX has learned that at least five of the 14 associations that have been checked out at the Central Electoral Commission could be refused permission to register the lists of their

State Duma candidate deputies owing to irregularities discovered in the lists of signatures they have submitted.

According to information from INTERFAX, the Russian National Union (led by Sergey Baburin), the Consolidation Party (led by Aleksandr Tikhonov), the "New Russia" bloc (led by Telman Gdlyan), the National Republican Party (led by Mikhail Lysenko), and the Constitutional Democratic Party (led by Mikhail Astafyev) could be refused permission to register.

Central Electoral Commission member A. Beloborodov says the regime's hardline is based on the fact that he is responsible for the lists that are submitted and also the serious consequences envisaged by the Statute on Elections for people who violate it. In the event of falsification, Article 47 states that the Central Electoral Commission is obliged to report the facts of the case to the law-enforcement organs for a thorough investigation. Let me remind readers that Article 17 (Point 6) directly instructs the Central Electoral Commission to monitor the legality of State Duma elections.

Thus, the district electoral commissions have reported to the Council of the Federation that 450 candidate deputies had been nominated in 86 (out of 89) components of the Federation as of 9 November.

The Central Electoral Commission is receiving both written and telephone communications from citizens regarding fraudulent collections of signatures, pressure brought to bear by directors of enterprises on their subordinates, and other subterfuges. Thus, an official message requesting "assistance to resolve a conflict" has arrived from the Rybinsk city organization of the Russian Christian Democratic Party in Yaroslavl Oblast.

The message provides the gist of a story involving representatives from A. Vichin and I. Germagenov's party. Having reached an agreement with the staff at Rybinsk's passport office "who were sympathetic to the Russian Christian Democratic Party," these party workers tried to speed up the collection of signatures by obtaining the passport details and addresses of the city's voters "with a view to gathering further signatures at these people's places of residence."

The Central Electoral Commission regards this action as questionable because nobody is entitled to gain access to the passport office except its staff, and the action taken by the militia in arresting the "petitioners" was justified. Usually, this matter would be dealt with by the Prosecutor's Office.

Checking the lists and accompanying documents is going on around the clock. An open session of the Central Electoral Commission will be held Wednesday 10 November at 1300 hours, at which the results of checking some of the electoral associations' lists of signatures will be announced.

Blocs Exceed 100,000-Signature Threshold

MK0911112093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Nov 93 pp 1, 2

[Report by Ivan Rodin under the "Campaign" rubric: "A Total of 21 Electoral Blocs Have So Far Been Allowed To Contest Elections. Communist Opposition Calls For Boycotting Elections"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] After a five-day examination of electoral lists by the Central Electoral Commission, the following electoral blocs will be allowed to contest the elections (numbers given in the order of their appearance at the Central Electoral Commission except for the last seven, whose representatives came nearly at the same time):

1. The "Kedr" ["Cedar"] Constructivist-Environmental Movement of Russia. It submitted its lists with signatures as early as 4 November (150,000).

2. The Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia. It submitted 173,000 signatures. Mr. Zhirinovskiy personally abridged the list, deleting names that also featured in other parties' lists and adding the word "traitor" with every energetic gesture of the pen.

3. The Agrarian Party of Russia. It collected 500,000 signatures. Its leader, Mikhail Lapshin, told your NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent that if they had more time, they would have collected more than a million: Many people thought that elections were already under way and did not let the collectors go until they covered the entire neighborhood.

4. The Civic Union for Stability, Justice, and Progress garnered 150,000 signatures, but its party list was nearly halved—from 270 to 150 candidates.

5. The "Dignity and Charity" movement submitted 130,000 signatures.

6. The "Russia's Women" movement—also around 130,000.

The above six electoral blocs will probably be registered on 10 November.

7. The Russian Democratic Reform Movement, despite the short period of time it had to collect signatures (it received permission to start on 3 November) brought 135,000.

8. The Russian Federation Communist Party decided not to overburden the Central Electoral Commission and submitted 187,000 out of half a million signatures its deputy chairman, Valentin Kuptsov, said it had collected.

9. The "Future of Russia—New Names" electoral association collected 109,000 signatures.

10. The Democratic Party of Russia, despite rumors about its problems with signature raising, submitted the

same number, although submission was delayed by the late arrival of a security convoy for the protection of signature lists.

11. The Party for Russian Unity and Accord [PRES] submitted 222,000 signatures collected in 71 regions, according to Aleksandr Kotenkov, one of the party leaders. The PRES is by far the front- runner among the "democratic" blocs in terms of signatures gathered, which, to all appearances, is what it was actually striving for.

12. "Russia's Choice" presented only around 200,000 signatures. Arkadiy Murashev said it was done "half-heartedly."

13. The "Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin Bloc" raised nearly 170,000, of which almost half was provided by its "marginalized" partner—the Russian Federation Republican Party.

The other electoral associations emerged in the last 40 minutes; this is why the exact time of their arrival, which is necessary for counting the signatures of parties that submit them in similar numbers, was still being clarified. It was learned that some of the following blocs could be denied registration.

14. The Constitutional-Democratic Party (People's Freedom Party)—103,500 signatures.

15. The Consolidation Party—over 100,000 signatures (this figure means that the number of signatures is just above the limit).

16. The "New Russia" Bloc—over 100,000.

17. The Russian Christian-Democratic Party—the same number.

18. The Russian All-People's Union [RAU] submitted 108,000 signatures. Its leader, Sergey Baburin, said that he has never been so tired as in the 36 hours after a raid on the RAU's head office, which triggered a frantic scramble to collect the missing signatures.

19. The Independent Professionals Association. It also appears to have done the impossible by collecting 103,000 in three days.

20. The National-Republican Party gathered 102,000.

21. The "Transformation" ["Preobrazheniye"] movement, which has escaped the attention of the press in the flurry of events, also submitted over 100,000 signatures.

Blocs, Parties Still Contest Election Race

PM0911141593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Article by Georgiy Ivanov-Smolenskiy under the "Russia Facing Choice" rubric: "Twenty-One Blocs and Parties Still Contesting Election Race"]

[Text] As is well known, of the 35 blocs and parties which began the election campaign 21 electoral associations have successfully cleared the 100,000-signature hurdle. However, quite a few were dissatisfied with and even incensed at the initial stage of the State Duma elections.

The statement issued by the "August" bloc, which had collected 62,000 signatures by the deadline, questions the fact that anyone apart from "August" and the "Russia's Choice" bloc collected signatures by methods that were not forbidden. "We cannot lie," the statement says, "or organize spectacular events in which thugs in black masks raid the bloc's headquarters. We do not consider it normal when people copy military divisions' muster rolls, kolkhoz workers' rosters, whole departments of staff, and the data banks of check funds and insurance companies onto their election lists and exchange signatures among blocs." The failure of a number of blocs representing the interests of key social forces to take part in the elections, the statement stresses, will transform the State Duma into a body similar to the former Supreme Soviet. In this connection the "August" bloc has urged those who support the Economic Freedom Party to cast their votes for "Russia's Choice."

At the same time it must be admitted that a number of blocs failed to reach the 100,000-signature mark largely owing to organizational mistakes. In particular, Irina Khakamada, a leader of the "August" bloc, said that by all accounts a number of regional organizations of the Economic Freedom Party wanted to "distinguish" themselves and stated that they had collected a given number of signatures but in fact delivered a different and far smaller number. On the other hand, Baburin's "Russian People's Union," which said that 100,000 signature lists had been stolen by unknown raiders, managed to submit the requisite number of signatures on time, according to Sergey Korovinskikh of the Central Electoral Commission.

Larisa Vlasova, an active participant in the election campaign, has described how her husband, writer and politician Yuriy Vlasov, one of the leading triumvirate of the Russian Christian Democratic Movement, had his passport torn up by militiamen along with signature lists while he was collecting signatures outside Sokol subway station. And three days before the "subscription" campaign ended, according to L. Vlasova, telephones lines at the movement's headquarters were cut, thus depriving it of a whole series of lists from the regions. In short, it seems that the Central Electoral Commission still has quite a lot of work to do if, on one hand, it is to confirm the authenticity of all the lists presented; and, on the other, to address complaints from dissatisfied customers. By all accounts, that is why Central Electoral Commission personnel declined to comment last Monday, citing "leadership instructions."

One of the associations eliminated from the contest for State Duma seats is the "Fatherland" bloc, although this is for a quite legitimate reason—the 20,000 votes that it collected outside Russia, in Narva and the Dniester

region, were discounted. The "Alternative" bloc led by economist Larisa Piyasheva has also been eliminated from the election race.

As for the associations which are continuing the fight for Duma seats, politically they are very heterogeneous, not to say motley. For example, grouped on the left are such highly intransigent groups as the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the "Russian People's Union," and the Agrarian Party of Russia, while their opponents on the right are the "Russia's Choice" bloc, the "Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin" bloc, and the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, which, if they can overcome their differences, which are very much of secondary importance, could form an equally "intransigent" counterbalance in favor of the reforms. Meanwhile in the center, the presence of "Civic Union," the Democratic Party of Russia, and such relatively new political movements as "Women of Russia" and "Cedar" is, you would think, a fairly convincing refutation of the charge that "there can be no talk of democracy" after the October events.

Official Reports on Processing of Election Lists

LD0911162093 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1541 GMT 9 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[Text] Moscow November 9 TASS—"The federal lists of candidates to the State Duma from parties and election blocs have become noticeably shorter as compared to those initially submitted to the Central Election Commission," ITAR-TASS was told by Alexey Korobov, head of the commission's registration department.

It was found that 275 "prudent public figures" had agreed to run for the parliamentary elections on the tickets of several organisations simultaneously in order to be "on the safe side whatever happened". "Therefore, their names have appeared on several lists," he explained. "For instance, candidate from the Russian Communist Party Sevastyanov figured also on the lists of the Agrarian Party and the Russian Popular Union," he added.

After the needed number of signatures was collected from voters, their lists, together with the lists of candidates and their written consent to run for the elections, had to be submitted to the Central Election Commission. Any duplication is categorically prohibited. Every candidate had to make his choice and they themselves have crossed out the duplicates. True, one candidate had submitted two written consents, but this was discovered during the reception of the documents.

The Central Election Commission is now carefully checking the signatures of electors and the party lists of candidates. "All the discovered misunderstandings and mistakes are being corrected," Korobov stated. The finalised versions of the lists of candidates are all but ready. They are currently being retyped. He recalled that no changes, except for reductions, can now be made in them. No replacements are permissible, even if a candidate dies. The order in which the names of the candidates are written cannot be changed, too.

The list of candidates from election blocs must be registered by the commission and officially published by November 11. This will give the start to a new stage of the election campaign—canvassing.

Consolidation Party Leaders on Election Campaign

LD0911164593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1433 GMT 9 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Ivanova]

[Text] Moscow November 9 TASS—Electoral coalitions that failed to submit lists with 100,000 signatures to the Central Electoral Commission in due time should have access to the second stage of the election campaign, leaders of the Consolidation Party told a news conference here today.

In their opinion, 14 electoral coalitions did not collect the necessary signatures only "on technical reasons".

The party itself collected 103,224 signatures in some 60 Russian regions. However, it did not cheer with defeat of rivals. Party leader and general director of the Interural enterprise Aleksandr Tikhonov said they are ready to consolidate with other centrist associations during the elections.

The Consolidation Party is able to compete with other election coalitions and blocs due to its orientation at practical work, believes head of the Germes multi-profile concern and candidate for State Duma deputy Valeriy Neverov.

Aksyuchits Demands Reduced Number of Signatures

LD0911195193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1549 GMT 9 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tamara Zamyatina]

[Text] Moscow November 9 TASS—Viktor Aksyuchits, chairman of the Russian Christian and Democratic Movement (RCDM) whose electoral association failed to collect 100,000 signatures necessary to continue their campaign in time, filed an application to the Central Electoral Commission demanding to reduce the number of signatures up to 30,000 or to prolong the terms of their collecting by two weeks.

Aksyuchits accused the Russia's authorities for hampering free collecting the signatures. However, he did not say whether the RCDM supporters had appealed to law-enforcement bodies in connections with alledged violations.

13 Blocs, Associations Registered for Election

LD1011144793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1130 GMT 10 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Yermakova]

[Text] Moscow November 10 TASS—Thirteen parties and blocs have been registered by the Central Electoral Commission to run for seats in the lower chamber of the Russian bicameral federal assembly (parliament) in the December 12 parliamentary elections.

Their lists of candidates were registered by the Central Electoral Commission after the deadline at midnight of November 6, Electoral Commission Chairman Nikolay Ryabov announced at an open meeting of the commission here today. Ryabov stressed that the registered blocs and parties "represent the entire spectrum of political forces in our society".

The following have been registered: the Constructive Ecologist Movement, the Liberal Democratic Party, the Agrarian Party of Russia, the Civic Union, the Dignity and Charity Movement, the Women of Russia political movement, the Russian Movement of Democratic reforms, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the Association "The Future of Russia—New Names", the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, the Democratic Party of Russia, the Russia's Choice bloc, and the Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev-Lukin bloc.

The registration was performed as the applications came in, the Central Electoral Commission officials explained.

Military & Space Issues

Grachev on Role of Nuclear Weapons in Military Doctrine

LD0911183393 Moscow Radio Moscow in Russian to Tajikistan 0200 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Commentary by Vadim Solovyev including recorded remarks by Defense Minister Pavel Grachev; from the "Radio Slavyanka" program of the Defense Ministry]

[Text] Circumstances in which Russia might use nuclear weapons are a military-political theme which is being much discussed at the moment, both in Russia and, especially, in the West. The conceptual basis for their use is set out in the military doctrine which was adopted the other day by the Russian Federation's Security Council. Here is a commentary by our observer, Vadim Solovyev:

[Solovyev] The military doctrine is based on the assumption that nuclear weapons are, first and foremost, a factor deterring possible external aggression against Russia and its allies. The doctrine notes that, in current circumstances, the threat of nuclear war has been reduced to a minimum. However, as long as nuclear arsenals exist, the possibility of nuclear warfare cannot be discounted. Let us recall that the United States, Britain, France, and China also have nuclear arsenals. Certain other countries would like to acquire these weapons, too. So, Russia's political and military leadership feels it would be wrong to ignore this extremely serious fact of international life. Here is how Russia's Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev views the question of nuclear weapons:

[Grachev] The Russian Federation will not use military force against any state except in cases of individual or collective self-defense. Nuclear weapons are viewed, first of all, not as a means of carrying out military action but as a political means of deterring aggression.

The objective of the Russian Federation's policy on nuclear weapons is to eliminate the threat of nuclear war or the use of nuclear weapons, by deterring aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies. The Russian Federation will not use its nuclear weapons against any state which has signed the 1 July 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and which does not possess nuclear weapons.

There are two exceptions to this policy. The first of these is in the case of an armed attack on the Russian Federation, its territory, its armed forces or other troops, or on its allies, by a nuclear non-proliferation treaty signatory which is allied by treaty to a state which does possess nuclear weapons. The second exception applies to joint operations involving a treaty signatory and a nuclear state, aimed at carrying out or supporting an invasion or armed attack on the Russian Federation, its territory, armed forces or other troops, or on its allies.

[Solovyev] A new aspect of the military doctrine, as many observers are noting, is the fact that Russia reserves the right to inflict a nuclear strike on the territory of an aggressor state, even if this state does not possess nuclear weapons but does, nevertheless, benefit from the nuclear umbrella of some ally or military-political bloc. This is by no means a sign of aggressive intent on Russia's part. It is merely recognition of the fact that Russia does not have the same powerful conventional armed forces as the former Soviet Union had—a factor which enabled the USSR to stand up to any military threat without using nuclear weapons. Pavel Grachev characterizes this situation in the following manner:

[Grachev] I merely wish to point out that none of the states which possess nuclear weapons clearly specify in their military doctrines that they will not use nuclear weapons. I repeat that the purpose of the Russian Federation's policy is to eliminate the danger of nuclear war. At the same time we again confirm that Russia will not use its nuclear weapons against any state which has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and which does not possess nuclear weapons. The doctrine says nothing about a state which does have nuclear weapons. This is something new.

[Solovyev] This approach is, indeed, fundamentally new for Russia. However, it has long been reflected in the

doctrinal objectives of NATO member-states, including the United States. At the same time, there is a quite logical question which follows from this. What has happened to the undertaking not to use nuclear weapons first—a pledge which was originally given by the political leadership of the former Soviet Union? The answer to this is quite simple. Since this approach contradicts the task of nuclear deterrence, Russia no longer proclaims such a policy.

Grachev Reads Greeting on Military Intelligence Anniversary

PM0911150593 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Nov 93 p 1

[Nikolay Poroskov report: "Military Intelligence Jubilee"]

[Text] A celebratory gathering to mark the 75th anniversary of the Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU] of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff has taken place in Moscow. It was attended by Defense Ministry leaders, representatives of the Russian Government, Foreign Intelligence Service, and Security Ministry, and military intelligence veterans.

Russian Federation Defense Minister Pavel Grachev, carrying out an instruction of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, supreme commander in chief, read out a welcome address stressing the role of military intelligence officers in ensuring the country's security. Greetings were received from the Russian Government, the Defense Ministry Collegium, and the Security Council. Those present honored the memory of dead intelligence officers with a minute's silence.

Colonel General Fedor Ladygin, chief of the GRU, gave his assurance that military intelligence officers currently have everything they need to fulfill their missions: highly-trained specialists, scientists, and designers, educational institutions, and a material base. People could see this for themselves by looking at the exhibition of exclusively domestically-produced examples of weapons and equipment for military, strategic, electronic, and space intelligence.

At the celebration soiree certain documents kept under the "Top Secret" stamp for many years were made public for the first time and intelligence officers whose names were shrouded in mystery were named for the first time.

Dozens of military intelligence officers were presented with state awards by edict of the Russian Federation president and rewarded by order of the defense minister for reliably providing the country's supreme military and state leadership with the intelligence data on military, military-political, military-technical, and military-economic questions needed to make appropriate decisions.

Yeltsin Congratulates Law Enforcement Bodies on Militia Day

LD0911220593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1731 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin has congratulated employees of Russia's interior bodies on the Day of Russian Militia. Russia celebrates this holiday on November 10.

"Today the role of law enforcement bodies has increased even more," says the president's message. "Economic transformations and creation of a legal democratic state are impossible without ensuring legal rights and security of the Russians, resolute annihilation of crime and stabilization of the situation throughout the whole country," notes Yeltsin.

He emphasized that "the recent events in Moscow have become a serious examination in the civic maturity of the personnel of Russia's interior bodies and soldiers of interior forces." "The whole world witnessed how your direct involvement prevented an attempt of a group of politicians to push Russia into the abyss of civil war."

Article Examines Armed Forces' View of Yeltsin

944K0188A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 44, Nov 93 pp 8-9

[Article by D. Makarov and commentary by Major General (Ret.) Aleksandr Vladimirov, former chief of staff of the 28th Army: "The Military Between Yesterday And Tomorrow: In Russia 200 Officers Were Promoted to the Rank of General in 1993 Instead of the Usual 50"]

[Text] *Despite the presence and even direct participation of dozens of television, radio, and newspaper reporters in the tragedy that unfolded in Moscow on 3-4 October, much of what happened remains unclear.*

First and foremost, regarding the role of Russian enforcement structures—the Ministries of Defense, Security, and Internal Affairs.

The material we offer you today deals with establishing the role of the military in these events. The information was received by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY editors on a confidential basis on condition that the sources not be identified.

"We know where our hearts are, but we must act according to reason," said one Airborne Troops officer at a conference at the end of September. The special collegium of the Ministry of Defense, convened for an emergency meeting on 22 September, proceeded in the same tenor. The collegium was to decide whom the military would support in the conflict between the president and the Supreme Soviet, and whether it would support either side at all.

The choice was not easy. In the opinion of some sources, many officers and generals are, to put it mildly, less than

ecstatic about the current executive branch and President B. Yeltsin personally. On the other hand, it should be noted for fairness sake that neither was the former representative branch held in high regard by the military. Nevertheless, it is the executive branch to which the military is subordinated. By Constitution, the president is the commander in chief. Therefore, the brunt of discontent is directed first and foremost against him. The reasoning goes as follows:

1. Moral reference points have been lost.

As is known, for all 70-plus years of Soviet power the military was one of the main objects of massive ideological assault. A pervasive system of political organs and mandatory CPSU membership for all officers captain and higher made the military highly manageable. But it was precisely this trait that the military was blamed for in the Tbilisi, Baku, and Vilnius events. The situation changed during the August '91 Moscow events: At the time, it was only the military's insubordination that made a victory for democracy possible. Many big-star generals made their careers on insubordination, but who can tell to what unpredictable consequences a military that is not controllable by the supreme political and military leadership may lead in the future?

"We have our own score to settle with the CPSU," an instructor at one of the Moscow academies told me, "we hated it just as much as others did. But why associate with it the symbols of the Russian state—the flag, anthem, state seal, and other attributes? In France, the tricolor flag of the Great French Revolution and the Marseillaise have been preserved throughout all regimes, while Russia, the legal successor of the USSR, discards its symbols of power to the trash heap. Shame!" **2. The military's financial situation is extremely difficult.**

From a privileged, well-paid caste during the years of stagnation, the officer corps turned into an army of paupers, ahead in terms of salary of perhaps only doctors and teachers. The president's pledge of a 1.8-fold raise came too late—literally on the eve of the events—and was perceived by many in the military not as fair compensation for difficult work but as a crude attempt at bribery.

3. The prestige of serving in the military is down.

This, of course, is associated among other things with the dismal financial situation. But not only that. Despite numerous requests of the Ministry of Defense, the government nevertheless has refused to draft students into active service.

In addition, many servicemen are irritated over what they believe is lopsided treatment given by the mass media to the problems facing the military, which discredits the latter even more in the eyes of society.

4. Most officers do not accept Russia's current foreign policy.

To a considerable extent this is associated with troop withdrawals. First, the Soviet Army was forced to leave East Europe; then the Baltics and the Transcaucasus. More farsighted officers understand the objective nature of the processes taking place there, but few can explain why the troop withdrawal should resemble a shameful flight. Many in the military are watching with great resentment the negotiations around the Kuril islands and Russian diplomacy's capitulation to the United States on the issue of selling rocket technology to India. Many are still convinced that Russia should have observed its treaty obligations with respect to old friends in Cuba, North Korea, and Iraq. "The United States feels free to support dictatorial regimes, send troops wherever it wishes, and bomb anybody it wants. We, on the other hand, have become such big democrats that we are even afraid to send troops and extinguish the flames of war on our own doorstep. And rest assured, every place Russia leaves, the Americans will immediately get into," say many of the most radically minded officers.

Despite the gravity of the accusations the military levels at the government and Yeltsin personally on the points enumerated above, all of this fades in comparison with the belief—common in the military (especially among higher-ranking officers)—regarding...

5. ...betrayal of the interests of the state—signing the Belovezha agreements, which led to the disintegration of the USSR."

"One can forgive Yeltsin our pauper salaries, the poor health of our children and wives, who are being evicted from warm housing into what nearly amounts to an open field," one senior officer in a division recently withdrawn from the Baltics told me, "but one cannot forgive when for no reason whatsoever we give up the land our fathers and grandfathers fought for, as well as our people living in those lands.

"The military lives by the idea of a state. We are convinced that the break-up of the USSR into separate states, executed contrary to the will of the people expressed in the 17 March 1991 referendum, is a short-lived phenomenon. The military, industrial enterprise workers, cultural figures—everyone except the politicians—live by the idea of the Union. And if the Union under any name is not restored in the nearest future, the politicians will be swept out. The Armed Forces will find the means to 'convince' them of this."

6. The low level of authority of the Ministry of Defense leadership and P. Grachev personally among the troops.

He was appointed to this post from the position of Airborne Troops chief on the merit of his role in August 1991. In the eyes of officers, however, this is clearly not a sufficient qualification to hold such a post. Neither is it much of a secret that his relations with his deputies—first and foremost Generals Gromov and Kobets, each of whom is a contender for the minister's job—are strained and sometimes hostile.

"In this 'love triangle': Grachev—Gromov—Kobets," an officer on the general staff of the CIS Unified Armed Forces told me, "Gromov has the greatest authority. This should come to head soon: Of the three, one will remain."

These are, briefly, the reasons why many members of the military are not with the president. And it appears that the president was not sufficiently informed of this. In any case, when several days prior to 3 October I asked one of the president's closest aides whether he realizes that most officers in the military, the Ministry of Security, and the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] are "not fond" of Yeltsin—to put it mildly—he replied: "Yes, Yeltsin is aware of it, but our greatest achievement is that Ministers Grachev and Yerin are on our side, and this is the most important factor today. At the same time, we have been able to 'neutralize' Barannikov, who has been 'stirring up trouble' and tried to entice Grachev and Yerin to oppose Yeltsin." The events of the end of September-beginning of October demonstrated, however, that this was not quite the case.

September. After Edict No. 1400

Those in elite military units and formations could guess that something was afoot, although they did not know precisely what. Two Airborne Troops divisions had been put on higher combat readiness in connection with the events in Abkhazia, but the peak of the events passed and they still did not receive an order to stand down. The famous Tula and Pskov divisions were placed in winter quarters earlier than usual, which made it possible to get them into a state of combat readiness in a matter of two hours. Similar preparations had been made in the MVD's elite Dzerzhinskiy Division, and the ground forces' showcase Kantemirov and Taman divisions.

Actually, with his typical straightforwardness Yeltsin himself had hinted at the forthcoming events: In August, he said, we will start a preparatory bombardment, and in September will begin an offensive against the Supreme Soviet.

At the same time, the Supreme Soviet took a very devious tack. It raised the question of repealing the Belovezha agreements; had they, in fact, been repealed, the October events could have had a completely different ending. Anyway, the extraordinary collegium of the Russian Ministry of Defense called up on 22 September resolved unanimously to observe complete neutrality. Minister P. Grachev supported the collegium's decision.

October

In the days following 22 September it became clear, however, that it would be extremely difficult for the minister of defense to hold a neutral line. All three enforcement ministries conducted continuous intelligence-gathering not so much against the "White House bunch" as against each other. It was extremely important for the government, in order to avoid a potential conflict between enforcement structures, to have them take action simultaneously and present a united front. In parallel, evaluations were being made as to which units of each of these ministries were most reliable. These were "plucked out" and moved toward Moscow. Among them was, for instance, the Border Troops training regiment in Tula. One has to give credit to those who did the selection—there were no instances of defections to the "enemy."

Although the Ministry of Defense clearly realized that a storming of the White House was inevitable, the military put it off as long as they could. Many officers, however, were irritated over the ungentlemanly decision to turn off the lights, water, etc.

Says one Airborne Troops senior officer: "On the morning of 1 October we received information that apparently the deadline for the Federation Council ultimatum was to expire on the 3d; it turned out that it had threatened both branches that unless a compromise was reached between them by the 3d, the Federation Council would assume all power.

"We also knew that since a compromise was unlikely, a shoot-out would begin on the 3d, which would serve as a pretext to begin operations against the White House. On the night from the 2d to the 3d Grachev again gathered the ministry's key officials, and again the generals refrained from using force against the White House."

Some time later, however, Chernomyrdin, Yerin, Golushko, and Luzhkov arrived at the Ministry of Defense. (Reports that the president was with them are not true.) Chernomyrdin spoke to the generals, urging them to immediately begin military actions against the rebels, but the generals remained silent. Then Yerin and Luzhkov spoke and said that militiamen are being killed and without the Army's interference there will be a massacre in Moscow. In the end, Grachev gave in and gave the order to bring in the troops. Recalling that horrible night several days later, a member of the president's staff admitted that everything at that point was hanging by a thread. To which another Yeltsin's aide objected: "No, you cannot compare it with a thread. That is too solid a substance. Everything was hanging by the skin of his teeth."

Do Not Make Us Into a Bogeyman: A Specialist's Opinion

We asked former chief of staff of the 28th Army, Major General (Ret.) Aleksandr Vladimirov, to comment on the ARGUMENTY I FAKTY correspondent's material published above.

It is true that the attitude toward President Yeltsin in the Armed Forces is not uniform. In my opinion, however, the prevailing element is trust, because President Yeltsin is practically the only person in the executive branch who is truly respected by the military. He is the first head of state in many years who has never "hidden behind the back" of the military and never discredited its actions.

We can consider the successful participation of the Armed Forces in the 3-4 October events a beginning of a certain new stage in relations between the head of the executive branch and the Armed Forces after the past few years. It happened many times that the military carried out an order, and then the head of state dumped all the responsibility for carrying it out on the military. I am referring to the events in Baku, Tbilisi, Vilnius, etc.

In Moscow on 3-4 October everything was different. It is after these events that the military gained trust in Yeltsin as its commander in chief. There is nobody else to trust anyway.

Yeltsin honestly tried to fulfill the promise he had given to the military. But he cannot fulfill the promises made at the time by the Supreme Soviet. The benefits declared there and the money to pay for these benefits simply are not available. In this way, the legislative branch set up the executive in the eyes of the military. But all this is not associated with the president's name. Everybody understands the difficulties he faces.

As a result of the disintegration of the USSR, communist ideals were discredited, and there has, indeed, emerged a certain spiritual vacuum in the military, which, alas, is not being filled with anything. Nobody is engaged in moral upbringing of personnel with examples of the remarkable history of the Russian military. Everybody is left to their own devices. The Armed Forces are trying to drown their problems in quite intensive—given our current poverty—combat training and trying to untangle on their own the knot of problems in which they have become entangled.

The most depressing impact on the Armed Forces comes from not paying salaries and benefits on time. Such instances keep occurring even now. There is a way out of this situation. The president must instruct the Central Bank—and the latter, in turn, its branches—to issue technical credit monthly to each military unit just to pay salaries and to purchase food.

Now regarding the signing of Belovezha agreements as a betrayal of the interests of the people and the military. There was indeed such an opinion in the Armed Forces, especially immediately after the Minsk summit. It was rather strong throughout 1992, although not prevalent. Gradually, however, everybody understood that we cannot bring back the past. There was a new round of this thinking later, following Rutskoy's statements, since he was quite popular among the military. Nevertheless, I can say with certainty that there is no such grumbling in the military now. Everybody understands that any attempt to restore the Soviet Union will inevitably result in a civil war, which the Armed Forces do not want. This is unanimous. One may possibly still hear such statements from high-level General Staff functionaries, because they bear no direct responsibility for the people. No regiment, division, or army commander, however, will lead his soldiers to restore whatever there may be. And those who think that it is enough to simply give an order to the Armed Forces and they will go and fight for the reunification of the USSR should remember that the army to which one could simply give an order and it went where ordered no longer exists. Tbilisi, Baku, and Vilnius have taught it much.

Of course, we have to admit that the reactionary part of the Russian top brass still retains the capability to influence events—for instance, in the Caucasus region, through sales of arms. This is a crime, and I think that the time will come when sales or transfers of arms to local clans will be properly appraised by the military tribunal. But this is not the policy of the Russian state—it is the mistakes and crimes of individual politicians. They simply do not understand how dangerous it is to plant an Ulster mentality here.

The process of reunification of former USSR republics may acquire momentum, but solely on a voluntary basis. The economic agreement recently signed by the CIS countries shows that it has already began. The problem lies elsewhere. Russia has not developed a concept of relations either with its ethnic outskirts or with the near abroad countries. And since there is no concept, the function of the military remains unknown.

Now about Minister of Defense P. Grachev's personality. Despite a wide range of differing opinions about him and the extent of his authority in the military, I want to say that he is making progress both as a military chief and as a politician. Grachev is the kind of person who has his own opinions, which go along the lines of democratic transformation in Russia. All talk about whether he hesitated that October night or not should be discarded, because a commander who has to make a decision that affects the fate of many people always hesitates. The important point is that he did not hesitate to support the president. Of course, it is not nice to use tanks to shell the parliament, but if these tanks were not there, thousands of people on both sides would have perished during the storming.

What conclusions should we draw based on the current situation in the military and in the country?

1. Radical reform of the Armed Forces is necessary. We currently have an imperialist-state army. Beginning with Ivan the Terrible, Russia has conducted 22 wars, only four of which were defensive. The mentality of the military and its structure remains imperial. Reform ought to turn it into a defensive national force integrated into the system of CIS, European, and world collective security. Many of those who are still in power, however, still see it as an instrument of intimidation of near and distant countries and peoples.

2. We need a purge of all enforcement structures, including the military. Far from all generals and officers share democratic values. Germany underwent denazification after the war; we, and first of all the military, must undergo decommunization. The military's imperial ethics must be reoriented towards democratic values, first and foremost the value of the human being.

3. Developing a new social policy is, by the way, not the military's business—it is a task for the entire state. Economic conditions must be created for servicemen and members of their families, in order to build on this basis the prestige of the military.

The military cannot reform itself—it does not have such forces within it. The reform must originate from the new parliament.

FROM THE EDITORS: In publishing these materials, we hope that our readers—first and foremost military servicemen—will share their opinion with us in letters.

Government Considering New Space Industry Finance Program

LD0911191793 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1814 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] In the near future Russia's rocket and space industry is to receive substantial state support. According to information received by Interfax, the government is considering a draft resolution "On Urgent Measures to Ensure State Support to The Russian Space Industry from 1994 to the year 2000" which provides, in particular, for the purpose oriented allocation of Rbs [rubles] 320 billion (about $273 million).

These funds are "to compensate the 1993 debts, ensure fulfillment of the state order and state defense order on space equipment in 1994, and maintain ground space infrastructure."

Beginning with December 1993 rocket and space enterprises will receive annual advance payments totalling not less than 40% of planned appropriations on state order for this year.

The resolution provides for development of a draft program to ensure Russia's independent accesss to space along with proposals to transfer the development and production of materials, elements, and components for space equipment from CIS countries to Russia."

Currently 20% of the share of rocket and space equipment produced in the former USSR falls on Ukraine.

Until the program is implemented, Space Defense Forces and the Russian Space Agency enjoy the right to conclude direct treaties and set mutual accounts with enterprises of CIS countries which participate in creation of rocket and space technology.

Work related to the creation and utilization of military space facilities will receive the status of federal purpose-oriented programs and priority financing. Besides, 10,000 people will be allocated additionally to the Russian Defense Ministry's personnel to implement the tasks related to exploitation and utilization of research and production facilities.

14th Mir Space Station Expedition Continues

LD0911115593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1137 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] Flight Control Centre November 9 TASS—Russian cosmonauts Vassily Tsibliyev and Alexander Serebrov, members of the crew of the 14th basic expedition on board the research space station Mir, continue their flight.

The scientific programme in the past days included astrophysical research with the use of telescopes of the international orbital station "Roentgen" and sets of equipment "bouquet", and geophysical experiments to study ultraviolet emissions.

On Tuesday [9 November] the cosmonauts are engaged in planned work to replace equipment of the thermal regulation system of the basic unit. Astrophysical, geophysical and technological experiments are also planned.

Work in the near-Earth orbit proceeds according to plan. The cosmonauts feel well.

Economic Issues

Central Bank Denies Rumors of Chairman's Resignation

LD0911194493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1815 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] The distribution of unfounded rumors of the resignation by the Central Bank of Russia's chairman, Viktor Geraschenko, disorganizes the functioning of the banking system and state bodies, according to the bank's press release issued today. The reports that the president allegedly signed a decree to relieve Geraschenko of his duties was published by the "Segodnya" (Today) newspaper of November 4.

The press release said the presidential press office the bank turned to neither had any information on such a decree, nor passed it to the mass media.

At a press conference last week, Geraschenko said he did not rule out the possibility of his resignation pointing out at the same time that according to the law he was to fulfill his duties by the time the new parliament is formed.

Regional Tax Policy Seen as Key to Cutting Inflation

PM0911164193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 3 Nov 93 p iii

[Interview with Professor Valeriy Rutgayzer, director of the Academy of the National Economy Investments Center, by unidentified ITAR-TASS reporter; place and date not given; from the "Delo" section: "Financial Stabilization Is Impossible Without the Territories"]

[Text] [ITAR-TASS] Is it possible, in your view, to stabilize Russia's finances by the end of the year, bringing inflation down to 10 percent per month?

[Rutgayzer] I do not think so. At any rate, the attempt to overcome it by inflationary methods will not be successful. I have in mind the credits of several trillion rubles taken recently virtually free of charge (at 10 percent per annum) by the Finance Ministry from the Central Bank in order to clear the budget deficit. What is this, if it is not pumping up inflation in the name of combating inflation?

In general, the deficit problem cannot be solved using restrictive measures alone. It is good that the government is seeking to reduce expenditure—particularly credits to the military-industrial complex, subsidies to the agrarian sector, and so forth; but this is insufficient. Indeed, such unpopular measures will hardly "come off" in conditions of an election campaign, when it is necessary to fight for the votes of those same agrarian workers, for example. Success here is only possible given a substantial increase in the income part of the budget. And for this it must be in the interests of regions and enterprises to pay their taxes properly.

I have already had occasion to set out my proposals: A total sum of taxes "due" from the regions this year must be calculated and fixed at an absolute level until 1995. Regional authorities act in a similar way with regard to enterprises situated on their territories: Pay next year, and the same fixed sum the following year, and all the rest is at your entire disposal. With one modification: Tax increases every month in exact proportion to how much you have increased prices for your output. Regional payments into the federal budget are also to be commensurate with this.

With this kind of system producers will finally have incentives to expand production. After all, the more output you produce and sell, the greater relatively will be the profit share at your disposal. The main thing is that the need to conceal income in every way possible and to avoid paying taxes disappears.

[ITAR-TASS] Is there a real chance of introducing your system in practice?

[Rutgayzer] I think that to some degree the government has accepted these ideas. A decision was recently adopted to stabilize tax income at the level of 10 percent of profits, leaving the rest to the discretion of regions. This, is my view, is correct, but we should go further, establishing a fixed sum and not a percentage for a transitional period. We must take into account the fact that financial prosperity today is determined not so much by actions from above as by policy at local level.

[ITAR-TASS] In other words, you propose that a "strong regional policy" be implemented in the financial sphere?

[Rutgayzer] Precisely. The trouble is that our entire financial system is suffering from a substantial bias in favor of the capital city (Moscow and St. Petersburg) structures to the detriment of regional structures—which disrupts the normal "blood circulation" in the national economy. In order to correct the situation we must create regional financial institutions—holdings, insurance companies, nonstate pension funds. This is the way to mobilize the financial resources of enterprises and the population and to create a base for the financial development of the regions.

State Drafts R100 Billion Privatization Plan

PM0811160793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Nov 93 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Privatizing 100 Billion"]

[Text] The draft state privatization program for 1994 will be submitted for discussion by the Federal Assembly in January, the Russian Federation State Committee for the Management of State Property Press Service reports.

The program is being drawn up by Russian Federation State Committee for the Management of State Property experts and well-known economists. Under the program it is planned to privatize around 100 enterprises with an incorporation capital of more than 1 billion rubles each. These will mainly be enterprises in the oil and gas complex and the automobile and machine tool building industries. It is planned to ease the prohibition on the privatization of military-industrial complex installations, as well as on land.

Economic Performance in Jan-Sep Summarized

PM0911111593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Nov 93 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report "based on material from the government report 'The State of the Russian Economy. Main Facts and Trends:'" "Score Not Yet in Our Favor. Results of the Country's Socioeconomic Development in January-September Summarized"]

[Text] Gross domestic product decreased 11 percent compared with the same period last year. The volume of industrial production decreased 17 percent. Output of products in the fuel and raw materials complexes geared not only to domestic consumption but also to export deliveries decreased at a slower rate. Thus, gas, coal, and oil extraction decreased 4, 10, and 11 percent respectively. At the same time the decline was greater in the processing industry, influenced by restricted demand. Especially in light industry, the timber industry, the chemical and petrochemical industries, and nonferrous metallurgy.

An appreciable increase was achieved in the production of a whole host of nonfood consumer goods. Primarily everyday electrical goods, as well as combined radio and tape decks and combined radio record players and tape decks, televisions, and knitting machines. Output of washing machines, electric vacuum cleaners, and sewing

machines has stabilized. But the volume of the types of products which are competing in the consumer market with a powerful influx of imported goods has noticeably decreased—tape recorders are down 16 percent, video recorders by 28 percent, video cassettes by 33 percent, and cameras by 42 percent.

Enterprises' investment activity continues to fall. The volume of capital investment was 90 percent of the figure for January-September last year or around 44 percent of that for the same period in 1991.

All the indications are that the grain harvest will reach last year's level. Things are roughly the same with sugar beet and sunflowers, and somewhat worse with vegetables and potatoes. Unfortunately most farms have not created reserves of feed sufficient for the entire indoor wintering period.

The reduction of the cattle population continues in livestock raising. Specialists believe that this is the main reason why the volume of meat production will decrease 10 percent this year. However, cows' productivity has increased and the decline in milk production has been halted. The poultry population increased 8 percent compared with last year.

Privatization has gotten under way on a wide scale in Russia. Typically its fastest rates are in trade, public catering, and consumer services. Since the beginning of the year around 60,000 enterprises in this sphere or 70 percent of facilities which have lost state status during this period have been privatized here.

The problem of inflation remains an acute one for the country. In the first nine months prices increased 480 percent. In September the average wage reached 80,0000 rubles [R], the average industrial wage being R85,000-R90,000. In relation to January-September 1992 the volume of sales to the population of goods and services, including the free market, increased 4 percent at comparable prices. The service sector is developing at an accelerated rate.

According to preliminary assessments the foreign trade balance of payments is heading for a surplus of over $20 billion, which has been achieved mainly through a substantial reduction in purchases of imported goods.

Official: 'Worst Is Over' for Consumers

PM0811153793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 6 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Deputy Finance Minister Aleksandr Pochinok by Vladimir Kuzmishchev; place and date not given: "Aleksandr Pochinok: We Have Bottomed Out"]

[Text] Aleksandr Petrovich Pochinok was the long-time head of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Commission for the Budget, Plans, Taxes, and Prices. He is now Russian deputy finance minister and chairman of the Russian Federation Commission for Transferring the Work of the Supreme Soviet.

[Kuzmishchev] Aleksandr Petrovich, you are a State Duma candidate and, at the same time, you are accepting the legacy of the White House. Do you have any time left for campaigning?

[Pochinok] Not at the moment. I have a great deal of work to do. It's not just a question of accounting and controls but a kind of moral drama. People with whom I worked for many years are in a very difficult position. I found myself quite literally on the other side of the barricades to many of them. And that leaves a very deep mark. On the one hand we need to be as gentle as possible with people but, on the other, there can be no amnesty. Nonetheless, I have told myself to see only the good in people and then to add a "but"...

[Kuzmishchev] Many people now think that the baby may be thrown out with the bathwater. I am thinking of the bad economic laws which were were passed by the former parliament.

[Pochinok] Those fears are groundless. Most of the laws we passed do work. For instance, the Law on the Tax Police is still in force! In the third quarter the Tax Police collected more than 300 billion in taxes. That is not counting the dollar sums it collected. Our customs legislation has severely cut back all the allowances that had been granted over the course of years. After all, what had been happening? We would sell oil or gas, and the money would remain abroad, going to firms which did nothing to carry out the commitments which were the reason why the allowances had been granted. That has now been stopped. Individual tax breaks have been abolished. And we have thereby eliminated the black hole in the Russian financial system.

[Kuzmishchev] You were involved in elaborating the law on foreign banks, limiting their activity. Admittedly, the president has not signed it. If foreign banks were to appear on the scene now, our own banks could not stand the competition. After all, the strongest Russian bank would probably not even get onto the list of the top 100 foreign banks. Would it not be the case that where we invested our money would be decided in New York or Geneva?

[Pochinok] Sensible protectionism with regard to our financial structures is necessary, and I do not think that this matter is closed. At the same time there will be no draconian measures such as closing foreign banks—even though the newspapers have been frightening people with that prospect. But I am confident that, at any rate, preference will be given to our own banks.

[Kuzmishchev] In Japan the state supported the banks for 20 years, and now their banks are some of the world's strongest...

[Pochinok] Foreign entrepreneurs are sometimes too touchy. They make out that it is easier to enter the

market of any European country rather than Russia, and not only in banking but in trade and insurance. Every country always protects its own, and that is entirely natural.

[Kuzmishchev] You are running for the State Duma. Will you be representing "Russia's Choice"?

[Pochinok] No, I am running in a territorial district. I think that that is the main kind of election. But I support the "Russia's Choice" platform.

[Kuzmishchev] But your approaches to the method of implementing reform differ somewhat from those of Gaydar and even contradict them in some respects. Won't this influence the achievement of unified goals?

[Pochinok] Undoubtedly within a single bloc there should be discipline, consideration for everyone's opinion, and a subordination to common ideas and goals. Then the Duma will not resemble a farce, as the old parliament sometimes did. But there will always be differences between representative and executive bodies. In general there should be differences between normal people if they are sincere. Even Fedorov and Gaydar have different views on methods of action and on specific decisions. After all, they are real people.

[Kuzmishchev] The mass media are now stressing in every possible way the antagonism between the Gaydar and Yavlinskiy economic programs. The former takes a strictly monetary approach to inflation. The latter proposes fighting inflation by boosting production.... That sounds preferable to many people.

[Pochinok] I can assure you that if Yavlinskiy were in Gaydar's place and if he kept his qualifications, in a month or two he would be doing exactly the same as Gaydar. And any qualified economist in Gaydar's place would have to do what he is currently doing. You see, there is the position of a dispassionate critic and the position of someone who is trying to do something.

[Kuzmishchev] Do you mean that this is more to do with politics than economics?

[Pochinok] Undoubtedly. It is just that some people stress that the chair is made of wood while others stress that it has four legs. After all, even Gaydar does not want to deny the need to support enterprises which want to learn fend for themselves. That goes without saying. And Yavlinskiy does not deny that we need to fight inflation... One thinks that the action program should be slightly longer drawn-out, while the other thinks it should be slightly tightened up. These are just nuances on which agreement can easily be reached in principle. But Yavlinskiy has now regrettably had a long layoff from purely practical work.

[Kuzmishchev] That can be seen as a drawback, of course, but there is also the opposing view that if ministers enter the Duma it will toe the executive line.

[Pochinok] That is just a campaign slogan. All the people speculating on this are forgetting the simple point that as soon as the State Duma session opens the government will resign.

[Kuzmishchev] Does that mean that the holders of positions are running a bigger risk?

[Pochinok] Indeed. Someone who runs in the election will not be a minister. Whether or not he is appointed one will be a problem for the president and the Duma. By the time the Duma starts work we will already have a new constitution, which will have laid down something on this point. In my view, the desire to remove representatives of the executive from parliament has done us more harm than good. As a result of the confrontation between the branches of power, parliament is deprived of many good, competent, and efficient people. Sometimes this has been the beginning of a great tragedy. Just remember the Dunayev affair. There is a lot of talk now about the path he took and the harm he did. Yet it all began when he was appointed a minister, removed his deputy's badge, and was later relieved of his position...

[Kuzmishchev] The election campaign has just begun, and many leaders of the democratic movement have virtually become ideological opponents already. We now know how this could end... But is it perhaps just an attempt to take votes away from more serious opponents?

[Pochinok] No, unfortunately, this is not a political ploy. People's personal ambition and dissatisfaction with their current posts come into play here. The great tragedy is that we have been divided at a time when we ought to be united. For instance, when I see in another bloc the very Misha Zadornov with whom I did my postgraduate studies and with whom my views coincide 100 percent, I find it unnatural.

[Kuzmishchev] If you become a deputy, that is not an enviable position. After all, you will be representing the Urals. But there has long been a sometimes overt, sometimes covert struggle going on between the regions and the center. Will you—as a representative of a region—have to betray your convictions?...

[Pochinok] I do not think so. The new constitution lays down a fundamentally different mechanism for the shaping of federal and territorial budgets—they will be independent so as to ensure that people at local level cannot claim to have been robbed. And the center should have its own—its own—real taxes from the territories. On the basis of the principle of equality. It should not be the case that certain regions pay more into the federal budget while others pay less. Under the new system the territories will have a chance to keep a considerable amount of tax, to vary the rates, to build a tax policy, and, in general, to feel far more independent. But this kind of system presupposes strict responsibility. If there is a federal tax, you have to be good and collect it in full, remit it in good time, and not refuse to make your

payments. And if payments from the center, from the Federation, are due, then they too must be made strictly on schedule.

[Kuzmishchev] My last question is a traditional one—what is your prediction for the future? I would like it to be as optimistic as possible.

[Pochinok] First, we have already bottomed out. There will undoubtedly be no sharp growth in prosperity for most people, but I believe that we will be able to cope with inflation in 1994. That is one more step. After that—to go by the experience of Korea and Japan once again—it will take 10-15-20 years of gradually moving upward and making structural changes to industry, the economy, and the state. I repeat—the worst is over. There is no threat of famine. Attempts to upset political stability have been firmly put down, and the state has shown that it can defend itself. There is no threat of any wholesale closure of enterprises either.

Regional Affairs

North Ossetian Parliament Approves Presidency

LD0911191893 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1731 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] The session of the North Ossetian parliament that ended its work on Tuesday has approved the proposal on establishing presidency, the head of the republic, the executive power and the highest official.

Interfax reports that the session recommended that the commission responsible for reforming bodies of power and of local self- government submit before November 20 specific bills on amendments to the republic's Constitution, as well as documents on presidency and presidential elections.

The session also approved the commission's decision on substituting the North Ossetian Soviet Socialist Republic for the Republic of North Ossetia.

Interfax has learnt from reliable sources another parliament session is scheduled for November 20.

In an interview to Interfax Valeriy Kozayev, member of the parliament presidium, has said that the decision taken at the session was crucial for reforming the bodies of executive power and self-government.

He said the proposals had been advanced in the republic for two years but were rejected by the majority vote. Kozayev believes the reform became possible due to serious changes in the social and political situation in Russia.

Karelian Parliament Speaker Affirms Federalism

MK0911133093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Nov 93 p 3

[Report by Radik Batyrshin under the "Constitution" rubric: "Boris Yeltsin Is Allergic to Republics' Sovereignty, Karelia Supreme Soviet Chairman Viktor Stepanov Thinks"]

[Text] "The conciliation commission set up after the Russian president's meeting with heads of the republics, krays, and oblasts did not reach its objective—to incorporate the republics' sovereign status and the Federal Treaty into the draft of Russia's constitution," Viktor Stepanov, head of the Karelian parliament, stated in an interview for NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA. Heads of the republics had delegated to him and Kabardino-Balkaria President Valeriy Kokov the powers to finalize the draft fundamental law of the Russian Federation. Stepanov proposed to its drafters a compromise formula: Federation components (including krays and oblasts) will possess the degree of sovereignty that will not harm the sovereignty and integrity of the Russian Federation. But this variant was turned down because, in Stepanov's words, "Boris Yeltsin is as allergic today to the word 'sovereignty' as he is to the word 'soviets.'" The Karelian leader at the same time stressed that if the Russian Federation constitution secures support in the referendum, it would have more legitimacy than the Federation Treaty. But, according to him, the problem is that in the referendum, citizens will not be voting for a unitary or a federative draft constitution, but for or against Yeltsin. Therefore Viktor Stepanov proposed, proceeding from Article 136 of the draft constitution, that the fundamental law of the Russian Federation should be regarded as passed, if voters in at least two- thirds of the federation components approve it. "I cannot accept it that 9 million Muscovites should dictate their will to the whole of Russia," the Karelian Supreme Soviet chairman stressed. He also invoked the Federation Treaty under which the status of former autonomous entities can be altered with the consent of the republics. But these arguments, according to V. Stepanov, were not taken into account in preparing the draft constitution for publication. He thinks that after 21 September, Russia became almost a unitary country, but there is no tragedy in this. Viktor Stepanov thinks that even the new constitution is not going to stop the tendency of Russia to move toward a genuine federation: "I believe a tree of federalism will grow on the constitutional rock of unitarianism."

Governor Disbands Khabarovsk's Local Soviets

OW0911184393 Khabarovsk Radio Khabarovsk Network in Russian 0945 GMT 29 Oct 93

[From the "Kray News"]

[Text] As of yesterday, the activities of the city and rayon soviets of peoples deputies in Khabarovsk Kray have

been abolished by decree of the head of the administration, in accordance with the edict of the President of the Russian Federation. The functions of the above mentioned soviets have been handed over to the corresponding local administrations.

In accordance with the 28 October decree of the head of the kray administration, all bank account operations of the abolished city and rayon soviets have been closed. Deputies and workers of the abolished soviets will be given guaranteed privileges on dismissal, in accordance with the current law.

St. Petersburg, Samara Voter Intentions Viewed

PM0911145593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Report by Mariya Matskevich: "St. Petersburg and Samara Opt For Democratically Orientated Parties"]

[Text] St. Petersburg—According to the data of the Center for Studying and Forecasting Social Processes (headed by Leonid Keselman), which has completed another poll of more than 5,000 inhabitants of St. Petersburg and Samara, around 65 percent of St. Petersburg and Samara voters intend to participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections (in mid-October the figure was just over 60 percent).

In St. Petersburg the majority—82 percent—of those who have decided to participate in the December elections have already identified their political preferences (the figure was 69 percent in October). The rest either do not have a definite stance regarding the political forces that have declared themselves (12 percent compared with 21 percent in October) or have no confidence in any of them (6 percent against 9 percent in October).

In Samara significantly fewer—57 percent (around 40 percent in October)—have made their positions clear. Some 36 percent compared with 33 percent in October still lack a definite stance on the political forces that have declared themselves. Seven percent (the same in October) have no confidence in any of them.

The likelihood is that the participants in the elections will be mainly those who have made their choice, while those who are undecided at the moment but who will nonetheless go to the polls will be distributed in the same proportions as those who have already made their choice. So (taking those who have a position as 100 percent), it can be reckoned that at the moment "Russia's Choice," headed by Ye. Gaydar, can expect 32 percent of the vote (compared with 34 percent in mid-October) in St. Petersburg; the G. Yavlinskiy-Yu. Boldyrev bloc can expect 29 percent (compared with 27 percent); the Movement for Democratic Reforms, headed by A. Sobchak and G. Popov, can expect 8 percent (compared with 15 percent); the Democratic Party of Russia, headed by N. Travkin, can expect 2 percent (compared with 5 percent). Moreover, the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, headed by S. Shakhray, can expect approximately 3.5 percent. The "New Russia" bloc, headed by T. Gdlyan, can expect 3 percent and the Association of Independent Professionals, headed by P. Filippov, can expect 2 percent; Civic Union, headed by A. Volskiy, can expect to get 1 percent.

The communists, headed by G. Zyuganov and Yu. Slobodkin, can expect 7 percent (they had 11 percent in October); and V. Zhirinovskiy's party can expect approximately the same (6 percent); the People's Freedom Party, headed by M. Astafyev and A. Nevzorov, can expect 3 percent; the Russian National [obshchenarodnyy] Union, headed by S. Baburin, can expect 1 percent (supporters of the National Salvation Front, which has gone underground, had 4 percent in October).

In Samara "Russia's Choice," headed by Ye. Gaydar, can expect 37 percent of the vote (compared with 45 percent in mid-October); the G. Yavlinskiy-Yu. Boldyrev bloc can expect 12 percent (compared with 17); the Movement for Democratic Reforms, headed by A. Sobchak and G. Popov, can expect 8 percent (compared with 7); the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, headed by S. Shakhray, can expect approximately 8 percent; the Democratic Party of Russia, headed by N. Travkin, can expect 5 percent (compared with 12). The communists, headed by G. Zyuganov and Yu. Slobodkin, can expect 12 percent (compared with 10 percent in October); V. Zhirinovskiy's party and the Russian National Union, headed by S. Baburin, can expect 2 percent, and the People's Freedom Party, headed by M. Astafyev and A. Nevzorov, can expect 3 percent (supporters of the National Salvation Front, which has gone undergroubd, had 7 percent in October).

In this city on the Volga the "New Russia" bloc, headed by T. Gdlyan, can expect 4 percent; the Association of Independent Professionals, headed by P. Filippov, and the Civic Union, headed by A. Volzhskiy, can expect approximately 1 percent.

Whereas the united opposition of "communist-patriots" can expect a maximum of 17-19 percent of the vote on St. Petersburg, an association of just three democratically orientated blocs—"Russia's Choice," the Yavlinskiy-Boldyrev bloc, and the Movement for Democratic Reforms—has almost four times as much support.

Sakhalin Oblast Lags in Election Preparations

OW0911184993 Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk Teleradiokompaniya Sakhalin Television Network in Russian 2005 GMT 27 Oct 93

[Report by V. Korotkikh; from the "Morning Cruise" program]

[Text] Remote regions like the Sakhalin Oblast find themselves in a very complicated situation on the eve of the Federal Assembly and the State Duma elections. Judge for yourself whether comprehensive, explanatory, and organizational work, can be carried out if, for instance, you consider that from 18 to 27 October, no

aircraft from Moscow arrived in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk due to a lack of aviation fuel. Because of this, there were no up-to-date pre-election documents and central newspapers, and the printed word, you must agree, is very essential when considering the new electoral system, with its numerous legal subtleties. The Sakhalin Electoral District Commission's organizational period has also been delayed, partly for the same reason. It was only able to get together for its first meeting on 27 October.

The work of the Commission resembled a discussion more than a business conference. The Commission is comprised of 16 people, of whom eight were appointed by the Oblast Administration and eight were from the oblast, city, and rayon soviets which had never dissolved themselves.

The Sakhalin Oblast was allocated three mandates: two to the State Duma and one to the Federal Council. While the District Commission is deciding on its organizational issues, the local branches of various parties, movements, and blocks are opening up their campaign struggle for the available power mandates with enviable activity. Nearly 10 names of future candidates to the federal organs of power have already been nominated, among whom, by the way, there are those who have already proven themselves as deputies to the Supreme Soviet of Russia. The collection of signatures for registration of candidates has begun. However, the pre-election campaign on Sakhalin and the Kurils as a whole bears more an anarchical rather than a democratic character, and there are simply no outward signs on the city streets of pending elections.

Nizhniy Novgorod Passes Self-Government Law

PM0911145993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Report by Anatoliy Yershov: "Elder and City Governor To Be Reelected"]

[Text] Nizhniy Novgorod—The Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast Inner Soviet has passed a statute on local self-government for the period of the phased constitutional reform, although for the time being, admittedly, only on first reading. It is a question of setting up new local organs of power to replace the rural, settlement, city, and rayon soviets which have ceased operating.

This document, which has been published in the local press and submitted for discussion to the oblast's population, notes that local self-government is to be exercised through the forms of direct democracy (meetings, assemblies of citizens) and also through representative organs. For example, city and rural population centers with up to 5,000 inhabitants elect an elder [starosta] at meetings and assemblies. Population centers with 5,000-50,000 inhabitants people elect a city (rural, settlement) duma consisting of 15 deputies. The duma elects a city governor [gradonachalnik]. In rural rayons in the oblast the local self-government organs are the land assembly [zemskoye sobraniye] and the elective head of the rayon administration.

The representative organs of power—the dumas and the land assemblies—examine local budgets, set local taxes and levies, and monitor the development of territories. An interesting feature is that the elder, duma deputy, and land assembly member may not be elected to other representative organs and the duma deputy and land assembly member working on a permanent basis cannot be employed in state service.

Whereas this draft is still subject to discussion and subsequent ratification, the recent session of the oblast soviet adopted a decision to hold elections to a new representative organ, the legislative assembly of Nizhniy Novgorod Oblast (in place of the oblast soviet), no later than six months after the elections to the Russian Federal Assembly. That legislative assembly will employ 45 deputies on a permanent basis.

Kaliningrad's Infrastructure To Be Expanded

PM0911142193 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 5 Nov 93

[Report by Stanislav Chekalinn and Vitaliy Belousov from Kaliningrad Oblast; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Chekalinn] Following the secession of the Baltic states, Kaliningrad's maritime and commercial port became in point of fact Russia's only ice-free port in the Baltic Region, and now it can no longer cope with the ever increasing flow of freight. A general reconstruction of Kaliningrad's transportation network is planned for the next few years, and this was the topic of a conversation between experts and Russian First Vice Premier Vladimir Shumeyko who arrived on a visit here.

Another problem facing this enclave zone of Russia is the redeployment here of Baltic Fleet units and ships from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. An entire settlement of 14,000 apartments for officers is under development here in Kaliningrad. The apartments are being constructed by Lithuanian construction workers from the (?Selma) Association, with which the fleet command concluded a contract. Kaliningrad's neighbors are working well, and to a high standard, and the vice premier promised every possible support for this worthwhile project.

Moscow Metro's Civil Defense Role Demonstrated

PM0911140393 St. Petersburg Fifth Channel Television in Russian 1800 GMT 25 Oct 93

[Report by Sergey Gaponov, identified by caption; from the "Segodnya" newscast]

[Text] [Gaponov] We often complain about transportation problems in big cities. The increasingly frequent disruptions in the work of the Moscow Metro are one

such problem. There are more and more passengers, trains are not being properly maintained, and waiting times between trains are growing longer.

But probably few of us recall that, apart from its transportation function, the capital's subway has yet another function. The vast underground city is one of the most important components of the capital's civil defense system. At first glance, the spacious halls seem ill-suited to wartime needs. However, as soon as the alarm is sounded, huge steel doors block off escalators. Civil defense detachment fighters check gas masks and special protective suits to ensure that they are serviceable. Metro stations are equipped with water supply and sewage lines and can be converted into bomb shelters in a matter of minutes.

The exercise, which was staged in the underground city during nightime, was successful. The Metro is ready to perform its wartime functions, but in the morning we will again be traveling to work in overcrowded cars. [Video shows subway escalator, control room, steel doors blocking off escalator, men donning gas masks and protective suits, subway tunnels.]

Civil Defense Exercise Reviewed

PM0911152193 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0700 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Report by unidentified correspondent on civil defense exercise in Moscow Metro; from the "Poligon" program]

[Text] [Video shows Metro tunnel, escalator being blocked off by steel doors, men donning gas masks and protective suits, women in Red Cross uniforms evacuating casualties, control room, panels being installed above rails over the sound of a siren, snatches of telephone conversations, orders being issued.]

[Correspondent] This is Teatralnaya Metro station near Red Square. Fortunately, this is neither war nor the latest armed clash. Although we are definitely preparing for something. The Moscow Government, Civil Defense Headquarters, and the Moscow Metro have carried out a comprehensive civil defense exercise. Many people may have forgotten about civil defense, but recent events have shown that it is nonetheless necessary.

Procedures were rehearsed for the event of a chemical threat, with the accommodation of citizens in the stations and tunnels of the capital's subway, airtight sealing of escalator wells and underground passages, deployment of medical stations, testing of sewage systems, water and power supply systems, and chemical protection. In short, everything in line with the laws of the times with which veterans are familiar. [more sirens]

A few days ago this exercise came in handy. There was an accident deep under the Kremlin walls at the Aleksandrovskiy Sad station. A train was derailed during the rush hour. Around 1,500 passengers were evacuated from the transport tunnel. There were no casualties. Let's hope there will be none in the future either, and not just in the Metro. Meanwhile...

[Unidentified uniformed woman addressing staff who had taken part in the civil defense exercise] The Metro operates in two modes. As a transport facility and as a shelter. As a transport facility it operates every day, and as a shelter it operates in extreme circumstances—in wartime and during accidents which may occur at our enterprises. [video shows civil defense exercise in progress]

International Affairs

Progress Noted in Zlenko-Kozyrev Talks

LD0911202793 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1640 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev, 9 Nov—The regular briefing at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry was devoted to issues of the working meeting between Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko and Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, which took place in Odessa 5-6 November. The main aim of the meeting was to look for ways of resolving existing problems regarding the Black Sea Fleet, nuclear weapons, an interstate treaty, issues of economic cooperation and so on. The sides agreed to begin joint work by state delegations on the text of a draft treaty on friendship, cooperation, and partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation in the near future. An understanding was reached that the work of groups of experts on problems of delimitation and demarcation of a joint state border should begin at the same time. Issues of developing the legal and contractual basis in Ukrainian-Russian relations between Ukraine and Russia [as received] were discussed during the meeting. It was decided to speed up the resolution of issues of opening additional consular establishments on the territory of both countries, concluding a treaty regarding issues of legal assistance, agreements on issues of merchant shipping, speeding up the process of ratification by the Russian side of the treaty on recognizing ownership, and so on.

In the opinion of Mykhaylo Dashkevych, chief of the first territorial directorate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, achieving an accord on speeding up work on coordinating the interstate treaty was an important result of the talks. The issue regarding the draft treaty on dual citizenship, which the Russian side is proposing that the two states conclude, was also discussed at the meeting.

Replying to a question from a UNIAR correspondent as to whether the issue of the status of Sevastopol was examined at the meeting, Mr. Dashkevych replied that the president of Russia and the Russian Foreign Ministry had disassociated themselves from the decision by the Russian parliament of 9 July on granting Sevastopol the status of a Russian town; this issue was not, therefore, examined.

Zlenko: Nonnuclear Status Requires Massive Aid

LD1011071393 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0600 GMT 10 Nov 93

[Text] Ukraine is trying to get rid of nuclear weapons, the legacy of the former Soviet Union, but is in dire need of massive foreign aid for this task, says Ukrainian Foreign Minister Anatoliy Zlenko. Ukraine will become a nonnuclear state if it receives the necessary assistance in destroying nuclear weapons, the minister said. Kiev has estimated that Ukraine would need about $2.8 billion for this.

Envoy to Russia on Nuclear Arms, Economic Aid

LD0911131093 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 9 Nov 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Excerpts] At today's meeting with journalists, Vladimir Kryzhanovskiy, Ukraine's ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary in Russia, spoke mostly about increased mutual understanding between the two Slavic states, to which the recent meeting in Odessa between Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers had contributed. [passage omitted]

Ukraine's readiness to ratify the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons was reaffirmed, but journalists did not get any answers as to when this was likely to happen. On the other hand, it was stated that tactical nuclear weapons had been withdrawn from Ukrainian territory completely—for which our independent neighbor expects to receive financial compensation. According to the ambassador, the Russian side has shown understanding on the issue.

As for strategic nuclear weapons, Ukraine will retain them. The ambassador said: We are able to guarantee our own security. He went on to acknowledge, however, that what Ukraine was not able to guarantee was its own economic stability.

Surprise was expressed at the international community's lack of attention to Ukraine's troubles. Why does Russia get more help than we do, the ambassador asked.

Further Comments by Envoy

LD0911152193 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1420 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] Russia does not have reason for concern over the safety of strategic nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine. The statement by Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev to the effect that no one will be able to guarantee the safety of these weapons in 24 months is "somewhat of an exaggeration." This was the response given by Ukraine's Ambassador to Russia, Vladimir Kryzhanovskiy, to an Interfax question at a news conference in Moscow on Tuesday [9 November].

According to him, if a missile deployed in Ukraine gets in dangerous condition, it will be deactivated at once. "We are not enemies of our own people, and we shall not let a tragedy take place," the ambassador said.

Nevertheless, he declared that Ukraine has some fears in connection with Russian strategic missiles which, "if a catastrophe occurs when they are in Russia, will have no further place to be removed to."

The ambassador confirmed Ukraine's intention to "move toward ratifying the START-1 treaty, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Lisbon Protocol." The main obstacle that prevents Ukraine's parliament from ratifying them is the issue of compensation for the tactical nuclear arms which have already been removed from Ukraine," Kryzhanovsky said.

He confirmed that Russian-Ukrainian agreements make no mention of such a compensation. "Nevertheless, Russia ought to display common sense and resolve this issue fairly," the ambassador noted.

With reference to the issue of the Black Sea Fleet, the Ukrainian ambassador said that the Massandra accords "should be made more comprehensible for both sides." "Some of the Black Sea Fleet ships should be transferred to Ukraine after all, to enable it to form its own Navy. The Russian side understands this," Kryzhanovskiy said.

In comments on the meeting between the Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers held in Odessa recently, Kryzhanovskiy called it "positive", and said that it "demonstrated mutual the desire to overcome the past which was not too agreeable."

As the ambassador said, the meeting drew Russia and Ukraine nearer to the signing of a large-scale political agreement. Governmental delegations are to gather in the near future to finalize it.

With reference to economic problems, Kryzhanovskiy expressed surprise in connection with the fact that some Russian politicians advocate a "harsh attitude" to Ukraine and insist that Kiev should pay "all its debts, in full, and as soon as possible."

The economic situation in Ukraine is "critical", he noted. According to him, he is surprised that the world community "gives much greater aid to Russia than to Ukraine."

Plyushch Talks With Komi Republic Delegation

LD0911221093 Kiev Ukrayinske Telebachennya Network in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] A delegation from the Komi Republic has been in Ukraine for the past few days.

[Correspondent] Ukrainian Supreme Council Chairman Ivan Plyushch received the delegation today. The guests raised issues of cooperation with our state. In particular they discussed the joint development of oil and gas deposits, and this idea was supported.

We are interested in developing links with the Komi Republic and we will set up a relevant composite group, Ivan Plyushch said. Yuriy Spiridonov, leader of the delegation, expressed himself in favor of continuous contacts with Ukraine. He aired problems which trouble citizens of Ukraine who have been working in the north for some time, in particular regarding securing accommodation in the places where they have come from. Ivan Stepanovych [Plyushch] observed that there is no need to change the legislation of our state on this matter, but certain clauses should be worked on.

National Affairs

Supreme Council Opens Plenary Session

Adopts Agenda

LD0911164093 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1320 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev [no date as received]—The Supreme Council today adopted the agenda for its plenary session which is to be held 9-12 November. Among the most important issues were those to approve the composition of the Collegium of the General Procuracy, draft laws on the election of people's deputies, the law on the fight against corruption, the composition of the Central Electoral Commission, and the introduction of appropriate amendments to the criminal code and the code of criminal procedure.

The issue of vetoing Ukrainian presidential decrees, "On the emission of state commodity bonds of Ukraine's natural resources" and "On privatizing uncompleted construction sites" was added to the agenda. In the opinion of Oleksandr Barabash they contravene at least three articles in the Ukrainian Constitution.

The Supreme Council adopted a decision to work in plenary session for two weeks without a break.

Further on Agenda

LD0911172493 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1439 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet [Council] resumed its work in Kiev Tuesday. The deputies adopted the agenda for the coming days and decided to hold only plenary sessions for two weeks.

Numerous deputies criticized the president-led government for failing to present a draft government program for 1994.

The legislature chairman Ivan Plushch said that the draft would be considered by the cabinet at its Tuesday meeting and made available to the deputies on Wednesday, November 10. President Leonid Kravchuk will make a report on the program Thursday, November 11.

The agenda of the coming sessions will include election legislation, election of the prosecution office collegium, the 1994 budget, a report of the state-owned TV and radio company and the issue of a free trade zone in Transcarpathia.

The basic documents on the zone had been prepared last February. At the end of October the Economic Reform

Commission had decided that debating this issue would not be useful and the setting up a free trade zone would require too much investment plus promote separatist trends.

Election Law To Be Discussed

LD0911222493 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 2000 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev, [no dateline as received]—The draft law on elections was submitted to a plenary session of the Supreme Council of Ukraine for the third time. In the opinion of many deputies, the last version, elaborated by the Commission for Legislation and Legality, is almost indistinguishable from the current one, in accordance with which the present composition of the Supreme Council was elected. Oleksandr Kotsyuba, Vasyl Durdynets, Volodymyr Filenko, and Vyacheslav Chornovil were granted the opportunity of speaking on alternative versions at the evening session on 9 November.

The proposal of Oleksandr Kotsyuba boiled down to adopting certain amendments and additions to the current law on elections of people's deputies, while not touching its essence. Vasyl Durdynets proposed that they come to a consensus, agreeing to a mixed system of electing people's deputies with a small quota for candidates from all parties.

Among other changes to the draft proposed by the commission, the Supreme Council deputy chairman [Durdynets] named a clause on candidates for deputies compulsorily submitting declarations on their incomes. "I am ready to be the first to complete such a declaration," said Durdynets, from which observers drew a conclusion on the speaker's desire to join in the pre-electoral marathon. On the other hand, V. Filenko, stressing a 50 percent proportion, maintained: "Should a mixed system not be adopted, I am not going to run at all, or in accordance with party lists, so that it is not said that it is supposedly because of this that party leaders are insisting on a mixed system." V. Chornovil called on colleagues to follow the example of Russia, where a progressive electoral law has already begun to operate. Regarding election to the Central Electoral Committee of nonparty members, he recalled that the candidacy of V. Shulha, head of a section of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine in the recent past, who is being proposed for the post of chairman of the Central Electoral Committee, conforms to nonparty principles as little as possible.

None of the versions gained a sufficient number of votes. Therefore, the issue of the law on elections has been postponed until 10 November. At the end of the session, the deputies adopted the law "On Combating Corruption" in its first reading and amendments ensuing from it to the Criminal and Penal Codes.

Kravchuk Decrees Bond Liquidity Guarantees

AU0911183293 Kiev URYADOVYY KURYER in Ukrainian 6 Nov 93 p 1

["Ukrainian Presidential Directive on Ensuring Guarantees for Liquidity of State Commodity Bonds of Ukraine's National Resources" issued in Kiev on 5 November]

[Text] In connection with Ukrainian Presidential Edict No. 447 of 12 October 1993 "On Issuing State Commodity Bonds of Ukraine's National Resources,"

1. To create a Supervisory Council for controlling the use of the capital obtained from selling state commodity bonds of Ukraine's national resources.

Ukraine's Ministry of Finance must submit, within two weeks, a list of candidates for the Supervisory Council.

Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers must elaborate, within a month, and submit for approval to the Ukrainian president draft regulations on the Supervisory Council for the use of the capital obtained from selling state commodity bonds of Ukraine's national resources.

2. The minister of Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers must create, within ten days, a working group for generalizing proposals advanced by ministries and other central bodies of the state's executive authority regarding investment projects to which the capital obtained from selling the state commodity bonds of Ukraine's national resources must be channeled.

The working group must submit, within a month, generalized proposals to the Supervisory Council.

3. Ukraine's Ministry of Finance must

use part of the capital obtained from selling state commodity bonds of Ukraine's national resources to stabilize the national currency unit;

create a fund for guaranteeing foreign investments from a part of the capital obtained from selling state commodity bonds of Ukraine's national resources and approve the regulations on the fund.

[Signed] Ukrainian President L. Kravchuk
[Dated] Kiev, 5 November 1993

Nuclear Malfunctions Prevalent in September

AU0911170293 Kiev UKRAYINSKA HAZETA in Ukrainian No. 18 (36) 4-17 Nov 93 p 8

[UKRINFORM report]

[Text] During the first month of autumn [September], 11 out of the 14 power units were operational at Ukraine's nuclear power stations [AES]. Three were under scheduled repairs. Over that period of time, 5.1 billion kilowatt-hours of electric energy was produced, which was 115 percent of what was planned. Over the month, 24

cases of malfunctioning were recorded, five involving the shutdown of power units and 12 reduction of capacity.

Ukraine's most powerful Zaporizhzhya AES had its ups and downs in September: It only produced 1.792 billion kW-hours. After the completion of repairs at the Rivne AES, three power units resumed operations, while the second unit remained under scheduled preventive repairs. In September, only the first power unit operated at the Chernobyl AES. At the second power unit, which is being taken out of operation, the unloading of the nuclear fuel from the reactor got under way. Major repairs of the first power unit at the Khmelnytskyy AES continued.

The radiation background was within normal parameters.

Chernobyl Theft, Security at Nuclear Plants Viewed

WS1011110193 Kiev KIEVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian 30 Oct 93 p 6

[Article by Yuriy Khlystun]

[Text] In an official declaration issued on 26 October, leaders of the State Committee for Use of Atomic Energy and the Chernobyl station director, N. Sorokin, reassured the populace that only 260 grams of uranium-235 had disappeared from the Chernobyl station. It is a well-known fact that the equipped tvel [heat emitting element] contains only 1.8 percent of this element, which is a little less than 3.5 kg of nuclear fuel in each missing component.

Nevertheless, one of the main leads being investigated is theft following by subsequent resale. All the more probable since such incidents have been reported in the past. In March of last year, the same thing happened at the Ignalinsk nuclear power plant in Lithuania. The theft was discovered during an annual inventory. Although R. Vasnis, chairman of the Lithuanian Committee for Atomic Energy Security, doubts that it was really a theft, the station's employees are convinced that the 7-meter-high container weighing 280 kg was stolen by a well-informed criminal group.

It was quite recently that disintegrative materials from the CIS appeared on the Western black markets, and they managed to raise serious concern among law-enforcement agencies in those countries. Last year in Germany, more than 100 attempts to sell radioactive substances were thwarted. German Environment Minister Klaus Toepfer described the situation as "extremely serious." A year ago, he was in Frankfurt and observed an operation to seize a load of cesium at the railroad station. Sometimes, it comes to comic situations such as one that happened in Ahlen, Germany. A local police department was informed that a Polish citizen attempted to sell 10 kg of uranium-235 for $600,000. When they arrived at the site, the policemen were surprised to learn that the entrepreneur also wanted to sell CIS warheads.

The dangerous spread of disintegrative materials throughout the world forced the International Atomic Energy Agency to set up a special department to monitor illegal operations in the nuclear sphere. However, the agency's opponents—the international organization "Anti-Atom International"—argue that its recommendations on storing radioactive substances are "too complicated and vague, even for experts."

Besides the uranium, which sells for $1,000 per 1 kg, the perpetrators could have been attracted by a nice-looking zirconium pipe flashing all rainbow colors. Incidentally, 1 gram of zirconium sells for $13.30.

As for preventing thefts at nuclear plants, Vadym Yuspyn, physical protection specialist from the State Committee for Nuclear and Radioactive Security, said it is not properly organized in Ukraine—even though it is the bedrock for security of any country. In the developed countries, you cannot even get near a main nuclear reactor building. You would be safe touring their stations even with a baby, but security will "scan" everyone, even the president. In Germany, when an unidentified object is close enough, a bullet-proof door will automatically shut. Flying objects would be shot down. In our country, on 16 October, a plane—I think it was Yak-40—circled the station three times uninhibited. And it has not been until recently that we managed to find out that it belonged to a commercial bank. It was not spotted by anti-aircraft defense forces as it flew over at a low altitude. The pilot said that he was lost. Now, the authorities are having a hard time trying to figure out exactly what laws he violated. Even though Ukraine ratified the International Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Substances on 5 May, no regulatory documents have been assembled until now. To be honest, we work like amateurs. The country has not yet developed a proper system of physical protection from nuclear accidents. Our system is safe against assaults from outside, but not from within. It is assumed that all the staff are checked, and there can be no dumb or deranged people in the station. In other countries, employees are put through special tests. As for the fences, they build them 2 meters into the ground. I am the only specialist working in the protection sphere, compared to 22 experts in Germany. The developed countries are, simply put, afraid of us. From March 1992 to March 1993, German authorities reported 20 cases of illegal trade in radioactive substances, presumably coming from the CIS countries. While Russia has already started to improve the physical protection systems at its nuclear plants, Ukraine has undertaken no measures in this regard. It is still widely assumed that there are no terrorists in our country.

Will the recent incident prompt any changes? The question remains open.

Democratic Party Leader on Election Outlook

WS0911140093 Kiev KIEVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian 29 Oct 93 pp 6, 7

[Interview with People's Deputy Volodymyr Yavorivskyy, chairman of the Ukrainian Democratic Party, by Yuriy Konstantinov in Kiev in October]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Konstantinov] The situation in the Ukraine is dramatic, however some deputies view it as if everything were fine—stern looks, serenity, stylish Western suits.... This evokes an understandable reaction from the constituency, as well as fears that a new legislature will be unable to overcome the old problems.

[Yavorivskyy] The current legislature is transitional, and it bears all the features of the old system. The Supreme Council's indisputable virtue is the adoption of the Declaration on National Sovereignty. Yet, there is a certain important detail here. It turned out that different people have been fighting for different kinds of independence. A lot of ministerial bureaucrats voted for independence only because national sovereignty liberated them from Moscow's controlling and punishing hand. The grim managing superstructure was disappearing and new exciting horizons began to loom: "I can do anything I want."

A lot of deputies hoped that they would work in the traditional mode—wear deputies' pins, enjoy immunity, and gain advantages for their enterprises and kolkhozes. When the situation finally took its current shape, a certain number of lawmakers lost interest in politics. Many of them went into business and are now controlling groups of private enterprises owned officially by their relatives. This is why one cannot even touch the subject of a ban on commercial activities for members of the deputies corps—these attempts are countered on the spot. What is going to happen in the future?

Now that a decision has been adopted to form a professional legislature, neither industrial nor agricultural managers will line up for deputies seats. A kolkhoz manager once said absolutely frankly: "I do not need a deputy's office; I need a kolkhoz warehouse." Thus, the circle will shrink. Still, there exists a threat that corrupt individuals, not directly involved in business, will be covertly implanted in the legislature to stand guard over businessmen's interests. These will be smart, perhaps even well- known people, because fools will not be entrusted with such tasks. However, I do not want to exaggerate this particular threat, because these people will protect market laws.

[Konstantinov] It seems that you are speaking about the present and not the future.

[Yavorivskyy] There is a lobby in the current legislature as well. These people always band together when their corporal interests are infringed upon.

[Konstantinov] The Ukrainian legislature is not devoid of drawbacks typical to similar structures in many other states. However, in Ukraine these drawbacks are sometimes exaggerated to absurd extremes.

[Yavorivskyy] This happens sometimes. Yet, it would be unfair to assess our legislature from this viewpoint alone. Regardless of our attitude toward the current Supreme Council, we must admit that the latter has never moved so far into the absurd as the Russian legislature. I hope that the new Supreme Council will be able to make use of the experience of its own and others' mistakes. It is extremely difficult to predict the results of the upcoming elections. The Communist Party of Ukraine [KPU] has been registered. It is in possession of huge funds. This money has been laundered and inflation has not gobbled it up. This money has probably been multiplied by now and will play its role in politics.

How should the democratic bloc behave under these circumstances? I must say that my linen is clean—I have done everything to make democratic leaders unite. God help us preserve this unity. Alarming reports have been arriving—there have been splits within the Rukh and the Republican Party.... Lack of unity is Ukraine's age-long disease, and it may feel its negative effects again.

However, I believe that more than 60 per cent of seats will be manned with new people who will bring in the fresh breath of change and a change of priorities. Politics must give way to economics. Being chairman of the Democratic Party, I am ready to be the first politician to sign a ban on the activities of all political forces in Ukraine. Everything must work for the economy. If we manage to give our people a chance to catch their breath and see the light at the end of the tunnel, changes for the better will become irreversible.

[Konstantinov] Prime Minister Kuchma appealed to party leaders to refrain, at least temporarily, from political activities and give the Cabinet of Ministers a chance to operate. The appeal was ignored....

[Yavorivskyy] I supported Kuchma on that matter. However, I could not accept his stance on other issues—I could not understand how a prime minister, a leader, could keep repeating one phrase: "Tell me what I am to build and I will do it." The leader of a government must have distinct guidelines of his own and understand what he wants to accomplish.

The graveness of the situation is enhanced by the current legislature's inability to answer Kuchma's question. There are more than 400 deputies here and if we let everyone build what he want , we would arrive at complete chaos.

I do hope that the future legislature's professional status will not permit deputies to combine their parliamentary functions with business and thus abuse their authority.

I believe that the new legislature will be more efficient and pragmatic, and that it will be able to get rid of

political complexities. Of course, communists will also have seats there, but I am sure that they will be a minority.

[Konstantinov] Communists, just like democrats, can be different. There are people in the KPU who are not orthodox communists ready to rush at their class enemies armed with volumes of Marx....

[Yavorivskyy] I know. We must change the old cliches. The criteria are changing. [passage omitted]

[Konstantinov] Not long ago, speaking to our correspondent, you expressed your opinions on the bloody Moscow events. How would you have acted, had you been in the Russian capital during those days of unrest?

[Yavorivskyy] To do this, one must separate himself from the realities of life. I am a Ukrainian citizen and a people's deputy. Aside from this, I would have been on Yeltsin's side.

[Konstantinov] Do you think that the reform of power in Russia will initiate a chain reaction in Ukraine? I mean the system of soviets, in the first place.

[Yavorivskyy] I can only say that this chain reaction is necessary. Local councils have exhausted their potential. This is not power; this is an imitation of popular rule, when a lot of people meet regularly but are unable to find a common language.

I am sure that we must look for ways of rational coexistence with Russia. Ukraine and Russia resemble convicts who escape from prison and are still chained together. One careless movement can hurt the counterpart.

[Konstantinov] You will be nominated as the Democratic Party's candidate. Whom does your party envision as Ukraine's prime minister and president?

[Yavorivskyy] In the party's opinion, either Pylypchuk or Pynzenyk could be proposed for prime minister. They are currently busy drafting the party's electoral program. We are also discussing a possible candidate for president. However, strange as it may seem, I think that presidential elections are of secondary importance. The main task is to elect a legislature and change the top echelons of power. Thus, we must carry out a civilized political revolution. [last five words published in boldface] The new legislature will approve a new government and then, it will be time for choosing a president. The fight for this post promises to be very tense and colorful. There will be a large group of contestants who will improve their chances by blaming all the failures on Kravchuk. The more so that President Kravchuk assumed management of the government. Ivan Plushch's candidacy should not be neglected either. Lately, he has won substantial support from lawmakers. I am sure that younger candidates will also appear. In other words, there are a lot of possibilities. [passage omitted]

Crimean Communist Groups Unite for Elections

WS0911140793 Kiev UKRAYINA MOLODA in Ukrainian 2 Nov 93 p 2

[Report by Yuriy Steblyna]

[Text] The leaders of the Crimean communist and pro-Russian organizations have announced that the People's Unity bloc has been reinstated. This decision has been signed by representatives of the Crimean Communist Party, the Republican Party, the Liberal Democratic Party, the Green Party, the youth organization Young Guard, and the Crimean Cossacks' Union. The new political bloc has already announced that it is willing to assume power and formulate a "new course" for the Crimean Republic.

Activists of the Russian Party of Crimea are not wasting their time either. Currently, they are "pushing through" the registration of their party. Should it be accomplished, the Russian Party will become the fourth officially registered political organization in the Crimea. Serhiy Shuvaynikov, the leader of the party, believes that the main task for his adherents is to mobilize all patriotic forces that support the "Crimean-Russian" idea of "solid success in the forthcoming elections to the republican legislature."

Nationalist Party Adopts Election Strategy

LD0911124693 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 2015 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] Kiev [no date as received] A regular meeting of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists [KUN] was held 6-7 November chaired by the party's leader. Leaders of 23 oblast organizations of KUN took part in it. The adopted resolution, "The strategy and tactics of the Congress in the elections to the Supreme Council" stresses that the Ukrainian nationalists are taking part in the parliamentary elections for the first time and "cannot bear responsibility for the present activity of the representative and executive bodies of power in Ukraine." As the resolution states, the Congress intends to play an active part in all electoral districts and pay particular attention to eastern and southern regions.

On 7 November KUN circulated a statement concerning Boris Yeltsin's speech at the unveiling of a monument to Yaroslav the Wise in Yaroslavl. It expresses resolute disagreement with the Russian president's treatment of the person of Yaroslav the Wise as a Russian prince, and indignation concerning "the absence of a principled state position by Ukraine's higher officials."

State Officials, Legislature Fire Opponents

WS1011105993 Kiev UKRAYINA MOLODA in Ukrainian 29 Oct 93 p 1

[Commentary by Hryhoriy Omelchenko, chief of the Department for Fighting Corruption and Organized Crime at the Ukrainian Secret Service: "If You Have Privileges, Forget Ideas!"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] On 19 October, the Ukrainian Supreme Council ultimately advised General Prosecutor Viktor Shishkin to leave his post. Viktor Shishkin refused to obey. After three days, the Ukrainian Supreme Council dismissed him from his chair.

I can easily explain the activities of the Ukrainian Supreme Council. The City Executive Committee has obtained data on some 100 people's deputies including People's Deputy Yuriy Haysinskiy [first deputy general prosecutor] who illegally obtained apartments in Kiev.

In addition, the general prosecutor was going to institute proceedings against the illegal purchase of weapons (carbine SKS) by over 2,000 officials along with the people's deputies-members of the Ukrainian Supreme Council, the president's representatives in provinces, and other oblast and rayon officials.

The last straw, in my mind, which decided the destiny of the general prosecutor, was his decision to submit an interpellation on lifting the inviolability of People's Deputies Yuriy Haysinskiy and Volodimir Tolubok—since criminal proceedings have been submitted against them—for consideration by the Supreme Council. Moreover, criminal proceedings against various high-ranking officials for law violations are under way. Thus it is clear why the execution has been so speedy. Only the future can show what will happen with the aforementioned criminal investigations. Having dismissed Viktor Shishkin, the Supreme Council also decided to dismiss Yuriy Haysinskiy.

Actually, the dismissal of Viktor Shishkin was already an established fact in the spring. Definite political circles and Mafia structures wished to put Yuriy Haysinskiy in his place. [passage omitted]

The dismissal of Viktor Shishkin can be placed at the same level with the resignation of Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov who opposed the transfer of the Black Sea Fleet to Russia and conducted an uncompromised fight with manifestations of corruption and Mafia activities within the Armed Forces. In light of the March 1994 elections, the nomenclatura has launched a campaign for the suppression of both internal and external political opposition. All high- ranking opponents of the existing political course are simply being fired. The aim of the nomenclatura is understandable: Either they control the elections and win them or they will do everything in order not to hold elections at all.

Unions Urge Deputies Not To Cancel Elections

LD0911220893 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1931 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] Ukraine's Independent unions have said the abolition of the parliamentary and presidential elections next year due to lack of time to prepare an election law and its mechanism was inadmissible. In a statement published today, they said the deputies and the president must realize that the day when the Supreme Council makes the decision to abolish the elections will be the last day of its legitimate existence, since such a decision will equal an impeachment of itself and the president.

The unions called on the deputies to be reasonable and constructively develop a new election law. The parliamentary election was scheduled for March 27 1994, while the presidential one for June 26 of the same year.

In addition, the unions appealed to the parliament and the president to pass a law or decree on the monthly indexation of pensions, stipends, salaries and wages.

Ukraine's Independent Unions were set up on November, 3, 1993 to encompass the Miners' Independent Union, Union of Air Service Workers, Air Traffic Controllers' Union and a number of other republican and regional trade unions.

Tension in Kiev Over Suicide Sect Abates

PM0911125193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Nov 93 First Edition p 1

[Report by Natalya Zenets: "'End of World' Rescheduled for 14 November: More than 600 'White Brothers' Detained in Kiev"]

[Text] According to information from the Ukrainian Internal Affairs Ministry, the tension generated in Kiev during the first few days of November by the actions of the religious sect known as the "White Brothers" has somewhat abated now. According to the latest reports, the "brothers" have brought forward the date of the "end of the world" from 24 to 14 November.

Although the report coming in now are not very alarming, the militia remains on the alert. The Internal Affairs Ministry's internal directive on the special situation prevailing 1-24 November has not been revoked. Reinforced militia details are on constant duty in the city center and in places where disturbances are most likely.

As Deputy Internal Affairs Minister V. Nedrigaylo has reported, young people, including juveniles, predominate among the detained members of the "White Brotherhood" who have been in breach of public order and are without documents. In addition to citizens of Ukraine, people have arrived from Russia, Moldova, Belarus, and Uzbekistan. According to approximate figures, the Kiev "White Brothers" organization comprises more than 2,000 people, of whom 200 are children. Criminal proceedings have been instituted against sect leader Yuriy Kryvonohov, who was last seen in St. Petersburg, under three articles of the Criminal Code: Fraud, the unauthorized seizure of land, and incitement to suicide... Mariya Tsvyhun, otherwise known as Mariya Devi Khristos, lies in a state of unconsciousness in Belarus.

According to the latest militia figures, the number of detainees exceeded 600, 120 of whom have been released

on the surety of relatives while 309 have been been sent to their places of residence in Donetsk, Lugansk, Cherkassy, and Zhitomir Oblasts. More than 150 "brothers" are continuing a hunger strike and are being kept in hospitals.

A routine inspection at the left-luggage room at Kiev's main railroad station resulted in the discovery of a bag and two rucksacks containing "White Brotherhood" literature and a passport in the name of Rkhovskyy, an resident of Chimkent born in 1968.

Belarus

'Standoff' Remains as Parliament Begins Session

MK0911135093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 9 Nov 93 p 3

[Vitaliy Tsygankov report: "Supreme Soviet Regular Session. Authorities' Standoff Will Continue"]

[Text] A regular session of the republic's Supreme Soviet is opening today in Minsk. The maze of problems the deputies will have to unravel include those of a constitution, referendum, and new elections. Having passed more than 60 percent of the text of a new constitution in previous sessions, the parliamentarians failed, however, to agree on its fundamental articles pertaining to a social system, the presidency, local government, etc. A consensus on these problems generally is hardly probable because passage of any article requires a two-thirds vote, whereas this number is impossible to secure if even one faction of deputies obstructs it. The second problem is early elections. Having banned a year ago the referendum proposed by the People's Front, the Supreme Soviet adopted a statement on a promise to hold new elections in March 1994 (a year before the termination of deputy powers). Now the parliamentarians are increasingly often doubting the need for such a step. The deputy association "Belarus" (its coordinators and most of the participants work for the executive branch) has worked out a new plan: to adopt a constitution; then to elect a president; and only after that to elect a new, and once again, a semiprofessional parliament. The opposition and Supreme Soviet Chairman Shushkevich are opposing this plan in every way. Shushkevich insists on the holding of new elections in October 1994, while the broad-based opposition led by the Belarus People's Front have put forward their own program: resignation of the Kebich cabinet; the election of a coalition government; elections for a professional parliament, and only after that, presidential elections.

As for the "Belarus" group, it will most surely once again raise the question of no-confidence in the Supreme Soviet chairman or even his resignation. In his turn, Shushkevich for several months has been criticizing the Council of Ministers, and has even stated that some members of the cabinet should resign. Quite naturally, much in this acute situation would depend on how active the "masses of people" are, while the Minsk City Executive Committee passed a decision several weeks ago banning all rallies and mass actions on Independence Square fronting the Supreme Soviet building. That notwithstanding, 33 deputies signed a declaration on holding a meeting with voters which will, after all, take place today on Independence Square. In addition to that, the Belarus People's Front has circulated among the population leaflets calling the people to come to the square, to support the stand of democratic parties, and to speak for the resignation of Kebich.

As your correspondent has been told by Deputy Internal Affairs Minister Konstantin Platonov, "people will be let onto Independence Square. Let them go wherever they wish. The militia will act according to the situation."

Shushkevich Opens Supreme Soviet Session

WS0911145493 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1300 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Report by Mikhail Rutkovskiy]

[Text] The long-awaited day of 9 November has finally come. The 13th session of our legislature opened today. The session was opened by Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Stanislavovich Shushkevich. At the beginning of the session, deputies commemorated the tragic death of People's Deputy Dimitriy Artsimenya, and then the working bodies of the 13th session were elected—the secretariat, the voting committee, and the editorial board. At the session, 330 Belarusian and foreign reporters have been accredited. Taking advantage of the rights of the Supreme Soviet chairman, the floor was taken by Stanislav Shushkevich.

[Begin Shushkevich recording] Honorable People's Deputies: We have been driven here by our common concern for the fate of our Belarusian state. The situation is really quite complex. However, I would like to call on you to execute the Supreme Soviet resolution that we adopted on 17 June 1993. The resolution provides for a debate, at this session, on the draft constitution of the Belarusian Republic that has been prepared by the Constitutional Committee, in accordance with the results of the previous voting. Numerous elements of our economic and political foundations have been built on the shaky foundation of the old Constitution, which is criticized by many and does not enjoy the people's respect. Due to this fact, the Supreme Soviet has so far not established a Committee for Constitutional Supervision. There has been no legal case, in which civil rights of an individual would be defended referring to the constitution. A new constitution must be adopted immediately, also because the existing Constitution impedes the implementation of one of the basic resolutions of our Declaration of State Sovereignty, which is our constitutional law. This relates to the distribution of authority, without which contradictions and even overt fighting between different authorities is inevitable. The new constitution will allow us to rid ourselves of an array of legislative blemishes, as well as to establish grounds for legislation based on new political and socioeconomic principles. [end recording]

Following the speech, deputies began to discuss the session's agenda. They came forward with various proposals and presented their arguments. As always, the legislative opposition was very active. Its leader Zenon Paznyak demanded that the government be dismissed. People's Deputy Mikolay Kryzhanovskiy said that, in the first place, the socioeconomic situation should be discussed, and the government should present its program to bring the Republic out of the economic crisis. Also voiced were

proposals to dismiss the minister of finance, reorganize the Cabinet of Ministers, include on the agenda the issue of Belarusian symbols, as well as hold a hearing on Yosif Syaredzich, chief editor of NARODNAYA GAZETA, among many other suggestions.

Shushkevich Discusses Kravchuk Initiative

LD0911202893 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1721 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Report prepared by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin; edited by Boris Grishchenko; from the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[Text] The Minsk-based headquarters of the CIS coordination bodies is discussing a proposal by Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk to transfer next summit of CIS heads of states from Ashgabat to Minsk and to hear there a report by Chairman of the Belarusian Supreme Soviet on the fulfillment of the Belaya Vezha agreements dated December 8, 1991.

In an interview with Interfax, Stanislav Shushkevich said that he learned about Kravchuk's initiative on Friday in a information program. According to Shushkevich, he has not received any official proposals from Kravchuk regarding this issue.

Shushkevich made it clear that if President Kravchuk has any reasonable grounds to force his proposals then all heads of CIS states should express their attitude towards them and adopt a corresponding decision.

Commenting the session of the Supreme Soviet presidium, which has failed to adopt decision pertaining to Belarus' signing of a document on Georgia's entering the Commonwealth, Shushkevich explained this "by absence of the appropriate number of the presidium's members at the session." He also declared that, despite all arguments against Georgia's admission to the CIS (in particular, the Almaty summit passed a decision obstructing the admission of states on which territories wars were being waged), he intended to vote for this issue at the next session of the Supreme Soviet presidium scheduled for November 9 or 10. At the same time Shushkevich noted that several members of Belarus' supreme power body oppose participation of this Transcaucasian republic in the CIS.

At a press conference staged on Monday in Minsk Shushkevich said that the above mentioned session of the presidium had been asked to ratify the agreement on creation of a monetary union between Russia and Belarus. According to Shushkevich, this supreme power body "was discussing all pro's and con's for a long time and made a conclusion on the expediency of uniting the monetary systems."

Regarding the intentions of Belarusian and Russian leaderships to create a customs union too, Shushkevich told Interfax that it was early to speak about the signing of an appropriate document in the near term.

At the same time the need for such a document "is pressing," believes head of the parliament. In his opinion, Russia's customs policy "can shortly transform into a discriminatory one towards Belarus" because "increasing of customs tariffs leads to growth of prices for production exported from Belarus to Russia."

"Moscow does not make any hasty moves to sign a customs union with Belarus as it is unprofitable for it from an economic point of view," believes Shushkevich.

Kebich, Radkevich Accused of Corruption

WS1011092193 Minsk BELAPAN in Russian 1500 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] Belarusian People's Deputy Sergey Antonchik [member of the Belarusian Popular Front opposition in the Supreme Soviet] delivered the following report at the 13th session of the Belarusian Supreme Soviet: "On 14 October 1993, the Belarusian Government authorized the opening of a trade office in Minsk of the Korean enterprise 'Company LTD.' The document was signed by V. Radkevich, chairman of the Belarusian Committee for Foreign Economic Relations. In return, this Korean company financed the commercial trip of Elena Ivanovna Kebich, wife of the Belarusian prime minister, and Radkevich's wife Tatyana Kuleshova, along with two well-known ladies to the Republic of Korea." Sergey Antonchik has called this fact "an open act of corruption."

Deputies Urge Ukraine To Review Opening Chernobyl

LD1011042793 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0200 GMT 10 Nov 93

[Text] Parliamentary deputies in Belarus adopted an address to the deputies of Ukraine's Supreme Soviet on Tuesday calling on their Ukrainian colleagues to reconsider their decision to start up Chernobyl's nuclear power station again. Most deputies in the Belarus parliament say the situation at this nuclear power station has not improved over the last few years. A large part of Belarus territory suffered radiation following the Chernobyl disaster.

Government Urges Public To Show Restraint

PM0911144793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Nov 93 First Edition p 1

[Mikhail Shimanskiy report: "Belarus: Opposition Urges Disobedience to Authorities"]

[Text] Minsk—The sociopolitical situation has deteriorated here on the eve of the latest session of the Belarus parliament, which opens 9 November. The government has even issued an appeal to the citizens of the republic.

Recently, the appeal says, rumors, pamphlets, and appeals inciting the public to take part in mass civil disorder and unlawful actions have been circulated at

enterprises and in organizations, institutions, and educational establishments as well as via the press, radio, and television on the initiative of the People's Front, the Belarusian Association of Servicemen [BZV] and the leadership of a number of trade unions and opposition political forces. They make open threats against the government, call for the setting up of combat militias and armed action, and make insulting attacks on the Russian people. The aims of the organisers of this inflammatory campaign are to shatter political stability in the republic and seize power by every available means.

The government has urged the citizens of the republics to show restraint and good sense and resist the provocative appeals of the political adventurists. It will employ all the resources at its command to protect the constitutional order. The appeal states clearly and unambiguously that the organisers of and participants in acts of provocation or any other unlawful acts will be countered in the most rigorous and resolute fashion.

Everything indicates that the republic Supreme Soviet's latest session will be very tough going. It is intended that it will examine around 60 questions, most of which are extremely important for Belarus. The adoption of the republic's constitution undoubtedly comes top of the list here.

Communist Leader on Publishing PRAVDA Articles

WS1011114693 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belarusian 29 Oct 93 p 1

[Interview with Viktar Chykin, a leader of the Belarusian Communist Party, by Valantsin Zhdanko; place and date not given—first paragraph is ZVYAZDA introduction]

[Text] The title of a very familiar newspaper, banned in Moscow, has shown up in Belarusian kiosks. The communist newspaper MY I VREMYA, which is published in Minsk, made its readers happy by printing a masthead that read PRAVDA. Its articles were signed by all too familiar PRAVDA journalists from Moscow. Does this mean that after being banned for its support of the Moscow coup plotters, the paper has moved to the Belarusian capital, where leftist movements have always been welcomed? I asked this question to Viktar Chykin, one of the leaders of the Belarusian Communist Party.

[Zhdanko] Was it on your initiative that PRAVDA appeared in your newspaper? Or was that the initiative of PRAVDA journalists from Moscow?

[Chykin] This was our initiative. The Moscow journalists just sent us their material—you understand that it is hard for them not to write.

[Zhdanko] Does this mean that PRAVDA is revived and will be semi-legally published in Minsk?

[Chykin] No, what you saw was a special issue of MY I VREMYA. The only liberty that we took was placing the PRAVDA logo on top of those articles.

[Zhdanko] What was the reaction of PRAVDA?

[Chykin] We sent one copy to its editorial staff, but have not received any reaction from them yet.

[Zhdanko] Are you not afraid that the appearance of PRAVDA in Minsk can have a negative impact on Belarusian-Russian relations?

[Chykin] Why should it? We have not distributed the paper in Russia. The print run sold out completely in Belarus. Besides, let me repeat that there is no way you can interpret this fact as the revival of PRAVDA.

[Zhdanko] What is it then? A manifestation of solidarity?

[Chykin] Yes, I would rather refer to it as an act journalistic solidarity.

[Zhdanko] One more question. Did you have to deal with our law-enforcement agencies after all the pro-Communist organizations and their publications were banned?

[Chykin] No, everything was just fine.

State Budget Helps Finance National Economy

WS1011110[illegible] Minsk BELAPAN in Russian 1600 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] According to the Belarusian Ministry of Finances, the financing of the branches of the national economy is the principal item of expenditure of the Belarusian state budget. Some 20.6 percent of budget resources are assigned to finance the national economy. Health protection, social protection and culture achieve 12.9 percent of the state budget each, 11.9 percent is spent on education, 5.6 percent—on the Armed Forces, 5.6 percent—on the maintenance of state structure and management.

Debt to Russia Blamed for Currency Devaluation

WS0911153793 Minsk CHYRVONAYA ZMENA in Belarusian 30 Oct 93 p 1

[Text] Sad as it is for every nationally aware Belarusian, the Belarusian "zaychik" [slang term for Belarusian currency] was again devalued on 28 October. Following the sale of 1,866,900,000 rubles at the 27 October session of the Inter-Bank Currency Exchange, the Belarusian National Bank was forced to set a new exchange rate for the Russian ruble, which from now on will be traded at 4.10 Belarusian "zaychiks" per ruble.

However, in all probability, this rate, too, will not last for long. Officials from the commercial bank "Dukat," whom we asked to comment on the rate change, said that demand for Russian money will not decrease in the near future, which means that the ruble exchange rate will

continue to climb. And this, not inflation alone, should be blamed. Numerous Belarusian enterprises which are running huge debts for raw materials, gas, and electricity in their trade with Russia, will be buying its national currency to repay them anyway. As for consumers, they will have to tighten their belts and take the news of upcoming price increases as best they can.

Article Questions Monetary Union With Russia

MK0911132093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 76, 9 Nov 93 (Signed to press 8 Nov) p 4

[Article by Lyudmila Ivanova from Minsk under the "Belarus" rubric: "Economic Union: Practice Makes Perfect? Belarusian 'Hare' Runs Away From Russian Ruble"]

[Text] Is a Belarusian-Russian monetary union possible? This question is growing more urgent for Belarus by the day as the exchange rate of "hares," banknotes issued by the national bank, against the Russian ruble is plummeting. At present it is 1:6 for noncash transactions and around 1:3 for cash. Paradoxically, documents on setting up a single money space, which were signed a couple of months ago, have not added clarity to the question of whether this union will take off at all. Yegor Gaydar, upon his return to the Russian Council of Ministers, "went" through the text of the document with a pencil, putting question marks on the margins, which have sent Belarusian leaders into deep meditation.

Stanislav Bagdankevich, chief of the Belarusian National Bank, conceded: "Russia has been tightening its requirements for the monetary union. Secretly, we have felt that these requirements would emerge, for the ruble has to be equally secured with goods throughout the ruble zone. If in Russia land, real estate, securities, and means of production can be bought for the ruble, the same things must be freely sold in Belarus. The agreements on a single monetary space that we signed did not specify this clearly enough; we thought we could go away with this, but—no chance."

Although he repeatedly acknowledged that Russia was ahead of Belarus in terms of market reforms, Belarusian Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich still dreams of being able to "grab the brass ring" being held out from the Kremlin: a monetary union with Russia will force Belarus to adjust itself economically to an accelerated pace of transformations.

There is a lot of room for acceleration. For instance, Belarus plans to launch a large-scale privatization only in the summer of 1994, when the law on named privatization checkbooks comes into force and the privatization program is in place. According to the local State Property Committee, only around 60 enterprises have been transformed into companies not owned by the state, and there is virtually no securities market.

The Kebich government has been presented with a choice: either to carry out reform together with its traditional partner—Russia—or to pursue the inevitable economic reform on its own with an independent money system of a sovereign state. One of the reasons pushing him toward the first option is the experience of Kebich himself. A pragmatic prime minister who has been at the head of a post-socialist country since the collapse of the USSR, he has realized that Western markets have already been divided and that no one needs Belarusian goods there.

Mr. Bagdankevich, for his part, also concedes that real assistance comes from the East, not the West: "We have always received payment credits from Russia on extremely beneficial terms, credits that will be repaid starting from the year 2000. As for new credits, Russia gives them on tighter terms. The West, however, has only promised them, but in practice gives nothing—so far it has only assisted in setting up market institutions, for which we are very grateful." He is certain that Moscow itself will refuse to set up a money union with Minsk. "Russia will not risk granting most favored nation status to Belarus because it may complicate its relations with the other republics that signed the agreement on creating a new-type ruble zone," he pointed out.

Come what may, Vyacheslav Kebich has already announced at a meeting with entrepreneurs that "to be on the safe side" he gave instructions to work out methods for the introduction of a Belarusian monetary unit for a transition period.

It is possible that a monetary union of the CIS countries—a cornerstone in the economic union's foundation—may never materialize. But Minsk is not abandoning the idea of an economic community with Moscow: Anatoliy Dremov, a high-ranking official in the Belarusian cabinet, made it clear that a focal point of the next meeting between the Belarusian and Russian heads of government may be an agreement on a customs union.

Moldova

Delegation Leaves for Moscow Troop Withdrawal Talks

AU0911145293 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Excerpts] Today in Chisinau Division General Pavel Creanga, the defense minister of the Republic of Moldova, received the U.S. attache for the Russian Federation and certain CIS states, Colonel Paul Manson [name as heard], to whom he presented the current political and military situation in the Republic of Moldova, as well as the activity of the peace-keeping forces deployed to the security zone along the Dniester River and that of the unified control commission deployed to the eastern rayons of the Republic of Moldova. [passage omitted]

According to our Chisinau correspondent, Mircea Dascaliuc, today an official delegation of the Republic of Moldova left for Moscow to attend the seventh round of negotiations on the withdrawal [from the Dniester region] of the 14th Russian Army. The negotiations, which on the Moldovan side will be headed by Moldova's ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Moscow, Anatol Taranu, will principally concentrate on Point 2 of the [Russian-Moldovan] inter-governmental accord to be signed later by the two sides, that is, on the point stipulating the future statute, the preconditions, and the deadlines for the withdrawal of the Russian military units from the territory of the Republic of Moldova.

Kazakhstan

Nazarbayev Holds Meeting on Economic, Social Issues

LD0911194993 Almaty Kazakh Radio Network in Kazakh 1500 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] President Nursultan Nazarbayev held a meeting today with heads of oblast administrations and the cities of Almaty and Leninsk. Kazakhstan's readiness to introduce its national currency was examined, and the responsibilities and tasks of the local executive power organs were outlined.

Despite the fact that new problems have emerged in financial and credit relations between the CIS countries, the meeting stressed that Kazakhstan remains faithful to its course toward preserving the common economic space and will do its best to ensure that the economic union—the creation of which is currently under way—will trigger off the implementation of the multilateral and bilateral agreements concluded earlier and fill them with concrete contents.

The issues of customs relations and mutual payments should be settled in a civilized way. The emergence of a different currency should not impede free movements of common people between one country and another.

The meeting devoted special attention to the problems of enhancing executive discipline. In particular, it was noted that the oblast and rayon levels are not doing purposeful work to implement statutes and resolutions of the president and decisions of the government concerning the most urgent questions. In this connection serious criticism was voiced concerning the administrations of Kustanay, Kokshetau, and Mangistau oblasts.

The necessity to intensify help for low-income groups of the population was a special discussion topic. Despite the objective difficulties, one has to aim at ensuring the efficiency of social help rendered to these people, and this help must be very specific.

Society should be safely protected against the wild outburst of crime. Local authorities are failing to make maximum use of their anti-criminal potentials. The protection of social morale remains urgent. Organs of power could be helped by the mass media to do this work in a more efficient way.

Vice President Yerik Asanbayev, Prime Minister Sergey Tereshchenko, and other heads of the Cabinet of Ministers participated in the meeting.

Kyrgyzstan

Akayev Addresses Deputies on Improved Statehood

LD0911211093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1721 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Report prepared by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin; edited by Boris Grishchenko; from the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[Text] In an address to the republic's deputies in connection with the parliament session to open December 7, President Askar Akayev has said that to ignore the issues associated with the improvement of statehood in Kyrgyzstan is fraught with greater social and political instability and confusion in the economy. Saying that there are more demands to enhance the authoritarianism in the state government, Akayev said that the multinational Kyrgyzstan has destined the republic to develop democratically in the post-Communist era.

According to the Kyrgyz leader, the strong state power in Kyrgyzstan is necessary but only on the basis of the accord of all political groups, strata, nationalities that compose the people of Kyrgyzstan.

Akayev has said that he does not see legal grounds for early presidential and parliamentary elections. He said, though, that he intended to prepare relevant proposals for the forthcoming parliament session.

Communists Biding Time in Comeback Effort

MK0911125093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 76, 9 Nov 93 (Signed to press 8 Nov) p 4

[Leyla Alibeyli report under the "Animation" rubric: "Kyrgyz Communists Intend To Fight for Power; Posing as Their Leader Is the Republic's Former Party 'Boss'"—based on INTERFAX materials]

[Text] Last Saturday, Kyrgyz communists marked the 76th anniversary of the October revolution by calling a celebration meeting in the former V.I. Lenin Museum, now Bishkek's History Museum. There, Kyrgyzstan's communists stated that they intend "to continue work" and are preparing "to say their weighty word" when "the political moment" arrives.

Dzhumgalbek Amanbayev, chairman of the Central Executive Committee presidium of the Party of Communists of Kyrgyzstan [PCK], whose job at the time of the 1991 August putsch was first secretary of the Kyrgyzia Communist Party Central Committee, stated that the "process of restoration" of party ranks in the republic "is gathering momentum." Created on a voluntary basis, PCK committees are already functioning in a number of urban centers and rayons, while a "sufficiently numerous" faction of communists in the Supreme Soviet "is preparing to uphold" during the scheduled session the question of rehabilitation of the

Communist Party of Kyrgyzia, whose successor is the PCK. The communists who took part in the meeting did not forget about Lenin either. They addressed to the Moscow mayor's office and the newspaper PRAVDA a statement calling for preserving the Lenin Mausoleum as "an outstanding monument of the present day, known the world over."

Tajikistan

Afghan Troops Driven Across Border by Mojahedin

PM0911160993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Nov 93 First Edition p 2

[Aleksandr Karpov report: "Afghan General Dustum's Subunits are Retreating to... Tajikistan"]

[Text] Dushanbe—In the space of two days, two large armed groups of government forces have crossed over to Tajikistan territory from the Afghan side of the border.

As your correspondent was told at the Tajikistan Foreign Ministry, there has been fighting between subunits of armed forces under General Dustum and mojahedin detachments near the Tajik-Afghan border in Afghanistan since the latter half of last week.

According to certain information from Tajik official sources, Afghan armed opposition gunmen have captured the population center of Shir Khan-Bandar and are forcing their adversaries out. Last Saturday a retreating group of 38 of Dustum's men crossed into Tajik territory at Pyandzh and surrendered to servicemen of the Russian border troops' Pyandzh detachment. The following day another group of around 70 men also entered Tajikistan from Afghanistan. They included General Begi, chief of staff of Dustum's troops.

The Russian border troops command in Tajikistan is prepared to send the Afghan servicemen back to their country's lawful authorities as soon as requested to do so.

Peacekeeping Force Commander on Troops' Role

PM0911134193 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Nov 93 pp 1-2

[Interview with Colonel General Boris Pyankov, commander of peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan, by Colonel Anatoliy Ladin; place and date not given; under the "Interlocutor of the Day" rubric: "Our Duty Is To Establish Peace in Tajikistan"—first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] **Calling Card**

Colonel General Boris Yevgenyevich Pyankov was born in Yekaterinburg in 1935. He has served in the Army since 1954. He graduated from the Far East Tank School and climbed all the rungs of the command ladder—he was an army corps commander, an army commander, deputy commander of Odessa Military District, and then commander of the Siberian Military District. In recent years he has been USSR deputy defense minister and deputy commander of the CIS Joint Armed Forces. From that post he was appointed commander of the collective peacekeeping forces [CPF] in Tajikistan.

[Ladin] Boris Yevgenyevich, it is two weeks since you arrived in Dushanbe with your staff as commander of the CPF. What has been done to stabilize the situation in the republic, and what are the troops under your jurisdiction doing now?

[Pyankov] I would first like to remind KRASNAYA ZVEZDA readers that the time of the CPF leadership's arrival in Tajikistan was laid down by the Agreement signed 24 September this year between the heads of the states party to the Collective Security Treaty. As you know, I was entrusted with the command of these forces. The corresponding contingent had to be formed by 15 October. The task set by the heads of state has been performed.

Command of the troops has now been organized and communications established with all CPF troop contingents. Subunits from Russia (the full contingent), Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan arrived in a timely manner. Some Tajik Defense Ministry subunits have also been transferred to our operational jurisdiction. We shortly expect a peacekeeping contingent from Kazakhstan. We hope that that republic's Supreme Council will adopt the appropriate decision.

What is the nature of the CPF in Tajikistan? I would say that they are an impressive force capable of cooling the hottest heads. The CPF comprise ground forces and various kind of aviation. We have in our arsenal tanks, artillery, air defense, engineering support, and communications systems plus other essential subunits. That is what peacekeeping forces must be like, i.e. fairly powerful, if they are to be capable of checking an adjoining state's aggressive actions whenever—I must stress this particularly—they start to become increasingly organized and brazen.

At the same time I must point out that some mass media sometimes seek a reason to cast a slur on the CPF and mislead the public. They try to ascribe to us mythical attacks on villages in neighboring Afghanistan. Nothing of the kind has or could have happened. We have no intention of threatening anyone or trying to resolve any domestic political problems by force.

We have other tasks: In conjunction with Russian border guards and subunits from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan which support them, as well as Tajik Government forces, we have to seal the border as tightly as possible and reliably guard and defend it. The heads of the states party to this agreement have given us a six-month mandate to perform our peacekeeping mission. In this time we must establish peace. The people of Tajikistan have a tremendous need of it, since the

republic has to contend with the extremely tricky problems of reviving a national economy disrupted by fratricidal conflict.

What are the men of the CPF doing now? Plenty of our subunits are reinforcing border outposts. They represent, you might say, the first echelon of the CPF. All units and subunits are engaged in providing personnel with vigorous combat teamwork training and instruction. We are devoting a great deal of attention to coordinating the actions of staffs at all levels and efficiently organizing command of the troops, enabling us to react instantaneously to a change in the situation on a particular section of the border.

[Ladin] What difficulties is the new military organization—the CPF—encountering and what, in your view, might ensure their successful activity?

[Pyankov] The CIS effectively has no experience of creating and using peacekeeping forces like those that have been sent to Tajikistan. That is why plenty of difficulties are still being encountered. For instance, funding for our troops. Transferring allocated funds from neighboring states to Tajikistan is alone a problem in itself. I spent the previous week for instance visiting the capitals of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. I also have a trip to Uzbekistan coming up.

Customs barriers and certain customs officials' ignorance of the provisions of the Agreement on the Collective Peacekeeping Forces and Joint Measures for Their Material Support, signed by the heads of state, sometimes prevent questions of material and technical support from being resolved in a normal manner.

But these difficulties can be overcome. The CPF staff is manned by generals and officers from all the member states, what is more we also have representatives from each Defense Ministry, which makes it possible to promptly coordinate questions that arise and find optimum, mutually acceptable solutions without delay.

The requisite legal base enables me as CPF commander to act confidently and effectively. I am directly subordinate to and carry out the instructions of the presidents of those republics whose troops form part of the CPF, and I am at the same time accountable to the states' defense ministers. I coordinate basic actions involving the use of combat forces with them, and they also approve our plans. But in the event of tasks suddenly cropping up where a delay in adopting a decision is inadmissible, I have the right to act autonomously and then report back to the defense ministers.

I have established close collaboration with each one of them and total mutual understanding. I am satisfied that the ministers have an in-depth grasp of the needs of both their subunits in the CPF in Tajikistan and those of the CPF as a whole.

[Ladin] Are you interested in the sentiments and opinions held by members of the opposition forces and the stance espoused by the Muslim clergy?

[Pyankov] Of course. But, I stress, not in order to somehow interfere in domestic political processes in Tajikistan, but only to explain to the armed section of the opposition forces the purpose of our peacekeeping organization and try to reduce the intensity of the aggression among that section of Tajik society. Yet what happens? Some commanders of detachments in Gornyy Badakhshan—I recently spoke to 35 of them there—say that they armed themselves in order to defend the population of their villages against terror and violence. In that case, I told them, our aims are the same. We cannot be at odds among ourselves. The peacekeeping forces also see their goal as being to create a calm atmosphere in those areas where extremist groupings are still trying to run amok, including those from abroad.

I would be lying were I to say that during my two-hour conversation with the commanders of local armed formations in Gornyy Badakhshan everyone understood where I was coming from or indeed wanted to do so. At first they even tried to intimidate me and made threats. In response I said firmly: That is futile. You are dealing now with fairly powerful regular armed forces. I advise no one to yield to the temptation of finding out what that means.

Many of them became thoughtful. I do not doubt that there are plenty of sober people in the "hard-line" detachments, as they are called here, who are well aware of how the situation may develop if armed groups from Afghanistan contine infiltrating the border and of the new disasters that could befall the Tajiks if major seats of military confrontation emerge on the republic's territory.

I would very much like our force to be a convincing factor for those who are still engaging in saber-rattling on the other side of the Pyandzh.

We are sincerely reluctant to unsheath our weapons and will not do so as long as we are not forced.

As for the Muslim clergy, who are, incidentally, freely pursuing their religious activity in the republic, their participation in the peace process is undoubtedly essential and plays an important role.

During the last few months of armed confrontation plenty of grief, mutual enmity, mistrust, and fear has built up in Tajik society. You cannot live with that forever. Who but the Muslim leaders of the republic should help reconcile people, create conditions for mutual forgiveness, and stabilize the situation in society.

Some people should indeed be answerable before the law for their crimes. But a great many people were embroiled in the conflict and ended up in a foreign land by chance through blackmail and threats. Now conditions are being created in the republic for them to come home. We are bound to welcome that since it weakens the adventurists'

social base—they are trying to use disappointed people in armed actions on the Tajik-Afghan border.

[Ladin] How do people get to serve in the CPF in Tajikistan, and is it materially beneficial?

[Pyankov] Everyone is sent to us—enlisted men, NCO's, officers, generals—solely on a voluntary basis. There is no one who has been forced to come. Contract troops might be said to form the base of the subunits today.

I would like to say in all frankness to anyone who wants to join us in order to earn a very high wage: They will hardly be satisfied. By way of example let me say that the amount that I, the commander of the peacekeeping contingent, am paid every month is one-sixth of the sum paid to a private in the UN peacekeeping forces. What motivates people serving in Tajikistan? Awareness of their civic and military duty, a desire to help the fraternal republic and its people. Banal as it may sound, that is the truth. At the same time I must say that servicemen's pay is decent, in the light of the current potential in each state.

[Ladin] I have heard suggestions—at high level too—that it would be a good thing to give the peacekeeping forces in Tajikistan the status of UN peacekeeping forces. What is your view on that?

[Pyankov] Undoubtedly positive. Incidentally, in Tajikistan we are in active contact with representatives of the United Nations, the CSCE, and other world peacekeeping organizations. But let me be blunt and say that the suggestion to which you referred has still not met with a positive response from the UN leadership. It may not yet be time for that.

Russians To Hand Over Afghan POW's to Authorities

LD0911152693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1420 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] Russian border guards deployed in Tajikistan are expected to hand over a group of Afghan prisoners of war to the Tajik authorities on Tuesday, military sources told Interfax.

More than 100 servicemen of the Afghan army's 48th Infantry Brigade and 78th Border Guard Brigade, ten of them generals, claim they had to defect into Tajikistan because of having been attacked by militants loyal to Prime Minister Golboddin Hekmatyar. Commander of the 48th Brigade General Begi is also among the prisoners.

The Russian guards have carried out a preliminary investigation into the incident.

Russians Control 'Tense' Afghan Border

LD0911191693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1715 GMT 9 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[Text] Dushanbe November 9 TASS—Despite tense situation at the Tajik-Afghan border, Russian border guards preserve control over the area, sources at the staff of the Russian border troops stationed in Tajikistan told ITAR-TASS today.

No armed provocations or border trespassing cases have been registered over the past 24 hours at the border.

The situation is calm in the lower Pyandzh region controlled by the Pyandzh border union. A group of Afghan servicemen and civilians crossed the border from Afghanistan under a white flag on weekend and surrendered to Russian border guards. They have sought protection of the Tajik authorities fearing reprisal on the part of Afghan field commander Amir Chugai from a paramilitary unit not controlled by the official Kabul authorities.

The same sources told ITAR-TASS this issue is considered by the Afghan and Tajik foreign ministers on diplomatic channels.

Uzbekistan

'Panic Demand' for Ruble Doubles Exchange Rate

MK0911134093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 76, 9 Nov 93 (Signed to press 8 Nov) p 4

[Lala Shikinskaya report under the "Money" rubric: "New Ruble Panic in Uzbekistan. Russian Ruble Rate Skyrockets Here"]

[Text] Turkmenistan's introduction of its own money and the intention of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to follow suit have led to a sharp increase in the Russian ruble rate, which is gradually becoming a transnational currency. The statement that members of the Uzbekistan Government made several days ago on a possible withdrawal from the ruble zone and the introduction of a national currency has caused a panic demand for Russian rubles in the republic. Their value against rubles issued between 1961 and 1992, which are still legal tender in Uzbekistan, doubled at once. Now one new Russian ruble is worth five old-issue rubles. As already reported, one of the conditions Russia made for merging the monetary systems of the two countries is to exchange paper money of the 1961-1992 issue for paper money issued in 1993 at a 3:1 proportion. Uzbekistan insists that the proportion should be 1:1. In the meantime, the actual exchange rate leads to a rapid devaluation of the old-issue money.

The ruble panic has also caused another price hike in Uzbekistan: prices in nonstate trade have nearly doubled in recent days, and low-price goods have vanished from the counters.

Besides, people from neighboring Kyrgyzstan, where the Kyrgyz som rate is dropping against the Russian money, have started to come to Uzbekistan for new Russian rubles. All this attests to the fact that our rubles are becoming a convertible currency in the outlying countries, unlike in more distant lands.

Armenia

Karabakh Responds to Azerbaijani Troop Deployment

LD0911195693 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1500 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] According to information from ARMENPRESS received at the Department of Information and the Press of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, Karabakh troops are continuing to strictly observe the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities decision on a cease-fire.

Moreover, according to information received at the press service of the Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Ministry, Azerbaijan's troops are redeploying their units throughout the whole line of the Karabakh front. In this connection, the commander in chief of Nagorno-Karabakh is compelled to take appropriate measures to defend the border all along the frontier line.

Spokesman on CSCE Minsk Group Meeting on Karabakh

LD0911221693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1931 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] In international documents Nagorno-Karabakh has been recognized as a conflicting party, Press Spokesman for the Armenian Foreign Ministry Aram Safaryan declared at a briefing in Yerevan on the results of consultations of CSCE Minsk group to settle the Karabakh problem held on November 4-7 in Vienna. In his opinion, this is an obvious victory for Armenian diplomacy.

Until that moment Nagorno-Karabakh Republic participated in the work of the CSCE Minsk group to settle the problem just as a supervisor without the right to vote. In general, the group is made up of representatives of 9 states.

Safaryan underlined that Yerevan supports Nagorno-Karabakh's recognition as a conflicting party because in the future the republic will be able to independently defend its state interests and present its proposals in international bodies.

As the press secretary said, a new schedule of urgent measures to settle the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh proposed by the CSCE Minsk group was adopted in Vienna. In the short term it will be sent to Baku, Yerevan, and Stepanakert. The parties should present their answers before November 22.

The previous schedule of urgent measures, particularly, provided for withdrawal of the Karabakh formations from the occupied Kelbajar, Fizuli, Kubatly, and other Azerbaijani regions and the simultaneous withdrawal of the Azerbaijani contingent from the Karabakh's Mardakert region. It also provided for the deployment of groups of supervisors, cessation of hostilities, and holding of Minsk conference on Karabakh in conclusion. According to Safaryan's preliminary data, the provision stating withdrawal of Azerbaijan's armed formations from Nagorno-Karabakh's Mardakert region and then of the Karabakh forces from the occupied Azerbaijani territories represents the major change when compared with the previous schedule.

Further on Spokesman's Comments

NC0911220293 Yerevan Armenia's Radio First Program Network in Armenian 2000 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] The informal consultations of the nine countries that are preparing the groundwork for CSCE's Minsk conference ended in Vienna yesterday. Armenia was represented at the meeting by First Deputy Foreign Minister Zirair Liparityan and Davit Shakhnazaryan, the president's ambassador for special missions. The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic was represented by Foreign Minister Arkadiy Gukasyan and his advisor Manuel Sargisyan.

In his news conference today, Armenian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Aram Safaryan noted that the meeting made a strong call to the Nagorno-Karabakh armed formations to unconditionally withdraw to the positions they occupied on 21 October. The meeting considered this to be the most urgent and fundamental problem.

The week-long talks touched on four major points. The first was the above-mentioned demand. The next point was the linkage of the solution of the refugee issue to that of the overall solution to the problem. The third group of issues concerned the amendments that will be introduced in the new schedule. These amendments must take into consideration each side's proposals and criticisms in connection with the schedule that was agreed to at the Paris meeting. The final point concerned the convening of the Minsk conference and each side's status at that conference.

The nine countries issued a statement on 5 November. They called on Nagorno-Karabakh to immediately withdraw its forces to the positions they occupied on 21 October. They also called on all sides to the conflict to accept the new schedule.

Safaryan announced that 22 November was given as the deadline to reply to the schedule.

Commenting on the talks and on the contents of the document submitted to the sides, Safaryan said he considered it a success that the documents adopted in Vienna clearly mention Nagorno-Karabakh as a party to the conflict, despite all the objections by the Azerbaijani side.

In commenting on Armenia's position, Safaryan stressed that Armenia will continue to work for the recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as a party to the conflict because it will give Karabakh the opportunity to freely defend its state interests in international forums.

On the convening of Minsk conference, Safaryan noted that the basic issue at the Vienna talks was clarifying

Nagorno-Karabakh's status at this conference. He said that consultations on this issue might continue, but it is clear that the main emphasis will be placed on the fact that Nagorno-Karabakh should participate in the conference as a separate delegation and as a main party to the conflict.

Safaryan denied press reports that Mario Rafaelli, who chairs CSCE meetings on Karabakh, has resigned. Safaryan said that Rafaelli's term in office will end in December. Only then will his replacement be known.

Russian Government Food Aid Arrives in Yerevan

PM0911155993 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1100 GMT 5 Nov 93

[Video report by R. Atayan from Yerevan; from the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] [Atayan over shot of aircraft] This new IL-76 has completed its first flight, importing humanitarian aid to Armenia. The republic's complex economic situation, made worse by the ongoing blockade, prompted the Russian Government to send this aid here.

[Oda Society Chairman G. Kulikov] This aid was organized by the State Committee for Emergency Situations on our society's initiative. We sent a letter to the president and the prime minister, and an urgent response followed almost immediately.

[Atayan] The freight dispatched weighs some 30 tonnes and consists entirely of food, including milk, flour, baby foods, and groats. Russian societies are assuming responsibility for its distribution themselves. You know, there are many people among the 30,000 Russians living in Armenia who are in need of this aid, which in itself will not go very far, but it is aid nonetheless. [video shows IL-76 delivering aid at Yerevan Airport, interviewee, cargoes being unloaded]

Azerbaijan

Armenian Shelling, Military Deployment Reported

NC0911191793 Baku TURAN in English 1246 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] Baku, November 9 (TURAN)—Last night the Armenian tanks shelled the Azeri region center of Terter from the village of Chayli in the north of Karabakh.

To the reports of the Azeri Defense Ministry, there were no victims. The same source reports, that the concentration of the armoured equipment and live force of the Armenians is observed in the north of Karabakh.

Aliyev: 25% of Territory Occupied by Armenians

LD0911203093 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1721 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Report by correspondents Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin; edited by Boris Grishchenko; from the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[Text] At present 25 percent of Azerbaijani territory is under Armenian occupation and the country has over one million refugees, said President Geydar Aliyev of Azerbaijan receiving a delegation of representatives of the U.S. Jewish community Sunday.

Addressing the same day fighters of military units deployed near Baku, the president marked a certain change in the mentality of the Azerbaijani population. He said the people changed their attitude to the military problems and the country's defense. Aliyev appealed to the army to perform its duty and protect the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan since this wholly depends on the republic's armed forces.

A high-ranking source in the president's administration has told Interfax that Azerbaijan is actively mobilizing all its economic and military construction resources. Now the country is living according to the laws imposed on us, he said.

Besides the strengthening of the army, said the source, Azerbaijan also boosts diplomatic efforts for a political settlement of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict. Baku believes that every diplomatic success may be effective only if is sustained by relevant diplomatic efforts.

Stressing the importance of the efforts, many officials in Baku refer to Yerevan's alleged plans for new large-scale offensive operations. The source said the possible strikes can be carried out against the northwestern areas of Azerbaijan where there are important energy and transport communications. Also possible are armed operations to the east of the Armenian-occupied regions in the south-west of the republic, where many refugees are concentrated.

IF [INTERFAX] Note: Iran and Turkey help much in providing shelter for refugees. The republic's state committee for refugees reports that on the initiative of Iran the construction of a tent settlement to accommodate 5000 refugees began Saturday in the Azerbaijani Bilesavar region bordering Iran. The Iranian government assumed the duty of providing essentials for refugee families who will live in the settlement.

The Iranian President 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani during his recent talks with Aliyev said that Iran would not remain an idle observer if Armenian offensive operations in the region escalated.

Parliament To Discuss Political, Military Situation

NC0911192693 Baku TURAN in English 1246 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] Baku, November 8 [date as received] (TURAN)—Today closed sitting of Milli Majlis (parliament) of Azerbaijan will take place in Baku. As TURAN Agency had been told by press-service of Supreme Soviet (SS), social-political and military situation in the country arisen after seizure of south-western regions of Azerbaijan by Armenian Armed Forces would be discussed at the setting.

According to available information, the sitting will also discuss the matter on introducing martial law in Azerbaijan.

As it is known, from October 20 to November 3 the whole Zangelanskiy region of the Republic and also southern parts of Fizulinskiy and Dzhebrailskiy regions controlled by Azeri Armed Forces were occupied in the result of offensive of Armenian Armed Forces. The number of settlements seized within this period exceeded 300,000.

Last Friday [5 November] deputies forwarded a proposal on discussion of social-political situation but the discussion had been put off.

More Hostages Released; Exchange Violations Noted

NC1011090293 Baku AZERTAC in English 0516 GMT 10 Nov 93

[Text] Baku, November 9 (AZERTAC)—Another 21 Azerbaijani hostages have been released from Armenian captivity owing to efforts of the Azerbaijani State Commission for hostages with assistance of the ICRC / International Committee of the Red Cross/. Mr. Namic Abbasov [name as received], the head of the commission, however has informed the AZERTAC of further Armenian violation of preliminary terms of exchange. A list of hostages has been verified beforehand, but among hostages handed over to the Azerbaijani party two people had been substituted for the insane who had been patients of an asylum in the enemy-occupied town of Agdam. According to Mr. Abbasov, he can hardly explain how mentally ill people have been kept as hostages. The fact that Armenians have held them captive is a crude violation of principles of the international humanitarian law, and people who have violated this law must be subjected to criminal punishment.

The head of the commission said that Azerbaijan proposed to exchange hostages by zero option that is all the hostages for all the hostages as long ago as in February 1993. However, this proposal was rejected by Armenia. At present a little more than one hundred Azerbaijani hostages and prisoners of war are released from Armenian captivity. According to the Defence Ministry of Azerbaijan, this is just one twentieth from the total number of people who are languishing in prisons of Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia.

New Health Minister, Regional Chief Appointed

NC0911204593 Baku Azerbaycan Radio Televiziyasi Television Network in Azeri 1600 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] With decrees signed by the Republic's president, Ali (Binnet) ogly Insanov was appointed health minister of the Azerbaijan Republic, and Teymur Geydar ogly Yahyayev was named chairman of Masallinskiy Rayon Executive Committee. Aladdin Aslan ogly Mulkiyev was relieved of this post.

Georgia

Black Sea Fleet Marines Take Control of Poti

LD0911133693 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1140 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] A battalion of Black Sea Fleet Marines has taken control of the port city of Poti. This follows an agreement reached between Black Sea Fleet Commander Admiral Eduard Baltin and Georgian Prime Minister Otar Patsatsia last Friday. Black Sea Fleet peacekeepers set up checkpoints close to the bridge across the Rioni river and in the port itself as well as a commandant's office to maintain law and order in the city.

The Black Sea Fleet is also expected to help Georgia in fighting illegal armed units, terrorists, and smugglers.

For its part, Georgia is committed to stay away from Black Sea Fleet affairs, provide facilities and housing for the fleet's servicemen, and all round support to Black Sea Fleet warships and vessels deployed in its territorial waters.

The agreement will continue in force until an appropriate decision by the government delegations on both sides.

The fleet's press office says the situation in Poti has gone largely back to normal after the fleet's task force landed there five days ago.

Communications have now been established between the force and Russian border guards and mobile units which are in control of supply routes starting from Poti.

All of this helped Georgia to move some of its troops and police units to rebel-held areas.

The Black Sea Fleet task force is also in control of the air space over Poti and a 12-mile zone at sea. Its servicemen and air defenses are on high alert.

Checkpoints were set up throughout the city last Saturday and a dusk-to-dawn curfew has been in force since 5 November, members of the commandant's office told INTERFAX.

More than 500 members of various illegal groups have left the city in the past two days, the Black Sea Fleet's press office said, putting the number of illegal weapons seized by Tuesday morning at about 300.

The press service denied reports that there are casualties among the servicemen. Nor did it confirm a report that a second task force is now on its way to Poti.

Russian Troops Enter Zugdidi; Shevardnadze Meets Admiral

LD0911180593 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Russian 1608 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] Admiral Eduard Baltin, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, arrived in Zugdidi yesterday afternoon, accompanied by several units of heavy equipment and marines. The entrance of the Russian marines into the town was acknowledged by the local population with understanding. The population presumably regarded this operation as a guarantee for establishing the peace and order for which they have been yearning so much. Peace and order are required in Zugdidi as well as in the whole region.

Russian marines together with Georgian armed forces will monitor strategic transport junctions in Zugdidi and the environs and will assist in establishing order in the town.

On the same day, a meeting took place between Admiral Baltin and Georgian Head of State Eduard Shevardnadze, who was in the town at the time. The meeting was attended by Georgian Prime Minister Otar Patsatsia, Parliament Speaker Vakhtang Goguadze, Vice Premier Avtandil Marguani, and other officials.

Black Sea Fleet Troops Consolidate Positions

LD0911203593 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1721 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Report by Andrey Pershin, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Vladimir Shishlin; edited by Boris Grishchenko; from the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[Text] Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze and Commander of the Black Sea Fleet [BSF] Admiral Eduard Baltin held behind-the-scenes talks in Zugdidi late on Monday, a Georgian Defense Ministry spokesman told Interfax. No word is given of the details of the meeting.

In the meantime, BSF Marines took control of the port city of Poti as part of an agreement Baltin and Georgian Prime Minister Otar Patsatsia reached last Friday. The BSF task force set up checkpoints close to the bridge across the Rioni river and in the port itself as well as a commandant's office to maintain public order in the city.

The agreement also provides for effective help to Georgia in combatting illegal armed units, terrorists and smugglers.

For its part, Georgia is committed to stay away from meddling in BSF affairs, provide the force with coastal infrastructures and housing facilities and render all round assistance to BSF warships and vessels anchored in Georgia's territorial waters.

The agreement will continue in force until an appropriate resolution is reached by government delegations on both sides.

The situation in Poti has largely returned to normal since the force took control of the city five days ago, the BSF's press office said.

Communications have now been established between the force and Russian border guards and mobile units which are in control of vital supply routes from Poti to Tbilisi.

This enabled Georgia to move part of its troops and police units to rebel-held areas.

In the meantime, fighting resumed on Tuesday between Georgian and Abkhazian forces in the border regions, our correspondents in Georgia and Abkhazia report. A Georgian Defense Ministry spokesman said that rebel units loyal to deposed President Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Abkhazian troops blew up a bridge in the region. Abkhazian sources in turn said that several civilians, many of them Armenians, were killed after the Georgians carried out a sabotage attack from Kodor Ravine on Abkhazian villages in the Gulripsha region. Chairman of the Abkhazian Parliament Vladislav Ardzinba in a televised address late on Monday said that "as long as the Georgian government continues to nurture revenge-seeking plans, the threat of new aggression will be looming large over Abkhazia".

Gamsakhurdia's wife Manana told Interfax on Tuesday that her husband was in a belligerent mood and had no intention of leaving Georgia. In her view, Georgia's liberation war had just started and will take the form not only of guerrilla warfare but also other measures aimed at recovering the republic's freedom.

Shevardnadze on Activities of Russian Forces

LD0911183193 Tbilisi First Program Television Network in Georgian 1700 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Interview with head of state Eduard Shevardnadze with unidentified television correspondent on 9 November; place not given—live or recorded]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Correspondent] Batono Eduard, apart from government troops controlling the town of Zugdidi, armed units of the Russian Federation also entered the town this evening. Will they also take part in this operation?

[Shevardnadze] As is known, they are stationed in Poti. They entered Poti at our request. I can say that Poti is in ideal order. It is a temporary agreement. They are helping us and it would not be easy to set up normal

conditions for life and work in Poti without this assistance. It is a big force, a powerful force. The agreement stipulates that they will have a definite zone.

[Correspondent] [passage indistinct]

[Shevardnadze] Not only. All that is linked to shipping, the coast that is linked to shipping is in this case a zone of common interest. And Zugdidi rayon is within this zone. The Russian marines were intending to get to the Inguri River today and select areas for camping if they regarded it necessary. People were sent there in advance and it did not become necessary to go there. We came to an agreement.

If need be, we will move out, and it might happen that the marines will take Zugdidi under their control, as they did in Poti. So far I have not made such a decision. This issue has many positive and negative aspects. Everything should be weighed well.

However, it must be well realized that we have firmly decided to establish order and restore the control of the authorities over the whole territory. For this, we will use all means which serve the interests of our people and correspond to these interests.

Groups Term Russian Troops' Actions 'Aggression'

LD0911210793 Tbilisi CONTACT INFORMATION ACENCY in Russian 1700 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] [no dateline as received]—A number of political associations of Georgia have made an appeal to governments of the world and international organizations, voicing a strong protest against Russia which, in the opinion of the authors of the appeal, is carrying out a direct and open aggression against Georgia. The fact of the Russian Marine Corps' landing in the town of Poti, as well as operations to protect transport routes in Georgia carried out by units of the Transcaucasian Group of Russian Armed Forces, is used as a foundation for the assertion.

Political organizations comprising the Georgian National-Liberation Movement demand an unconditional and immediate withdrawal of the forces and call for the beginning of talks involving all political forces of the republic, with the aim of establishing a coalition government and holding new elections.

Bridge Over Inguri River Blown Up

LD0911175993 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1609 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Report by IPRINDA correspondent Zurab Dvali via telephone from Tbilisi]

[Text] Despite the fact that some mass media have disseminated reports that Georgian Government troops have forced their way across the Inguri river and have penetrated into the territory of Abkhazia, official sources in Tbilisi do not confirm this information. The headquarters of the Transcaucasian Group of Russian troops has also refuted it. According to data from the IPRINDA news agency, the situation in Zugdidi remained a stable one on the whole today. Police subunits have taken control of all vitally important facilities. An uncompromising struggle with the marauders is being waged. Ten marauders have already been caught and shot. General Shota Kviraia, minister of internal affairs, is personally supervising the activities of the police.

Today an operational meeting took place in Zugdidi, presided over by Georgian Prime Minister Otar Patsatsia. The situation that has taken shape in this region and the planned gradual measures to restore law and order and to improve the economic situation in the region were discussed. Tomorrow Zugdidi will already be supplied with fuel, the acute shortage of which is being experienced by the townspeople, as well as foodstuffs and bread.

As reported earlier, in Zugdidi rayon the railway bridge linking Mingrelia and Abkhazia over the Inguri river was blown up by people who have not yet been identified. The republic's railway communications directorate told the IPRINDA correspondent that the bridge that was blown up was the largest in Georgia. It was 450 meters long. The extent of the damage is being clarified, although according to preliminary data, two spans of the bridge have been completely destroyed. It is not clear when and by what means this structure will be restored. The railwaymen are experiencing an acute shortage of materials, and the restoration work can only be carried out after this area is completely under the control of government forces.

As far as the operational situation is concerned, today, according to data from the republic's Ministry of Defense, no wide-scale operations have been carried out against the armed supporters of the ex-president. In the main the government formations are engaged in exposing and neutralizing remnants of the Zviadist groups.

Embassy in Moscow Denies Report

LD0911173993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1629 GMT 9 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow November 9 TASS—Embassy of Georgia in Moscow denied media reports about a skirmish which allegedly took place between Georgian and Abkhaz troops along the river of Inguri which divides Abkhazia from the rest of Georgia. "The information was false", ITAR-TASS was told by an embassy official.

Commander Seeks Recruits for Action in Abkhazia

AU1011115093 Tbilisi SVOBODNAYA GRUZIYA in Russian 3 Nov 93 p 4

[Address by Unit Commander Boris Kakubava to "those who have fought in Abkhazia"; place and date not given]

[Text] We, the relatives of dishonored and insulted women and children, who have been abused by the Abkhazians and dirty foreigners hired by them, robbed, had our homes burned to the ground, become not refugees but paupers who have left the graves of our ancestors and families, are roaming Georgian towns and villages.

Our deadly enemy is now giving our homes to murderers and, certain of our cowardice, is planning to drive us out of Abkhazia for ever.

No one would have dared to have humiliated us and forced us to leave our homes if we had not been betrayed....

We are not cowards! We are brave and experienced fighters. We have the strength to give what is due to those who have abused us. We will never reconcile ourselves to an unworthy fate. We should return to our homes!

All those who wish to return to their homes and want their children to grow up happy and free on their native land should join the Northwestern Expeditionary Unit!

We are calling upon you; we will lead you with weapons in hand!
Remember! Our struggle is holy and just!
Join our ranks and follow us!
God is with us! We will get back our lost homeland!

[Signed] Unit Commander Boris Kakubava

Registration will begin at 1000 in the foyer of the "Iveriya" Hotel [in Tbilisi].

Abkhazians Claim Georgians Prepare To Invade

LD0911132693 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1145 GMT 9 Nov 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Irina Shchegoleva]

[Text] Sochi, 9 Nov (ITAR-TASS)—Following the Georgian Government forces' advance to the border of Abkhazia, over the last 24 hours the situation in the region has deteriorated sharply. The ITAR-TASS correspondent learned from the press service of the Abkhaz Republic's Defense Ministry that last night subunits of Georgian Government forces aimed automatic weapons fire against the positions of the armed forces of the Republic of Abkhazia near the railroad bridge across the River Inguri, along which the border with Georgia runs. Abkhaz subunits opened retaliatory fire.

According to Abkhaz Defense Ministry information, the Georgian Government forces are massing personnel and military equipment on the adjacent side.

An Abkhaz Defense Ministry statement released by the republican Supreme Soviet [as received] press service today stresses that "all these actions are links of the same chain and bear witness to the fact that Georgia's military leadership is drawing up a plan for another invasion of the territory of Abkhazia."

Zviadists Reportedly Execute Wavering Troops

LD0911225393 Tbilisi CONTACT INFORMATION AGENCY in Russian 1700 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] [no dateline as received] Reliable sources report that Loti Kobalia, commander of illegal armed units loyal to the ex-president, has made a statement admitting the participation of Chechens and militants from the Confederation of Highland Peoples on the Zviadists' side in the armed conflict in Western Georgia. In Kobalia's opinion, "the war against the junta" can justify any means.

However, not all members of he illegal units apparently agree with such a formulation of the issue. Some of them protested against the Muslim sway among them and announced their decision to go over to the government troops. According to reliable reports, Zviadists executed this group of people by shooting.

Shevardnadze Urges Political Solution for Abkhazia

LD1011045793 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0015 GMT 10 Nov 93

[By GIA-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Tbilisi, 10 Nov—Eduard Shevardnadze, head of the Georgian state, returned from western Georgia to Tbilisi late on Tuesday.

On arrival to the Georgian capital Shevardnadze told journalists that the situation in western Georgia is stabilizing and government troops are completing the operation of clearing the region from Zviad Gamsakhurdia's illegal armed formations. Asked about whether Georgian troops could move into the autonomous republic of Abkhazia, Eduard Shevardnadze replied: "We will try once again to solve all the problems related to Abkhazia by political means." According to the head of state, issues of protecting the Poti port and the railway in western Georgia were discussed at his meeting with Admiral Eduard Baltin, commander of the Black Sea Fleet.

Touching upon the reports circulated by Abkhazian news agencies, on a shoot-out near the Inguri river, Eduard Shevardnadze said that he had no data or facts confirming this information. According to Shevardnadze, by circulating such reports the Abkhaz leadership is deliberately aggravating the situation.

Abkhaz Leader Confirms Readiness To Resume Dialogue

LD0911152993 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1420 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] Abkhazian leadership has reconfirmed its readiness to resume "a civilized dialog" with Georgia under the mediation of Russia and the UN, says statement of the Abkhazian parliament made public on Tuesday. Abkhazian authorities also believe that "the way towards full-scale political settlement lies through fulfillment of the main provisions in the Sochi agreement."

The statement expresses readiness of the Abkhazian party to start the demilitarization of Abkhazia on conditions of ensuring Abkhazians' security and guarantees for the continuation of the functioning of the executive and legislative bodies (which were created after the 1991 elections and provide for obligatory representation of Abkhazia's national communities in these bodies).

Abkhazia's Supreme Soviet reassured that the republic does not interfere and will not interfere in the civil war in western Georgia and will not permit using its territory for transit shipments of arms and fighters. Armed formations which arrive in Abkhazia during the conflict will be kicked out of Abkhazia.

Abkhazian parliament addressed the Russian government and world community with a request to render humanitarian aid to the republic because "we alone will not be able to restore the ruined economy and render an efficient assistance to the returning refugees."

Meanwhile, the press center of the Abkhazian parliament declared that Abkhazia would not sustain a new penetration of Georgian forces into the republic. According to the statement of the press center, actions of the Abkhazian forces "will be adequate to the actions of the Georgian forces" in the case of intrusion.

The document reports that the situation along the Inguri River which divides Georgia and Abkhazia has aggravated over the previous 24 hours. The Georgian forces subjected positions of the Abkhazian armed forces to shelling. Simultaneously, Georgian detachments in Abkhazia's Gulripsh and Gali regions undertake more active actions.

The Abkhazian army's press center indicates that these events which have been confirmed by Shevardnadze's words "on the necessity to bring order in Abkhazia" and "false" assertions stating that Georgia's ex-president stays on Abkhazian territory "testify to the fact that Georgia's leadership still clings to the position of coercive solution to mutual relations between Georgia and Abkhazia." The statement underlines that as in 1992, Georgia once again tries to use the struggle with zvia'ists and the necessity to guard rail ways to justify its aggression against Abkhazia."

Tbilisi Backs Signing Political Treaty With Russia

LD0911195793 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1452 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Report by diplomatic correspondents Dmitriy Voskoboynikov, Igor Porshnev, Vitaly Trubetskoy, and others; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[Text] Georgia stands for signing as soon as possible a basic political treaty with Russia that would lay the legal foundations for relations between the two countries. Such a document can be signed either before December 12, for which elections to Russia's Federal Assembly are scheduled, or right after the elections, Georgia's Ambassador to Russia Valerian Advadze told a news conference in Moscow on Tuesday.

According to him, Georgia's joining the CIS is a positive factor. "Georgia joined the Commonwealth through errors, doubts, pain and blood," he said. "Beyond the CIS Georgia would not be a state more independent politically than Ukraine or Kazakhstan are."

Speaking about the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, Advadze said that, in his view, Russia's support for the Abkhazians "is beyond doubt." "The war for Abkhazia was waged by the Russia which planned to return totalitarianism and revive the imperial spirit. It was Russia's former Supreme Soviet, certain military circles and all those who wanted no democracy," the ambassador said. "As for official Russia, it sought to play the role of peace-maker, even though it did not quite succeed in this."

In answer to a question from Interfax, the diplomat said that the UN, CSCE and other international organizations "work slowly and are late in many respects." In his view, they were particularly late in resolving the issue of giving the status of peace-keepers to the Russian troops stationed in Georgia. According to the ambassador, this was connected with Russia's "covert" participation in the conflict on the side of Abkhazia.

Nevertheless, the ambassador said he hoped that "definite progress" would be gained at the Georgian-Abkhazian talks that begin through the mediation of Russia and the UN in Geneva on November 29.

Advadze also said that "Georgia would be glad to join the ruble zone if it is admitted." "This presents certain difficulties, since Russia watches economic processes in the countries intending to join the ruble zone, and conducts a kind of selection," he said.

Government Decides Not To Pursue Gamsakhurdia

PM0911172593 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 10 Nov 93 p 1

[Gennadiy Sobolev report: "Situation in Georgia Stabilizes"]

[Text] Eduard Shevardnadze's trip to Zugdidi, a city where Zviad Gamsakhurdia's headquarters were located until recently, has confirmed that the former opposition stronghold is completely controlled by republic government troops. Incidentally, units of the Mkhedrioni Corps did not enter the city so as not to worry the inhabitants, who feared looting and pogroms. Organs of local self-government have started to form in Zugdidi in order to normalize the work of all spheres of the city's economy. The main problems in the liberated areas include a shortage of electricity and the preservation of law and order; it is no accident that a curfew has already been imposed in these areas.

Georgian Government troops are refraining from pursuing the armed formations of ex-President Zviad Gamsakhurdia's supporters. This was reported by Shevardnadze's press secretariat, which stressed that republic Defense Ministry subunits are not even moving toward the Iguri River on the border with Abkhazia, where Zviad's supporters regrouped following their withdrawal from Zugdidi. According to some Georgian reports, Zviad Gamsakhurdia has taken refuge in the rayon center of Gali on Abkhaz territory, together with a group of deputies of the former Georgian Supreme Council and the armed formations supporting him.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Boiris Pastukhov believes that the main result of the Moscow meetings with Eduard Brunner, the UN general secretary's special representative, is that the United Nations and Russia are united in their opinion regarding the need for effective and immediate action to settle the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict.

During conversations held in the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry there was discussion of the idea of holding a special meeting between the conflicting sides under the UN aegis and with Russian mediation, which could probably take place in Geneva as early as at the end of this month.

But the echoes of war are still reverberating around the republic. Bauchki Kalatozishvili, a 15-year-old student at a Kutaisi school, was blown up by a mine and died of his wounds when he and four other civilians tried to break into a rocket and artillery shell dump on the premises of a military unit of the Group of Russian Forces in Kutaisi.

Abkhaz Leader Denies Gamsakhurdia in Abkhazia

LD0911130093 Tbilisi IBERIA in Georgian 1115 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] Tbilisi, 9 Nov—IBERIA has learned that Vladislav Ardzinba, speaking on Gudauta radio, has categorically denied media reports that the former Georgian president is staying on the territory of Gali rayon in Abkhazia. He said Zviad Gamsakhurdia has not left the territory of Georgia, by which he means that the former president remains in Zugdidi or Tsalenjikha rayon, while Vakhtang Kobalia's units are hiding in the Mingrelian woods.

Vladislav Ardzinba also stated that measures have been taken to prevent a new Georgian aggression. (It seems that he had in mind the destruction of a bridge across the river Inguri)

Mountain Peoples Send Letters to Shevardnadze, Yeltsin

AU0911181393 Tbilisi SAKARTVELOS RESPUBLIKA in Georgian 3 Nov 93 p 2

[Letters to head of state E. Shevardnadze and Russian President B. Yeltsin from the Confederation of Mountain Peoples; adopted in Sukhumi on 26 October—words between slantlines published in enlarged print]

[Text] **The two letters published below were adopted in Sukhumi on 26 October at a session of the parliament and presidential council of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples [CMP], which is an illegal body and has not been recognized by the international community.**

/Address/ to Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin

The long-awaited time has come and the war in Abkhazia has ended, a war that was unleashed by the Georgian leadership with the aim of genocide against the people of this republic and the deprivation of its statehood. The predatory war that lasted more than one year has left us with a painful legacy and has transformed a flourishing Abkhazia into ruins.

With the firm moral and political and material support of the people of the Russian Federation, the Abkhazian people have endured this historic ordeal, successfully repulsed armed aggression, expelled the occupiers from their territory, and put an end to the war and set about restoring peace on the devastated Abkhazian land.

In spite of all the complications that have arisen on the path to eradicating the catastrophic consequences of the destructive war, the Abhkazian people and their leaders are firm in their resolve to stabilize the political situation and restore the national economy in the shortest possible time.

However, the economic blockade of the republic that has continued for over a month now is creating serious obstacles along this path. The people, who have endured barbaric aggression and are in great need of moral and political support, do not even have the chance to receive humanitarian aid. Through the agency of the Russian state, an attempt is now being made to do what the Georgian leadership failed to do by military means with regard to the people of Abkhazia and Abkhazian statehood.

The CMP Parliament and Presidential Council express their concern that the leadership of the Russian Federation is again continuing to build its relations with Georgia to the detriment of the interests of the CMP.

It is the hope of parliament that you, respected Boris Nikolayevich, will make use of all your powers to lift the economic blockade of Abkhazia and grant its people humanitarian aid.

Adopted at a joint session of the CMP Parliament and Presidential Council.

Sukhumi, 26 October 1993.

To Batoni Eduard Shevardnadze, chairman of the Republic of Georgia's Parliament

The CMP Parliament and Presidential Council express serious concern regarding the implementation of a policy of revanchism toward Abkhazia by you and your circle. We hope that you will give a sober evaluation of the consequences of the war of conquest unleashed by the Georgian leadership in Abkhazia and draw the appropriate lessons from this, and reassess the policy of violence directed toward that people whose desire it has been to decide its own fate on the basis of the universally accepted norms of international law.

The CMP calls on you once more to consider the bases of the policy that Georgia has been implementing in recent years. The aggressive, militaristic, and Nazi policy that has recently become so popular in Georgia's leading circles brings death and destruction not only to the people of Abkhazia but also to the peoples of South Ossetia and the entire north Caucasus and, first and foremost, to the Georgian people themselves, who have endured the entire burden and misery of the war.

However, if the Georgian leadership again attempts to unleash a predatory war in Abkhazia, its consequences will be even more catastrophic for the fate of the peoples of Georgia and Georgian statehood.

The CMP reminds you once again that the peoples of the north Caucasus are firm in their resolve to defend the honor and freedom of the Abkhazian peoples from any encroachments, no matter from whose side they may arise.

Adopted at the joint session of the CMP Parliament and Presidential Council.
Sukhumi, 26 October 1993.

Tbilisi Reiterates Wish To Join No. Atlantic Assembly

AU0911173093 Tbilisi SAKARTVELOS RESPUBLIKA in Georgian 2 Nov 93 p 1

[Letter to North Atlantic Assembly President Loic Bouvard From Tamaz Gamqrelidze, chairman of the Georgian Parliament Foreign Affairs Commission; written in Tbilisi on 1 November—words between slantlines published in enlarged print]

[Text] **/To His Excellency Batoni Loic Bouvard, president of the North Atlantic Assembly, Brussels, Belgium/**

Tbilisi, 1 November 1993.

Most Respected Batono President!

First of all, allow me to thank you for the warm reception and hospitality that were extended to our delegation during the session of the North Atlantic Assembly in Copenhagen.

The meetings that our delegation had at this session were extremely interesting and informative.

On behalf of Head of State Eduard Shevardnadze, I take this opportunity to invite you, together with the general secretary and his deputy, to Georgia at a time suitable to you so that you may familiarize yourselves with the activities of our republic on the spot.

At the same time, we would like to confirm the desire of the Republic of Georgia to become a member of the North Atlantic Assembly and to be granted official status in it so that we would be given the opportunity to participate in your activities.

We believe that such participation in the North Atlantic Assembly will contribute significantly to the development of parliamentary democracy in our country.

[Signed] Yours most respectfully,
Academician Tamaz Gamqrelidze,
chairman of the Republic of Georgia Foreign Affairs Commission.

Estonia

Council of Europe Sets Equal Standards for Russia

WS0911154193 Tallinn BNS in English 1731 GMT 5 Nov 93

[Text] Tallinn, Nov 05, BNS—The Council of Europe [CE] intends to make Russia fulfill all its standard conditions for membership before it extends the new seat, said Tunne Kelam, the head of the Estonian CE delegation.

Kelam returned from Strasbourg today after a session of the Political Committee of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly.

The committee session was attended by the CE secretary-general, Catherine Lalumiere, who outlined the position of the CE Ministers' Committee. Kelam said the committee is favorably disposed toward Russia, but "the ministers' message was clear: Russia must fulfill all the set conditions."

The stand conflicts with the speech the Russian deputy foreign minister, Vitali Churkin, delivered to the Ministers' Committee. Churkin claimed, Kelam said, that "since Russia is a major power and the trouble is great, you have to speedily admit us, maybe even before Christmas."

The Political Committee's standpoint is, in Kelam's opinion, best expressed by the maxim "festina lente," make haste slowly, used by the French delegate, Kaspereit. The committee concluded that Russia's early admission would create great geopolitical and strategic problems.

"It is obvious that Russia's admission to the Council of Europe may drag out over several years if the great powers do not make a sudden turn," said Kelam. He told the committee that, in Estonia's opinion, Russia must fulfill very concrete conditions, the first of which is democratic parliamentary elections. He also emphasized protection of the rights of the ethnic minorities in Russia, especially the right to self-determination. The committee considered it essential to check the use of the CE's increasing aid to Russia.

Russia must fulfill two conditions that are "self-evident yet vital for its neighbors" before it can be admitted to the CE, Kelam said. First, Russian troops must, by the moment of its admission, have been pulled from the states in which they were not invited. Second, Russia must unconditionally honor the independence of the Baltic states and give up attempts to meddle in their domestic affairs.

Government Allots 6 Voting Stations for Russians

WS0911155293 Tallinn BNS in English 1656 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] Tallinn, Nov 08, BNS—Russian citizens residing in Estonia can cast their votes for Russia's new parliament in one of six polling stations. Four stations will be opened in Tallinn and two in Narva.

The polls for the Russian Federation Council and the State Duma open Dec. 11-12.

The press secretary of the Russian Embassy, Andrei Yakushev, said one station will be located in the embassy's consular department and the other three in the Russian cultural center.

The two Narva polling stations will be located in the Rugodiv house of culture.

The Estonian government permitted the Russian Embassy to open polling stations only in Tallinn and Narva. More than 40,000 Russian citizens live in Estonia.

Yakushev said there are 21,000 Russian citizens in Tallinn and more than 12,000 in Ida-Virumaa, mainly in Narva. Tartu's Russian citizens number a little more than 1,000, and about 1,000 Russian citizens live in Parnu.

Laar Remarks on Role of State Radio Criticized

LD0911143293 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1000 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Excerpts] We will continue on the subject that was raised yesterday during the prime minister's information hour at the Riigikogu: the role of state radio in Estonia. We have Peeter Kaldre in the studio, with Erkki Haldre, Estonian Radio's director general.

[Kaldre] It is an elementary truth that every state official must be responsible for what he says, particularly if the issue has to do with Estonian (?statehood). The free dissemination of information and everybody's access to it form one of these issues.

What Prime Minister Mart Laar said yesterday at the Riigikogu demonstrated, however, that he cannot cope with this subject. As is known, Rein Veidemann wanted to know how the government had been operating during the crisis in Moscow at the beginning of October and why Laar had not informed state radio of his midnight address. Last night's "Paevakaja" program, already dealt with this subject, and there is no point in going into details again.

Several problems, however, are still up in the air. First, Laar claims that information about his forthcoming address had been given to all forms of the mass media, but only Kuku radio relayed his address live. Estonian Radio's news section knows for certain, however, that no prior information had been given about Laar's address.

Second, Laar claims that, for this reason, state radio was not doing its job properly. Radio journalists should have found out if Laar had any intention to speak on the radio and when.

Third, does Laar not know that Estonian Radio is a state-run structure, or, in other words, state property? Estonian Radio has an Estonia-wide air network. The state radio exists for the purpose of allowing the state leadership to use its own channel so as to inform the whole nation in a crisis situation. So, it is the prime minister's obligation to speak on state radio, and not for state radio to be chasing the prime minister along the corridors (?of power). State radio is not in compet tion with commercial radio stations.

Incidentally, Foreign Minister Velliste did turn up in person at Estonian Radio on the evening of 3 October and addressed the nation.

Fourth, Laar's claim that state radio and television are a (?unified) structure does not bear any criticism. Laar has been in power for over a year. This is a sufficient time for anybody to find out that Estonian Radio and Estonian Television have been independent structures standing on their own feet for quite some time.

Fifth, Laar is right when he says that the state must determine Estonia's order to both the radio and television. However, when he says that some commercial structure might perhaps be able to handle this state order much better, Laar is not ruling out the possibility that Estonia does not need a state television and radio at all. Incidentally, Laar, who speaks regularly on this self-same Estonian Radio, has repeatedly said that state radio must stay.

In conclusion, perhaps Mr. Laar thinks that the Defense Ministry should also be privatized, for example, because some commercial structure would be able to deal with state-defense matters better and more economically.

I would now like Erkki Haldre, Estonian Radio's director general, to comment on the issues raised.

[Haldre] It seems to me that the present crisis—this is what I would like to call it—has to do with the draft 1994 state budget and its allocations by the Riigikogu, first and foremost. On the other hand, it has to do with the fact that the law on broadcasting is being drafted, and our Riigikogu members are waiting for it to arrive like a (?Messiah), to explain what the role of broadcasting should in fact be. [passage omitted]

However, the main difference about commercial radios is that they would never ever be interested in such a costly (?outlay) as coverage across the whole country. This is a task of strategic importance. Commercial stations are interested only in densely populated areas—like Tallinn, Tartu, Parnu—and do not care what will happen to Assamalla, [word indistinct] or some other such nice places where small numbers of people live for whom [word indistinct] chocolate and [word indistinct] lemonade are beyond their means, which means that they are not yet [word indistinct], and consequently, nobody, not even Mart Laar will ever spend any money on them by placing transmitters in their reception areas or even by leasing these transmitters from [Estonian] Telecom. [passage omitted]

Should the state want to inform the people across the whole of the country of something very important, it would be objectively not sensible to use some kind of a channel whose audience is below 10 percent. Holland is a very good example. The state radio's job there—and incidentally, Dutch state radio also runs a commercial operation—the Dutch state radio's job is to ensure that its audience accounts for at least 50 percent of the whole population so that it will be able to fulfill its state-imposed function, to be ready for use and broadcasting.

At the moment, the most important thing is that state officials and the government, and the legislator first and foremost, the officials at the Riigikogu, should grasp what the role of state-run broadcasting should be.

Cabinet Weighs Internal Disagreements

WS0911154293 Tallinn BNS in English 1731 GMT 5 Nov 93

[Text] Tallinn, Nov 05, BNS—The Estonian government met Thursday [4 November] night to discuss the recent disagreements in the Cabinet.

The talk came at Economics Minister Toomas Sildmae's initiative. Sildmae told BNS that he "got a clear idea of the position of each government member." He refused to comment on those positions, however.

The minister affirmed the discussion focused on a list of conflicts reflected lately in the Estonian media. Those issues include banking controversies, the so-called Liviko scandal and the alleged privatization of industry without competition.

The economics minister did not deny reports that he threatened to resign. He noted, however, that "organizational changes" in the Cabinet are within Prime Minister Mart Laar's competence.

The closed-door government meeting took place after the regular Thursday session.

Justice Minister Kaido Kama, known to be Sildmae's opponent on several questions, refused to comment.

Rise in Cost of Living Reported for Oct

WS0911154693 Tallinn BNS in English 1444 GMT 5 Nov 93

[Text] Tallinn, Nov 05, BNS—Estonia's consumer price index [CPI] increased by 2.6 percent in October, compared to September, reports the Estonian Statistics Department.

The increase in the CPI was 3.0 percent in September and a record low 0.7 percent in August.

Prices of goods last month went up by an average of 2.8 percent. Food prices rose by 3.0 percent and prices of manufactured goods increased by 2.5 percent. Services went up by 1.8 percent.

The price hike was the greatest in meat and fish, 4.7 percent; flour and cereals, 3.1 percent; and fruit and vegetables, 2.9 percent.

Expenditures on health grew in October by as much as 8.4 percent. Clothing and footwear spending went up by 2.35 percent, outlays on free time and recreation grew by 2.1 percent, and on personal consumption, by 2.0 percent.

Viktoria Trasanov, the head of the price statistics service, blamed the increase in health expenditures on rising medicine prices. The price rise, however, is not a constant process since the medicine consignments bought from different exporters come at varying prices, she said. For that reason, the CPI for health declined by 2.9 percent in July and by 1.1 percent in August, but rose by 4.3 percent in September.

Goods and services were an average of 1.42 times more expensive last month compared with October 1992.

Majority of Small Businesses Privatized

WS0911153893 Tallinn ETA NEWS RELEASE in English 1941 GMT 5 Nov 93

[Text] Tallinn, November 5—Estonian privatization agencies have sold 236 smali enterprises at competitive biddings during this year, with a sales price of 168,934,816 kroons, director of privatization department of the Estonian Privatization Agency Margus Kastehein told ETA.

According to Kastehein about 80 per cent of small state enterprises have been privatized by now.

30 big state enterprises have been privatized during the first ten months of the year, with a sales price of 117,810,921 kroons. 19 of them have been sold as a whole or as shares, and 10 have been sold in parts.

The sale of the 30 enterprises has guaranteed investments of 52,630,000 kroons and 4,900 jobs, Kastehein said.

Liberal Democrats Form Parliamentary Faction

WS0911154793 Tallinn BNS in English 1836 GMT 8 Nov 93

[Text] Tallinn, Nov 08, BNS—The leadership of the Estonian parliament today registered a new six-member faction formed by Liberal Democrats who split from the Pro Patria faction.

The chairman of the faction, Tiit Kabin, said the Liberals remain in the governing coalition and plan to sometimes hold joint sessions with the Pro Patria parliamentary faction.

The Liberals' only ministerial portfolio is held by Culture and Education Minister Paul-Eerik Rummo. The party doesn't plan to increase its stake in the Cabinet for the time being. Kabin refused to comment on its future ambitions, however.

The leader of the new faction claimed "the Liberals got lost among the crowd" while members of the Pro Patria faction. Kabin said the faction primarily intends to "bring into prominence the voice of jurists." Three of the six members of the Liberal faction are lawyers.

Kabin claimed the quality of legislation passed by the parliament leaves something to be desired. "Our objective is to make laws understandable and to avoid their rejection by the president and questioning by the justice chancellor," he said.

New Language Draft Law Being Prepared

WS0911153993 Tallinn ETA NEWS RELEASE in English 1941 GMT 5 Nov 93

[Text] Tallinn, November 5—A committee under the Estonian Ministry of Justice is to present the government a draft law on language, with additions and changes to the law on language adopted in 1989 by the then parliament—the Supreme Soviet, on November 15.

A member of the committee, Ulle Luberg from the Ministry of Justice told ETA that the former law was "out-of-date". "The law, adopted during the Soviet era, defended Estonian language against the influence of the Soviet Union and the Russian language. Times have changed, Estonia has regained independence and adopted the Constitution, laws on cultural autonomy and education, and the law on language is to be brought into agreement with them," she said. She added that the new law was based upon the law on language of 1934.

Latvia

Commander Discusses Status of Armed Forces

WS1011124993 Riga LETA in English 1500 GMT 9 Nov 93

[From the "Latvian Press Review"]

[Text] Riga, November 5 (LETA)—At present 17 colonels, 45 lieutenant-colonels, 73 majors, 64 captains, 138 ober-lieutenants and 192 lieutenants are serving in the Latvian Armed Forces, the daily "DIENA" wrote in the report about a news conference given by the commander of the Armed Forces, Colonel Dainis Turlais. He met with reporters to inform them on work done in respect of the Armed Forces within the two years since they had been formed. According to Colonel Turlais, 145 women are also serving in the Latvian Army which amounts to the total of more than 7,000 troops. It is 87 percent of the required contingent. "DIENA" remarked that the most complicated problem in Latvian Army is the poor health of the troops. About 7,000 cases of illness have been

registered in the army this year, and more than six percent of the conscripts were demobilized due to health causes while ten troops had died.

Explains Role of Armed Forces

WS1011125293 Riga LETA in English 1500 GMT 9 Nov 93

[Text] Riga, November 9 (LETA)—This year the main aim of the Latvian defense forces has been manning of new defense forces' subunits including naval forces in the central and southern regions, a detached antichemical defense division and a field engineer battalion. This was said by commander of the defense forces, Dainis Turlais, at the press conference held on Monday [8 November].

While answering journalists' questions concerning participation of the defense forces in struggle against crimes Dainis Turlais said that there should be strategical subunits ready to act at the period of a military political crisis in the republic. The complex of measures necessary for this as well as the system of the national Armed Forces' readiness for actions had been worked out. "However, if anybody thinks that the army should fight against crimes inside the state he should rename the army into internal troops", said Dainis Turlais at the press conference. He also stressed that having no guarantees in foreign security of the state numerical strength as well as budget allocations to the army mustn't be reduced.

Saeima Rejects Appointment Restriction Bill

WS0911154393 Tallinn BNS in English 1444 GMT 5 Nov 93

[Text] Riga, Nov 05, BNS—The Latvian Saeima [parliament] rejected Thursday [4 November] two bills on appointment restrictions for the persons who collaborated with the former communist regime.

The drafts were handed in by the Latvian National Independence faction and the Homeland and Freedom Party.

The declined bills required post restrictions on persons who actively worked for the occupation regime, thus harming the Latvian state, citizens and culture.

The decision to reject both drafts was taken after a long debate. Latvia's Way's Andrejs Pantelejevs described the debate as fruitful because it succeeded in proving the inconsistency of the two bills.

Indulis Berzins, another spokesman for the Latvia's Way, said that lawmakers should differentiate among various degrees of responsibility for the crimes of the totalitarian regime.

Equal Rights Larisa Lavina criticized the drafts as "juridically ungrounded and politically subjective." The adoption of the bills would have disappointed many now-loyal citizens, she said.

The authors of the bill claimed their draft corresponded to "the principle of justice and the seriousness of the crimes."

Lithuania

President on 'Constructive' Talks With Yeltsin

PM0911123393 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Nov 93 p 3

[Report by Vasiliy Fatigarov under the "Events and Commentary" rubric: "Lithuania Seeks Its Place in Collective Security System But Is Not Turning Away From Cooperation With Russia"]

[Text] It is well known that a meeting between Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas took place in Moscow at the end of last week. In the Lithuanian head of state's opinion, expressed at a briefing for journalists at the Lithuanian Embassy in Moscow, the conversation with Boris Yeltsin was constructive, amicable, and very specific. And, although not a single agreement was signed, the reasons for this were merely technical and organizational.

Brazauskas proposed that the Russian side send a government delegation headed by Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin to Vilnius 15 November. During the visit it is proposed to sign, besides other documents, a treaty on truck shipments across Lithuania which is important for both states. In it the sides establish that truck shipments will be free of charge and that only the loads most attractive to thieves—alcohol, tobacco, and nonferrous metals—will be guarded.

In addition, Brazauskas believes, closer integration in Kaliningrad Oblast's Baltic region [Baltiyskiy region] is of interest.

Concerning the question of collective security, Brazauskas observed that Lithuania is seeking its own place in it. In this context the possibility of its joining NATO has not been discounted. But this does not mean that Lithuania is turning away from Russia. Our states have no territorial problems, while goods turnover with Russia accounts for 40 percent of Lithuania's foreign trade turnover.

Seimas Deputy Chairman on LDDP Program

WS0911120093 Vilnius TIE[illegible] in Lithuanian 22 Oct 93 No 206 p 7

[Article by Juozas Bernatonis, Seimas deputy chairman and LDDP member: "How Does the LDDP Implement Its Electoral Program?"]

[Text] This question has emerged and been discussed repeatedly. It was analyzed thoroughly at the third Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party [LDDP] congress which approved the guidelines for LDDP activities in the near future. The recent LDDP Council meeting

discussed the implementation of its economic and social policies. The LDDP Council will again address this issue at the suggestion of activists from the Klaipeda region and the LDDP program group in the Seimas [parliament]. Although this problem is very broad and manifold, it is always useful to discuss it in a constructive manner, the more so that this issue has recently acquired a certain political tone in the party itself.

As soon as we gathered for the first Seimas session following elections, we heard the voices of the "constructive" Homeland coalition—LDDP IS NOT FULFILLING ITS ELECTORAL PROGRAM. First of all, we heard primitive cries—you did not give boiled sausage and bread for a nickel. Back then, it was only a propaganda fad chosen by those politicians who announced that the nation had made a mistake, who did not understand the reasons for their failure, and who sought quick revenge at any cost.

Later, this choir was joined by other political forces supporting the campaign of early Seimas elections. Not losing hope of becoming the most influential left-wing force in Lithuania, the social democrats have also begun to criticize most of our moves. They do not recognize the social democratic nature of the LDDP. On the other hand, they accuse us of betraying the principles of social democracy in our electoral program. Certainly, if we assessed scholastically each LDDP move in power according to the norms of the social democratic ideology, such criticism would seem partly justified. It is obvious, however, that while leading society from a post-communist system to a socially-oriented market, we cannot restrict ourselves by dogmas that would have a completely different meaning in democratic and economically developed states. To distribute, first of all, we must create and accumulate something in the state budget through socially acceptable taxes. If we did not think about the future, we could waste all state reserves on social support. However, **we promised our constituents to continue consistent, moderate, and irreversible reform.** That is why we can allot less for social needs in order to have more for tomorrow. We must pay a high price for the ruined economy and other ill-considered reforms launched by the revolution. We must sacrifice much money for the correction of these mistakes and debt payment.

Not long ago, we could ask our critics, both on the left and the right, why after the elections they had rejected our proposal for cooperation, cast off responsibility for the fate of the nation and the state, refused joint efforts in overcoming the crisis, and chosen a role of outsiders who are always right. We could remind our critics that many political parties were content with populist slogans during the elections, and that only three of them (including the LDDP) presented their electoral programs. It is all very well for the so-called conservatives to voice radical slogans of social justice and promise all citizens, in socialist fashion, to divide the moose in the forest equally among them. It is easy to criticize when others ignore the electoral program, when they do not have such a program themselves, and I wonder whether they will ever have it.

The "LDDP program group" that has emerged inside the LDDP faction also criticizes the implementation of our program. Our colleagues' **good intentions of seeking more radical decisions and actions**, looking forward to immediate results, have caused a great uproar in the press. All of our opponents' hopes that we might split, lose the people's trust, and pass on the scepter of power ahead of time have flared up again. Let us just remember the things these propagandists have created. Some of them predicted the revival of the disbanded Communist Party under another name, others spoke about radical changes in the LDDP leadership and strategy, while the third group began to talk nonsense about the influence of the old structures. This avalanche of propaganda drowned all explanations that different trends and groups could exist in the LDDP and its Seimas faction, and that constructive criticism was the most vital condition for effective action. We hope that the new group will manage to present useful proposals and projects rather than just criticize us.

While the rightists are promising a new paradise at pickets; while dogmatists are accusing us of renouncing nonexistent dogmas; and while colleagues inside the party, probably unconsciously, are mounting a propaganda horse overridden by the right wing, many people forget the principles of the LDDP program eclipsed by populist slogans. Therefore, I think that it is worth recalling the electoral program, **calm down, and soberly ponder the implementation of our promises given to constituents.**

First of all, I would like to remind to everyone of two parameters defining the LDDP electoral program in time and space. Let us not forget that this program must be implemented in four years of the Seimas term. Thus, the claims that the LDDP program has not been fulfilled are premature. We could speak only about the result of one year, that is, about the beginning of its implementation. Certainly, we should not forget the folk wisdom that a good beginning makes a good ending. Moreover, the LDDP electoral program is not a set of definite measures of action and it cannot be such. It only defines our party's key principles, guidelines, and goals after elections. Thus, when analyzing its implementation, one should not make a fetish of its every norm or word. In real life, the LDDP **electoral program must be and will definitely be made more specific, and it will even be corrected.**

We could not express many definite things before the elections, because there were no reliable statistics, and the true effects of "radical reform" were held back. The program defined only our goals, the implementation of which depends on the economic legacy, the actual possibilities of the state, the international political and economic context, the previous ineffective management, and other objective conditions.

We had to study the effects of the rightists' ritual government and ill-considered reform. This is what we did first of all. It is said today that the analysis and the naming of the key culprits of the crisis were insufficient. However, we can continue this work. The initial analysis was sufficient to begin the drafting of a strategy for a reasonable economic restructuring. This analysis has demonstrated that the economic collapse exceeded our apprehensions during the elections.

Economists and politicians spoke for a long time about our sliding into a hole. They did not know, however, when we would stop. It is obvious today that **we have reached the bottom of this hole.** Objective economic indicators show that we have already managed to curb the crisis. Certainly, this is little consolation to those who have found themselves in the worst situation in comparison with the past. Social improvements, as symptoms of a recovering economy, always lag behind. Furthermore, they are felt individually and not immediately. It is also cold comfort that we would have been in a considerably worse situation if other political forces rather than LDDP pragmatics had been in power. We know that our neighbors paid a much higher price for a market economy. However, this does not soothe us because we experience our difficulties ourselves. Nevertheless, assessing objectively, we cannot ignore things that the LDDP, its Seimas majority, and the government have managed to achieve over their first year in power. It would be difficult to prove that all this has been accomplished by accident and without a definite economic and political strategy.

We cannot disregard the fact that our key electoral principle—economic stabilization—is being implemented slowly but surely.

A recent drop in inflation and prices for staples and consumer goods testifies to this. On the whole, the standard of living, although still low, has stabilized and it has no distinct signs of deterioration. These fragile positive tendencies are not safeguarded from possible drafts in the future economic development. Enterprises often find themselves on the verge of bankruptcy if they are not restructured, do not receive capital investments, or are unable to react quickly to the new situation. Some of them will probably go bankrupt.

We have received a poor privatization legacy. Although the initial privatization has been launched, the share of private capital is still insignificant. Large concerns privatized for convertible currencies can be counted on one's fingers. It is necessary to balance the remaining amount of unprivatized investment coupons with that of assets subject to privatization. At the same time, we should always remember that privatization is not a goal in itself, and that an enterprise will not begin to work more effectively after one ownership form is replaced by another. Therefore, no matter which government is in power, an owner will always take a risk and be ready for a possible defeat, which is inevitable for weaker enterprises given the market and competition.

It would be easier to say that the LDDP is guilty of this because it does not fulfill its promises. Let us agree, however, that many negative economic phenomena were programmed in ill-considered privatization projects and cavalry attacks against agriculture which expected a wiser reform.

The right-wing opposition has never lamented so much over anything, not even over the lost elections, as it did over the amendments to agrarian reform. Scientists and pragmatics, Seimas deputies and farmers themselves discussed the key trends of agrarian reform for nearly half a year. This allowed the government to draft a national program for the development of agriculture that would ensure a normal functioning of this industry, meet the nation's demand for staples, and allowt it to export, as much agricultural produce as is profitable, to the state. Special programs are being drafted for each separate industry.

The amendments to agrarian reform and the law on property restoration introduce more order in the privatization of land and allow us to receive relevant compensation for unnrestored land. Unfortunately, farmers are not content with formal decisions alone. They also need dynamic and definite moves in both activating agricultural services and implementing the planned measures supporting agriculture. It is pitiful that, thus far, we have not managed to arrange payments for the sold produce and have neglected the procurement of winter reserves.

The agricultural produce grown by farmers' sweat and at the enormous cost of outdated and primitive facilities and technologies has become unnecessary to anyone, as it were. Who must answer for these flaws? The community's assessment of customs duties on imported food products is controversial. Such a policy protects domestic producers and processing enterprises from competition with cheap foreign suppliers. On the other hand, however, it harms the consumer.

A human being will feel content not only when doing the work he or she likes, receiving normal wages, and living comfortably. Public security and order are no less important. The law on operative activities amended in July considerably expanded the possibilities for law enforcement institutions in crime prevention. The isolation of a large number of detained people from the community was fully justifiable. The crime rate in Lithuanian is lower than that of our neighbors. In 1992, the number of crimes for 10,000 inhabitants was 150.5, 232, and 264 in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, respectively. Unfortunately, these seemingly better statistics were eclipsed by the recent violence that amazes one with its horror, impudence, and a shameless challenge to the state and society.

There is no doubt that the criminal situation depends on all of our laws, primarily on economic ones concerning capital investment, privatization, and influence on the market. As long as there is legal nihilism, a confusion in

laws and resolutions, and no control over their execution, neither a human being nor the state will feel safe in Lithuania. It is disappointing that we try to rally law enforcement forces for joint work, overcome bureaucratic barriers, and formulate preventive strategy only when shocked by shots at representatives of democratic institutions [allusion to journalist Lingys' murder]. Scholastic debates in the Seimas about a word or a comma are of little help here, while the opposition intimidates us with a phantom of a police state for adopting more resolute measures, like the aforementioned preventive detention.

Lithuania's current situation and image in the eyes of international observers are not very favorable for its march toward Europe. Nevertheless, the key foreign policy trends are being implemented consistently. Lithuania has been accepted to the European Council, the Russian Army has eventually left our country, and a Baltic Council of Ministers is being created. We are gradually strengthening ties with our neighbors and regions near and far. Different contacts have proven repeatedly that the world is open to Lithuania, its good intentions and initiatives. However, such goals can be achieved in a civilized manner, through respect to one's partner and mutual understanding.

We have moved ahead considerably in laying the foundation for a democratic state over this year. We have created laws that provide for the election of a Lithuanian president according to the Constitution rather than to the whim of the third Sajudis. We probably did not think a year ago that the Constitutional Court would begin to function so soon, because this idea expressed by democratic forces did not receive immediate support from the previous government. Legislative traditions are also changing. The former principle of the domineering majority is being replaced by that of proportion in the new Seimas statute. The most important thing is that every deputy receives a chance to express his or her opinion. People are no longer divided into good and bad persons, patriots and enemies. Government institutions no longer encourage political and social tension. **Those who create do not need what destroyers were seeking.**

Thus, before assessing the implementation of the LDDP program, let us look around and notice the changes, and let us think whether they could occur earlier. We will have no doubt then that the LDDP will be able to implement most of its electoral principles in four years. If the people opt for early Seimas elections, let us not accuse the LDDP for things it had no time to do. Let us ask whether the LDDP has done everything it could, or whether it could do more. Certainly, **it could do more**, particularly if representatives of other prominent parties had not remained observers from safe opposition box seats.

Recent Christopher Visit to CIS Viewed

WS1011091793 Vilnius RESPUBLIKA in Lithuanian 28 Oct 93 No 209 p 4

[Editorial: "Becoming a Region Again?"]

[Text] Yesterday, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher concluded a week-long visit to Hungary and the states of the former Soviet Union. Before the visit, Mr. Christopher stressed that the visit "symbolizes that Russia is a strategic partner rather than an enemy." The U.S. secretary of state mentioned that he would tour the Baltic countries. However, his visit ended in Riga.

On Wednesday [27 October], Mr. Christopher met with representatives of the Russian community behind closed doors. Few people know what they discussed. This meeting was extremely annoying to Latvian leaders because it was widely reported. It was like a demonstration of support for B. Yeltsin. W. Christopher did not see any violations in Latvia. Thus, the Russian community was far from satisfied. It is strange, however, that on the eve of the visit, this problem was associated with all three Baltic countries, including Lithuania.

The United States would like to remain a mediator, while the Baltic countries are resolving more difficult international issues. It also intends to allot $50 million to the Baltic American Economic Foundation by the end of this year. The three foreign ministers of the Baltic states spoke primarily about the withdrawal of the foreign Army. Expressing his delight with the exchange of opinions, Lithuania's foreign minister also recalled that there was a security vacuum in Lithuania. Therefore, it was looking for a "security umbrella." The minister also mentioned Kaliningrad Oblast. Our foreign minister did not arouse journalists' interest, and he received no questions. Few people cared about his delight with the "3 + 1" formula and his personal participation in the event. Moreover, it is difficult even for us to understand our minister who is looking for a "security umbrella," but who supports the president not hurrying to NATO. We are looking for shelter under a foreign mother's skirt like children, instead of choosing with whom to go the same way.

The visit of the U.S. secretary of state has ended. The representative of the great power discussed the problems of our region en masse.

Czech Envoy on Ties, Cooperation

WS1011110693 Vilnius RESPUBLIKA in Lithuanian 28 Oct 93 No 209 p 13

[Interview with Czech Charge d'Affaires Jaroslava Jaslinkova, name as published, by Algimantas Zukas; place and date not given: "Our Countries Are Similar"]

[Excerpt] [Zukas] **This year, you would have celebrated the 75th anniversary of the restoration of the Republic. However, after the split of the federation, you will have only a holiday without an anniversary. Is a split between**

two countries becoming a universal fashion, or is it the outcome of an unavoidable process?

[Jaslinkova] The universal fashion may have had a certain influence. However, the issue of divorce in relations between the Czech Republic and Slovakia is not new. It has its own historical roots. The history of our country shows quite clearly that the unification was not stable. During the "Prague spring" of 1968, Czechs wanted democratization most of all, while Slovaks demanded federalization. In the late 1970's, this was accomplished. The negotiations on the future of our country that began in 1990 were fruitless. Elections were held in 1992. Following them, we had such a political situation in which we were unable to form a federal government. The political forces that won the elections in the Czech Republic and Slovakia envisioned the country's future very differently. The first round of talks took place in June of 1992. Following 10 hours of negotiations, both prime ministers stated that there was only one possible outcome—divorce. The procedure was discussed until the end of that year. Having sat down at the negotiating table as inhabitants of one country on New Year's eve, they rose as residents of two different states. The divorce occurred overnight.

[Zukas] **What meaning did it have for the Czech Republic?**

[Jaslinkova] The latter only fulfilled Slovakia's desire. Certainly, this is not economically beneficial because the market has shrunk. However, the situation has already stabilized. No foreign investors wanted to take a risk in Czechoslovakia over the last two years because they did not know its future. Now the situation in the Czech Republic has become stable. Last year, the economy was growing, while it deteriorated again at the beginning of this year. Specialists claim that the economy will remain at the same level as last year.

We signed agreements on a customs and monetary union with Slovakia. The monetary union lasted only six weeks, and now each country has its own currency. Most economic relations between producers have also broken down. Unfortunately, nationalistic goals have become superior to economic ones.

[Zukas] **At a meeting of the majority of European leaders in Vienna, Czech President Vaclav Havel stated that a citizens' community was far more important than an ethnic state. How does the Czech Republic interpret this?**

[Jaslinkova] The key principle of Czech statehood is a citizens' community. Our country now has about 10 million Czechs, 500,000 Slovaks, and many people of other nationalities. It is important that they mind the country's interests rather than their nationality. Not all of our ministers are Czech. Is that important at all? I think that the significance of the principle of a citizens' community will also increase in the EC.

[Zukas] **The embassy, which was established as a diplomatic mission of Czechoslovakia, now represents the interests of the Czech Republic. With what activities are you pleased?**

[Jaslinkova] The Czech Republic continues to honor agreements signed by Czechoslovakia, including those on visa free travel. However, many new agreements are now being drafted. The agreements on economic relations and technological cooperation have already been prepared. We also have a draft agreement on the protection of investments and the evasion of double taxation. Two weeks ago, we submitted a draft agreement on cultural cooperation to Lithuania. All this provides a basis for the future. This week, Economy Minister J. Veselka will visit Prague. He will be accompanied by Lithuanian Bank representatives who will negotiate with the Trade Bank of Czechoslovakia (I would like to draw your attention to the fact that it has retained its former name because of its international commitments) and draft an agreement on banking activities. During his visit in Lithuania, our foreign minister was accompanied by industrialists and leaders of the department for trade with the Baltic states. Over the first half of this year, mutual trade has grown two and a half times in comparison to last year, while deliveries of equipment for car production have increased seven-fold. By the way, these are Lithuanian statistics.

[Zukas] **Is the Czech Republic not scared that the leftists, who are often reminded of their communist past, assumed power in Lithuania a year ago?**

[Jaslinkova] Our foreign minister stated in Vilnius that the Czech Republic was ready to cooperate with Lithuania. He confirmed that we had common goals on our way to Europe. Moreover, A. Brazauskas has an inclination for social democrats, while this force enjoys 14-percent popularity among our voters. This political group is not alien to Europe as well. By the way, we also support Boris Yeltsin, even though he embarked on the course of democracy later than A. Brazauskas. We have analyzed the program of the Lithuanian Government—it is very similar to that of the Czech Republic. [passage omitted]

Russian Planes Said To Violate Airspace

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[Text] VILNIUS, Nov 08, BNS—Around two Russian airplanes per day fly over Lithuanian airspace without permission, said Col. Zenonas Vegelevicius, the Lithuanian Air Force commander.

Others may also fly through, undetected by Lithuania's out-of-date radar system, he said.

The colonel notes that figure is down from the rate when Russian troops were still stationed in Lithuania.

"Minimum technical measures" against illegal flights are already available to Lithuania, he said, but their use requires a "political decision."

Lithuania does not intend to make any aggressive threats like Russia did when an unidentified airplane was detected above its Kaliningrad region earlier this year, he said. The problem, he said, should be solved either by governments or delegations in interstate talks.

Although the number of violations dropped, the violators continue to act in the same manner. As a rule, Russian pilots do not respond to questions by Lithuanian airspace control and jeopardize the safety of all other aircraft above Lithuanian territory, the colonel said. "All that is in the air must be controlled from one spot and by a single pair of hands."

Russian military planes, which penetrate Lithuanian airspace from Kaliningrad, Belarus and Latvia, are the only ones ignoring Lithuania's sovereignty. "The entire world observes international norms," said the colonel.

According to the temporary airspace regulations, a foreign country must get permission from the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry for its aircraft to fly above Lithuanian territory. On the average, one permission is issued daily to Russian military planes, the ministry's protocol department said. The flights are usually related to army withdrawal from Lithuania and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, or visits by high-ranking Russian officials.

The Foreign Ministry cites 15-20 illegal flights a month in its regular notes to the Russian Embassy, but no official reply has been received.